The short answers, of course, are alliance commitments, the maintenance of regional stability, and, the Sea Service’s own preferred ways of operating. But, might the maritime services want to reassess the strategic concept of Forward Presence to help relieve the inevitable pressure it puts on the number of platforms, the survivability of platforms, the security of forward bases, and the human toll of operating forward? Lest readers believe this heresy is unthinkable, respected analysts have called in to question the “tyranny of forward presence” for decades, including, for example, on the pages of the Naval War College Review.

Warfighting First

Perhaps the greatest driver underlying CS21 is “Warfighting First.” Since Admiral Greenert became the Chief of Naval Operations it has been the constant refrain in his Sailing Directions, Navigation Plan and numerous blog posts.

As a rallying cry to help prevent complacency in the Navy, a service largely spared the combat of the last decade or so, “warfighting first” makes imminent sense. It reminds officers and sailor alike of the need for readiness, to prepare for the possibility if not likelihood of high-end, kinetic operations largely absent on the high seas since the great Pacific sea battles of the Second World War.

But as a strategic precept, “warfighting first” raises a number of questions. The CNO’s own words introduce the issue: “Our first consideration is the ability to fight and win today, while building the ability to win tomorrow; it is why we have a Navy.” The USN seems to assume it is possible to operate forward with a high edge of readiness to fight and win current wars, while simultaneously preparing for a more dangerous future.

By adding to the numbers of ships and other platforms available and ensuring that they retain qualitative advantages over the “pacing” threats, the Sea Services plan to maintain their current dominance. But is this possible in a period of fiscal austerity? Can the United States both drive its maritime forces hard against current requirements while modernizing, recapitalizing and innovating? Sequestration, roundly and rightfully warned against by CS21-2015, suggests that at least some members of Congress see a day of reckoning; there may be a trade-off between present operations and the quantity and quality of the future force that the Sea Services do not publicly acknowledge in their strategic vision.

Further, aside from the counterpiracy operations and the occasional firing of a Tomahawk at a terrorist base or insurgents ashore, who is the USN fighting today? With all the tension and potential for conflict with China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, we are not yet at war and as the National Security Strategy makes clear, “[t]he scope of our cooperation with China is unprecedented, even as we remain alert to China’s military modernization and reject any role for intimidation in resolving territorial disputes.”mOr stronger still, “[t]he United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China.” Warfighting, especially against an adversary possessing weapons at the high end of the capability spectrum involving the most challenging A2/AD systems, is largely a rhetorical device. But is it a rhetorical device with consequences.

Stressing warfighting first is not just a message to our sailors, marines, and coast guard personnel. It is assuredly heard loud and clear by our allies (providing perhaps Reassurance), partners, and perhaps especially our adversaries. When coupled with tensions in the Middle East (especially over Iran its nuclear program), Russia (over Crimea and Ukraine), and the Asia-Pacific Rebalance (largely about the rise of China regardless of what diplomatic correctness requires), the term “warfighting” suggests aggression. While readiness and willingness to fight may help deter, it may also contribute to classic security dilemmas. American rhetoric and actions, seen within the United States as prudent, defensive, and even status quo preserving, might be interpreted as destabilizing by the rest of the world. As for American allies and potential coalition partners, a focus on warfighting may even highlight the serious difference between the global interests of the United States and the local, regional, and particularistic interest of the United States.

“Big Bets” Moving Forward

To borrow a phrase from the late Vice Admiral Cebrowski, former President of the Naval War College and the first director of the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation, the Sea Services have just made a series of “Big Bets” with their three “Big Ideas”:

– They are betting that the American public (and especially Congress) will be willing and able to pay the bills sustaining increasingly expensive Sea Services to defend the global economy from relatively modest threats even in the face of fiscal austerity;

– They are betting that American ingenuity—in the form of our nation’s defense-industrial and military-university-laboratory complexes—will be able to devise technological solutions to the dilemma of maintaining Forward Presence in the face of proliferating A2/AD capabilities;

– They are betting that our friends, allies, and potential maritime partners will continue to share the American focus with “warfighting first” even as other less-traditional security challenges compete for their attention and resources;

– They are betting that the rhetoric of warfighting and plans to overcome A2/AD capabilities with innovative technologies and warfighting concepts will deter and not contribute to rising tensions, arms racing, and the potential for escalation; and finally,

– They are betting that the Services will be able to recruit and retrain sufficient numbers of high-quality marines, sailors and coast guardsmen even amid the stresses of overseas and extended deployments.

Internal contradictions in the core or “big” ideas underlying CS21-2015 may over time weaken the case of the service chiefs and thus potentially endanger the long-term health of the Services. As an example of what Captain Barney Ruble has called a “pleading document,” asking for attention and resources, CS21-2015 may not accomplish its ultimate purpose of ensuring that the service chiefs convince Congress to provide the full measure of budgetary authority required to man, train, and equip for the future.

Lest this assessment sound overly critical, the fact is that developing a tri-service strategy that meets the needs of all internal stakeholders, as well as convinces DOD, the other military services, and Congress of the priority of their claims, is extremely difficult, especially for Services notoriously resistant to thinking and acting strategically.

What CS21-2015 represents then is yet another step toward redefining American military power in the post–post–Cold War world. And, this ultimately is where A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready serves the nation. It both promises to contribute mightily to U.S. national security strategy while laying bare several of the contradictions facing not just the Sea Services but the nation as a whole as it executes a long, complicated, and politically controversial strategic adjustment to the circumstance of the future.

Peter Dombrowski is a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, where he serves as the chair of the Strategic Research Department. The views expressed here are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense.​

Image:Flickr/U.S. Pacific Fleet