• a weapons truck (F-15SE variant perhaps),
• new models of the F-35 (perhaps optimized for air combat),
• a variant of the B-21 as a long-range, multi-role combat aircraft;
• arsenal platforms (e.g., upgraded B-52), and
• mother ships for unmanned systems (e.g., C-130s).

We essay a summary of the case below.  It rests first on the improbability of a 6th generation fighter by 2030, or even 2035.  It’s also founded on opportunities that are arguably more promising than a new manned fighter.

Past experience indicates timely fielding of a new aircraft is unlikely.  The time it takes to get new weapons systems in service continues to grow.  Lacking a serious bending of the system development “time curve,” we can expect a new fighter no sooner than the late 2030s – even with a forced march from here to source selection.  If, as the Air Force predicts, we lose a war in 2030 against a first-rate opponent, then a post-2035 solution amounts to an engraved invitation to begin hostilities some time around 2030.

A promising weapons revolution is in progress.  There have been serious efforts to upgrade existing weapons, and develop new-technology munitions.  These include the following:

• upgrades for older weapons, such as improved seekers and warheads for Tomahawk cruise missiles; and new seekers for bombs;. 
• applications of newer technology such as directed energy and hypersonics;
• expendable unmanned vehicles including swarms.

These are in various stages of development, but all have attracted both interest, and a DoD willingness to fund their acquisition by cutting back on other programs.  In short, there’s a case for emphasizing weapons now and letting the 6th-generation manned aircraft wait for a good while, perhaps until 2045.  There’s also a good case for upgrades to existing aircraft being a better exploitation of the weapons revolution than developing a new fighter aircraft.

We should finish the nail soup.  There’s an old folk tale about starting with a nail in boiling water, and adding various ingredients to make an excellent meal.  That analogy applies here.  An F-35 fleet, taken alone, .looks a lot like that nail in boiling water; it’s merely a start.

The F-35 with four weapons stations in stealthy configuration lacks a “deep” magazine.  To contribute significantly to the fight, it needs to collect sensor data, fuse that data, and bring other weapons to bear.  In practice, this means the F-35 would direct stand-off strikes from other platforms – such as non-stealthy heavy bombers.  Also, the Air Force proposes a set of upgrades for the F-15– to include increased weapons carriage.

While we’re confident there’s been significant progress in this area, and it’s continuing, there’s still much to be done.  As one Navy flag officer put it, “I would hope … that when that aircraft in the mid ‘20s comes off the flight deck doing an ISR and tanking role, we can connect it through a waveform still to be determined  … to give that aircraft commands”  (emphasis added).

F-35 is really the Joint Scout Fighter – finding targets for the real strike systems.  And without effective networking, the F-35 doesn’t add much operational capability.

However, saying “effective networking” is easier that doing it.  Judging from the open literature, we aren’t even close to achieving the networking that can provide shared situational awareness and unity of effort so crucial to future air combat.   The Air Force has reported difficulties in sharing operational awareness even within F-35 formations.  Likewise reported was an unsatisfactory degree of connectivity between F-22s and F-35s, and with other Air Force assets. 

While there’s been significant progress in this area, and it’s continuing, there’s still much to be done.  As one Navy flag officer put it, “I would hope … that when that aircraft in the mid ‘20s comes off the flight deck doing an ISR and tanking role, we can connect it through a waveform still to be determined  … to give that aircraft commands”  (emphasis added).

Networking between services is an even thornier issue.  There is the very difficult technical interoperability problem.  Even more difficult is bridging the cultural gaps between US services and with allied nations.  Those problems are undoubtedly solvable, but doing that will take time, effort and resources. 

Bottom Line for the 2030s: Foreseeable Capability Gaps and Possible Solutions Prioritized

Drawing from the current discussion in the open literature, there is a long list of capability shortfalls ahead. Any reasonable set of solutions constitute would a very ambitious set of programs.  For example, the F-35’s Block 4 software could, by itself, be considered a major defense acquisition program on account of the resources entailed.  Also, improving networking is likely to entail an archetypical system-of-systems integration program; and there’s good empirical evidence that such acquisitions are especially difficult to manage.

In all likelihood, the solutions below are not affordable in toto, given the expected state of the US federal finances over the next decade and beyond.  Thus, for example, DoD has stated that “the Air Force has insufficient resources to maintain the … mandated number of fighter aircraft” past 2021.  And the current time of budget sequestration is likely to be replaced by sequestration’ functional equivalent. 

Accordingly, it’s important to decide which increases in operational capability are most important, and most affordable.  We therefore also offer a draft list of priorities as a contribution to this discussion.

First Level: It seems to us that networking clearly comes first.  Without good networked capability, the Joint Scout Fighter becomes the Joint Voyeur Fighter – using its superb sensor suite and situational awareness displays to understand the air battle, but with little capability to do anything about it. 

Likely expensive and lengthy; this could well be the system-of-systems program(s) from hell.  But better networking is well worth it, even if not perfect.

Second Level: Continue F-35 capability improvements.  Develop Block 4 software.  Keep the JSF’s countermeasures suite abreast of new threats.  Make reasonable investments in signature reduction.  Indicated improvements include weapons launchers that can provide timely responses to targets the JSF finds.  There are weapons carriage and communications upgrades ongoing for current aircraft, including the B-52.  These should continue.  Address the F-35 range issue with continued tanker modernization and development of basing that’s robust in a high-threat environment.

Third Level:  Continue air-ground weapons upgrades – especially capabilities to respond to mid-flight retargeting (which is occurring, for example, with the Tomahawk missile).  Develop new-technology weapons – such as hypersonic missiles and directed energy.

Fourth Level:  Update the air-air missile inventory.  This might be done by buying a newer medium-range missile (like Meteor) and also developing a new long-range missile – suitable for launch by a non-stealthy platform operating in a lower-threat location.

Fifth Level:  Extend the B-21 production run as a theater multi-role strike aircraft.  Expensive and not readily available; but less costly and more readily fielded than a new fighter (especially if it’s manned).

Sixth Level: Develop and field a new manned fighter, or two.

While a new aircraft type, or types, would certainly add useful capability, funding will be scare and there are more promising alternatives available.  In addition, a new manned fighter is pretty much an all-or-nothing proposition.  The other possibilities can provide useful capability in more fiscally bite-sized pieces.

In any case, we feel it’s past time to inject fiscal constraints into current policy discussions, and in DoD planning for the next generation of air combat capabilities.

Brig Gen Raymond Franck (USAF Ret) is Professor Emeritus at the Air Force Academy.  He has also served at the Naval Postgraduate School.  He has written and published multiple works on defense acquisition and military innovation.

Professor Bernard Udis (Professor Emeritus, Colorado University at Boulder) has a wide reputation for expertise on international defense affairs and defense acquisition.  His published work includes three books and numerous articles in scholarly journals on defense industries, defense management practices, and military power.

Image: U.S. Air Force