ESCALATING COMPETITION with China and Russia has collided with global climate diplomacy. Looking ahead, the United States and China (or Russia, though less weighty in this context due to its smaller economy and lower share of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions) are quite unlikely to cooperate to establish deep, mutually binding emissions limits. Prior U.S.-China government-to-government collaboration in developing and deploying clean energy technologies has eroded if not entirely halted. Across multiple economic sectors, including energy, advanced technologies have become a central arena for America’s competition with China. Russia’s war in Ukraine exacerbated these energy, security, and climate dilemmas, but did not create them.

Climate advocates have hoped that a U.S.-China deal on substantial emissions cuts could facilitate an ambitious international agreement to reduce emissions. This view has long been misplaced. First, the United States has yet to develop and implement domestic policies that would allow U.S. leaders to make such commitments to China or anyone else. Republican opponents have not been solely to blame for this: Democrats controlled the White House and Congress in 2009–2010 and gave priority to other issues, such as immigration reform. In a similar position today, Congressional Democrats have been unable to enact emissions limits and have instead relied almost wholly on federal spending, especially through tax credits.

No less important, however, is that Beijing doesn’t appear prepared to do more either. China’s leaders earned an impressive public diplomacy boost from President Xi Jinping’s surprise announcement that the country would aim for carbon neutrality by 2060. After that, however, China has seemed to have little left to give. Xi and other senior leaders skipped the Glasgow climate summit. Since then, China’s economy has reeled from repeated COVID-19 lockdowns and its planned coal-power construction has soared relative to 2021.

Moreover, intense geopolitical competition hinders diplomacy. In China’s case, what were once distant American anxieties about Beijing’s possible forcible integration of Taiwan in 1997 became much more immediate by 2022. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February is merely the most prominent example of increased tensions with Moscow. In these circumstances, even some who see climate change as an existential danger could reasonably consider its greatest risks to be distant in comparison with the prospect of war with a technologically advanced, nuclear-armed adversary.

Likewise, because China is the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, slashing emissions requires extensive and expensive projects to modernize China’s energy sector. In a period of heightened geopolitical tension, intense economic and technological competition, and potential military conflict, the United States is less willing to support its adversary’s economic growth, energy efficiency, and overall competitiveness. Congress is particularly skeptical of Chinese energy and technology firms seeking markets in the United States; for example, many pending bills target China’s solar panels.

FORTUNATELY FOR those troubled by climate change, it is possible to compete in energy and energy technologies with Beijing (and, in nuclear energy, with Moscow) while simultaneously taking meaningful action to combat rising greenhouse gas emissions. The path forward requires a nuanced understanding of successful collective international action, as well as a strategy that respects the practical limits of shared interests.

So far, climate policy advocates have argued that stopping and reversing climate change should be a shared interest among all nations and, therefore, that all governments should accept steadily stricter limits on greenhouse gas emissions. This view is fundamentally flawed, in that a shared interest in emissions reductions is not identical to a shared interest in internationally negotiated, legally-binding emissions limits or, for that matter, in non-binding political commitments made under diplomatic pressure. The UNFCCC embodies the former, but many top-emitting countries are unwilling to embrace the latter because it may undermine their economic interests.

Effectively aligning national interests to reduce greenhouse gas emissions requires policies that respond to competitive aims rather than ignoring or resisting them. This means developing innovative clean energy systems to build or sell at home and around the world—something the United States should do anyway to maintain economic competitiveness during a global energy transition. If America does this, ideally in partnership with technologically advanced allies like Japan and South Korea, Washington could do considerably more to cut global emissions than it can in any feasible international agreement limiting greenhouse gases. This means not simply transforming America’s energy systems, but also working with U.S. allies to design, build, and sell transformative energy technologies around the world—especially in developing nations, where the United States is competing with its rivals for influence, and where Washington can make the greatest difference in cutting or avoiding future emissions. We need something akin to a clean energy arms race.

TOKYO AND Seoul welcome deeper cooperation with the United States on energy, technology, and climate—something evident in both official statements and unofficial dialogue meetings among experts from the three countries. Japan and South Korea are already leaders in engaging with the U.S. Department of Energy, though many past interactions have focused narrowly on nuclear technologies. Increased engagement could contribute substantially to achieving U.S. economic, technological, and climate goals. If pursued with sensitivity toward Japanese and South Korean interests and constraints, this collaboration can also usefully complement U.S. security relationships with the two countries and reinforce cooperation in other technology areas.

One challenge for the United States—as Japanese and South Korean officials readily admit—is that neither Tokyo nor Seoul is eager to confront Beijing or Moscow. They are far from the only governments with this view, in that most countries are weaker than China militarily and many are loath to risk their trade and investment relationships. In Russia’s case, energy-dependent governments tread cautiously. Like U.S. allies in Asia, many if not most of America’s European allies are also careful in dealing with China and Russia. Realistic American strategies for great power competition should incorporate a clear view of what U.S. allies will and will not do.

From this perspective, cooperation on energy, energy technology, and climate change is an important opportunity to strengthen U.S. alliance relationships precisely because the United States can do a great deal with its partners that does not pose direct security threats to America’s rivals. In broad terms, this includes policies to expand research and development partnerships among government, academic, and private sector laboratories, to ease and grow trade and investment, and to harmonize regulations and standards.

Trade or other policies that directly challenge China are the most difficult avenues for cooperation. In recent unofficial dialogue meetings, Japanese and South Korean participants pointed out that China is their nation’s largest trade partner—a major consideration for their governments. This is not only about money, but also about supply chains; in the energy and energy technology sector, they said, Japan depends heavily on Chinese firms for electric vehicle (EV) components, while China is a major solar industry supplier for South Korea. Both governments are reexamining supply chains, but changes will be complex, expensive, and time-consuming. 

South Korea is the more vulnerable of the two as its economy is only one-third the size of Japan’s, which is in turn about one-third of China’s. Thus it is not surprising that South Korean experts saw Japan’s government as more willing than their own to support assertive U.S. trade policies toward China. Japanese experts agreed, stating that Tokyo is already discussing “selective decoupling” from China with Washington.

COOPERATION ON energy and energy technologies can play a central role not only in buttressing alliances and supporting a global transition to clean energy, but also in contributing to U.S. innovation, growth, trade, jobs, and competitiveness.

We use energy to generate electricity, to produce heat for residential, commercial, and industrial uses, and to provide mobility. However, various energy sources are not equally suited to each of these tasks, especially when incorporating clean energy goals. Energy-dense fossil fuels are efficient for power, heat, and mobility, but are only “clean” in conjunction with technologies that prevent carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere. Nuclear energy provides efficient carbon-free power and heat, but has limited applications for mobility (in some warships and submarines). Solar photovoltaic technology and wind can provide clean—if variable—power, as well as mobility by charging EV batteries, but do not deliver the high heat needed for industrial processes like steelmaking. In tandem with clean energy for processing, fossil fuels can also serve as a source of hydrogen, which can, in turn, provide carbon-free power, heat, and mobility through combustion or fuel cells. Some hope to use nuclear, solar, and wind energy to produce hydrogen through electrolysis of water, which splits its hydrogen and oxygen atoms. 

The United States, Japan, and South Korea can be close energy partners because they share challenges and have impressive technological capabilities. Moreover, while they are commercial competitors in some areas (such as gas turbines, nuclear reactors, solar panels, and EVs), their economies are complementary in others (especially U.S. natural gas exports, which are critical to both Tokyo’s and Seoul’s energy transition strategies today and could be—like hydrogen—in the future as well). In highly competitive areas, cooperation can become more difficult as technologies move from early research and development to demonstration and commercial deployment.