Egypt has become a prison state. Reported HRW in September 2016, “between Morsi’s overthrow and May 2014, Egyptian authorities arrested or charged at least 41,000 people, according to one documented count, and 26,000 more may have been arrested since the beginning of 2015, lawyers and human rights researchers say. The government itself has admitted to making nearly 34,000 arrests.” That was as of two years ago.

In February, author Mona Eltahawy compared el-Sisi to Vladimir Putin and cited more recent estimates by the Arab Network for Human Rights Information estimated: 2,332 death sentences, sixty thousand political prisoners, seventeen new prisons, 7,513 civilians tried by the military, five hundred Egyptians banned from international travel, fifty-four journalists imprisoned, and 465 internet sites blocked (which has since surpassed five hundred).

Cairo was ill-prepared for the flood of prisoners. New prisons could not be constructed fast enough and living conditions remain awful. In Tora Maximum Security Prison, wrote HRW: “Authorities have banned inmates from contacting their families or lawyers for months at a time, held them in degrading conditions without beds, mattresses, or basic hygienic items, humiliated, beaten, and confined them for weeks in crammed ‘discipline’ cells—treatment that probably amounted to torture in some cases—and interfered with their medical care in ways that may have contributed some of their deaths.”

El-Sisi justifies every arrest, abuse and suppression of basic liberties as necessary to fight terrorism, which, however, has expanded as his brutality has increased. Outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood decapitated the more moderate leadership, fractured the organization, and left some members believing that nonviolence no longer was an option. As ever more Egyptian families see loved ones and friends unjustly imprisoned and mistreated, resistance and instability are likely to grow.

Indeed, knowledgeable observers worry about the long-term consequences of repression. Washington Post reporter Sudarsan Raghavan in early April wrote that el-Sisi’s “outsize economic and political ambitions are at the same time breeding resentment within large segments of the general population and, some analysts say, inside Egypt’s highly influential military.” The armed forces once were beyond public suspicion. But now, noted George Mason University’s Abdallah Hendawy, “hundreds of journalists, activists, bloggers, and even some politicians, both in and outside the country, have become increasingly critical of the military overreach.” H. A. Hellyer of the Atlantic Council worried that “by closing the space for expressing dissent openly, the possibility is that something far more chaotic than 2011 becomes more likely.” Similarly, Philip Crowley, who served in the Obama State Department, warned that “the seeds of the revolution are budding in Egypt right now.”

Alas, the United States and other Western governments have gone soft on Egyptian repression because they value stability more than liberty. They assume that only obsequious support can preserve Egypt as an ally. However, Cairo is not going to war upon Israel, whether or not Washington subsidizes el-Sisi’s dictatorship. Interdicting traffic through the Suez Canal would be self-defeating for any Egyptian government. And the regime would retain significant incentive—access to spare parts and training for U.S.-supplied weapons, for instance—to maintain positive contacts with the West.

However, New York University’s Alon Ben-Meir dismissed the possibility of democracy succeeding in Egypt and reported that “Egyptian officials prefer that concerns over human rights violations be addressed behind the scenes in order to not embarrass and weaken el-Sisi’s position in the eyes of the public.” No doubt. From their perspective, the less said the better.

However, pious private complaints, of which there have been many, evidently have had no impact. El-Sisi is the primary architect of what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, has called a “pervasive climate of intimidation.” Egyptian officials reflexively dismiss all concerns as lies, misinformation, or “fake news”—even as the human-rights climate has rapidly deteriorated.

In March Raghavan reported that “over the past year, al-Sisi has intensified an assault on basic freedoms.” Hendawy noted how repression accelerated before the presidential vote, destroying the democratic façade within which “political parties, social movements, and political dissidents were all allowed to play a limited role within certain bounds” even under Mubarak. In March el-Sisi called criticism of the military and police treason. Before the election the government’s chief prosecutor, Nabil Sadek, threatened to punish journalists for any criticism of the regime which allegedly hurt the nation’s “reputation.” As the election approached he targeted foreign journalists, who he said were “forces of evil” for their negative stories.

America’s leverage is limited. Last year the United States held up nearly $300 million in economic and military assistance, but to no effect. Washington could stop the additional $1.3 billion going to the Egyptian military annually, but that would not change Cairo’s policy, since el-Sisi is receiving large-scale transfers from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Still, by doing so Washington would stop underwriting regime repression.

However, the Trump administration prefers to embrace dictatorship. On election day U.S. charge d’affaires Thomas Goldberger sounded like he was employed by el-Sisi: “As Americans we are very impressed by the enthusiasm and patriotism of Egyptian voters.” Vice President Mike Pence visited Cairo and offered embarrassingly obsequious comments, opining that el-Sisi “said to me again that his dedication is to all of the people of Egypt.”

Ben-Meir argued for dropping human rights and focusing on economic development: “Every country that has contributed financial aid to Egypt, including the United States, EU, and Gulf states, should substantially increase their aid” to assist Cairo. He presumed the regime would use the money well, which represents the triumph of hope over experience. El-Sisi has pushed a cavalcade of dubious expensive “investments,” including a second capital, nuclear power plant, and greatly expanded “New Suez Canal.”

Worse, additional aid would strengthen Cairo’s repressive rule. Today no action is too small for the regime to punish: posting a cartoon of el-Sisi with Mickey Mouse ears on Facebook earned one man a three-year prison term. A pop star recently was sentenced to six months in prison for calling the Nile River “dirty,” which was taken as an insult to the state—even though the river is, well, dirty, as I have seen from personal observation.

Foreign policy inevitably involves occasional tough moral compromises. However, the end of the Cold War has reduced pressure on Washington to ignore the cruel brutality of client regimes. In cases like Egypt, America is complicit in grotesque and widespread violations of human rights. That repression makes future violence more likely when political change inevitably occurs, and ensures that the United States will be targeted by those who suffered under what Vice President Pence lauded as a “strategic partnership” of “great importance to the American people.” Washington cannot make Egypt free, but it should stop enthusiastically embracing and subsidizing those who hold an entire country in bondage.

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire.

Image: Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi attends a military ceremony at the Hotel des Invalides in Paris, France, October 24, 2017. REUTERS/Charles Platiau​