Over the past few months, the Levant sub-region in the Middle East has experienced geopolitical changes of historic proportions. The shockwaves from these changes, which are still very much in play as various powers and factions holding pieces of territory in Syria try to tilt the gameboard and pull the area’s future in their direction, will be felt throughout the entire Middle East and, through it, the world. 

The situation is fraught with both danger—and opportunity. President-elect Donald Trump clearly indicated in his recent interview with Time Magazine that when it comes to the Middle East, “…I support whatever, whatever is necessary to get not just peace, a lasting peace. It can’t go on where every five years you end up in tragedy. There are other alternatives.” In seeking to make these aspirations a reality, the incoming president has his work cut out for him. Unfortunately, one place where he is unlikely to get any practical help is France. 

One could argue that the recent upheaval in Lebanon, which, along with Syria, used to be a French protectorate, began when Hezbollah began firing into northern Israel a day after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. By September 2024, Israel began hitting back hard—first blowing up the pagers, cell phones, and laptops used by Hezbollah field commanders and then eliminating its leadership, including its central leader, Hassan Nasrallah. During most of this period, Lebanon’s and Syria’s former colonial ruler, France, was largely missing in action, except for occasional, often contradictory, and occasionally grandiose comments from French President Emmanuel Macron. 

Although Macron recently held discussions with Trump about the seismic developments in the Middle East, the French leader’s beleaguered domestic position will likely complicate matters for the incoming American administration. Macron’s unstable and debt-ridden National Assembly already has gone through a record-breaking three prime ministers only this year. 

On December 13, Macron appointed centrist political ally Francois Bayrou as prime minister, a week after Bayrou’s predecessor, Michel Barnier, was forced to resign after losing to a vote of no confidence in parliament, where Macron faces major opposition from far-right and left-wing forces. Hours later, credit ratings agency Moody’s downgraded France’s rating because “the country’s public finances will be substantially weakened over the coming years” as “political fragmentation is more likely to impede meaningful fiscal consolidation.” With France’s debt already set to rise over 6 percent of GDP, this only increases pressure on the new premier to gain support from legislators for his plans to manage the country’s strained financial situation—as was evident from the ousted prime minister’s failure to get approval for the 2025 budget. 

Facing a dreary domestic situation, France Macron is in search of a diplomatic triumph. Hence, his efforts to insert himself in the international efforts to achieve a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. Paris used the November 21 International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants against Netanyahu and then-defense minister Yoav Gallant, who the ICC claims were engaged in war crimes in Gaza, to its advantage.

Initially, France was vociferous in insisting that it would arrest Netanyahu if he set foot on French soil. Within a week, however, the rhetoric from Paris shifted once Israel agreed during a Netanyahu-Macron phone conversation to have France play a mediator role in the ceasefire talks. 

The French position dramatically changed from one of unwavering commitment to international law to equivocation, saying that while France respects the ICC, Netanyahu may enjoy immunity as a serving cabinet minister in a country that is not party to the ICC agreement. That Paris had to go to such lengths to try and regain a say in the future security of Lebanon underscores the extent to which the French have lost ground in their former colony. Indeed, until the unprecedented weakening of Hezbollah in the conflict with Israel over the past few months, Iran had more influence in the country and the broader Levant than France. 

With the dramatic toppling of the Assad regime at the hands of Turkish-backed rebels in the wake of the weakened Iranian position in both Lebanon and Syria, it is important to note that France heavily shaped the modern Levant following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of its defeat in World War I. While France’s involvement in Lebanon’s sectarian conflicts actually dates back to the nineteenth century, both Syria and Lebanon fell under French control as per the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement with the British. 

This arrangement was solemnified under the mandate system of the League of Nations after the end of the First World War. In the early period of French rule, the area was divided into a half dozen smaller entities largely along confessional lines, such as Damascus, Aleppo, a Maronite-dominated Greater Lebanon, and Alawite and Druze states. By the 1930s, the French had consolidated these various states into the modern republics of Syria and Lebanon. Lebanon was granted independence during World War II in 1943, while Syria became a sovereign nation-state in 1946. 

Devastated by World War II, France’s ability to influence events in the Levant declined greatly. The rise of left-leaning Arab nationalism, especially in Syria in the form of the Baath Party, led to the Soviet Union becoming an influential external power. France continued to retain its influence in Lebanon. However, in 1975, the Lebanese Civil War broke out, and Syria (under the regime of Hafez al-Assad, who came to power in 1971) intervened militarily. The Syrians, along with their new ally in Tehran, the Islamic Republic, together developed Hezbollah in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, altering the balance of power in the country. By this time, the French had aligned with Saudi Arabia, which had gained considerable influence in Lebanon (especially among its Sunni population) after emerging as the world’s leading oil producer. 

The civil war came to an end in 1990, but it left Hezbollah as the most powerful faction in the country. By this time, Iran and Syria had begun to weaken French and Saudi influence in the country. The French and the Saudis hoped to stage a comeback in 2005 when Syria was forced to withdraw its 14,000 troops strong task force from Lebanon following the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri. But Hezbollah had become too powerful for Paris and Riyadh to counteract. The Arab Spring uprising only further strengthened Iran and Hezbollah by rendering the Syrian regime dependent on the patron and proxy along with Russia for its survival. 

The French likely see the events of the past several months as an opportunity to revive their influence, at least in Lebanon. However, the geopolitical chessboard is too complicated for France. Lebanon is at risk of internal strife because of the weakening of Hezbollah and, more importantly, the collapse of the Assad regime and the empowerment of Sunni Arab forces under the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of Al Qaeda. Turkey, through its backing of HTS and other Sunni Arab rebel forces, is in a position to replace Iran as the dominant power in Syria. Meanwhile, the latest news out of Paris indicates that Macron may face the loss of his most recently appointed prime minister in the very near term. 

Despite its long legacy as a liege of the Levant, France lacks the wherewithal to help the Trump administration manage the Middle East effectively.

Kamran Bokhari, PhD is Senior Director of the Eurasian Security & Prosperity at the Newlines Institute for Strategy & Policy in Washington. He is also a national security and foreign policy specialist at the University of Ottawa’s Professional Development Institute. Bokhari has served as the coordinator for Central Asia studies at the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Service Institute.

Image: Antonin Albert / Shutterstock.com.