Under Admiral Samuel Paparo, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has embraced a command directive to “prevail,” emphasizing greater readiness and the ability to deny and defend against adversarial actions in the Indo-Pacific. Moving beyond integrated deterrence, this framework highlights the need for U.S. forces to be prepared to win any conflict decisively, particularly in the face of growing challenges from China. The “prevail” framework marks a shift in INDOPACOM’s prior strategic and operational direction, signaling a heightened tolerance for risk in the pursuit of regional stability. It also reflects a hardening of the Biden administration’s approach to China and a significant departure from previous INDOPACOM commanders’ projections of U.S. military power.

Conceptually, the “prevail” approach builds on the foundation laid by former Commander Admiral John Aquilino’s “Seize the Initiative” program. Aquilino prioritized proactive deterrence, integrating alliances, and enhancing operational flexibility across multiple domains (air, land, sea, cyber, and space). His approach sought to shape the regional security environment before threats fully materialized, ensuring U.S. forces could stay ahead of adversaries.

INDOPACOM leadership has further developed this approach by prioritizing the enhancement of U.S. joint forces’ lethality, increasing readiness to respond to and win any crisis or conflict, and facilitating interoperability with U.S. allies and partners. The “prevail” focus ensures that the United States and its allies are not just positioned to deter aggression but are prepared to respond decisively to any regional threat. To this end, Paparo and INDOPACOM leadership have urged regional states to choose between supplication or military preparedness—“arming to the teeth” being the recommended path.

This approach is particularly focused on the prospect of conflict with China, a state Paparo has described as “revanchist, revisionist, and expansionist.” Accordingly, INDOPACOM is preparing actionable responses to Chinese aggression that go beyond mere deterrence. INDOPACOM leadership has challenged the widely held belief that the U.S. would struggle in a limited regional conflict with China, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, expressing confidence that the United States and its allies would ultimately prevail. The emphasis on military superiority, operational resilience, and coordination with allies reflects a commitment to achieving victory rather than merely maintaining the status quo.

Notably, the “prevail” concept is a natural evolution of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, particularly regarding China. Over the past few years, the Biden administration has demonstrated a greater willingness to risk conflict with China over issues ranging from technology and trade to maritime activities, as well as its support for Russia and its posture toward Taiwan. As Combatant Commander, Paparo’s approach aligns with and reinforces the Biden administration’s Asian strategy while shaping U.S. military policy in the Indo-Pacific.

Four months into Paparo’s tenure, INDOPACOM leadership has used this framework to redefine U.S. engagement with its allies and push back against Chinese activities in East and Southeast Asia. In July 2024, INDOPACOM supported the expansion of the U.S.-Japan alliance by agreeing to establish a joint forces headquarters in Japan. When operational, the new headquarters, commanded by a three-star officer but directly overseen by the INDOPACOM Commander, will collaborate with Japan’s self-defense force to strengthen security cooperation, enhance command integration, and facilitate greater interoperability in joint operations.

The reconstitution of U.S. Forces Japan into a joint headquarters will bolster U.S.-Japan military capabilities, particularly in response to increased Chinese incursions into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace. INDOPACOM leadership has committed to Japan’s defense, making it clear that should deterrence fail, U.S.-Japan joint forces will respond decisively to Chinese aggression.

INDOPACOM’s “prevail” model was also visible during Paparo’s recent trip to the Philippines, where he reaffirmed the combatant command’s role as a security partner. His pledge to strengthen interoperability with the Philippine Armed Forces and his suggestion that U.S. ships could escort Philippine vessels in the South China Sea underscores INDOPACOM leadership’s willingness to use U.S. military power to shape regional security dynamics, even at the risk of direct conflict with China. This is an offensive posture aimed at asserting dominance, not merely deterring aggression.

INDOPACOM leadership has also hinted at what a “prevail” approach to Taiwan could look like, describing a scenario in which thousands of unmanned vessels, submarines, and aircraft would be deployed to turn the Taiwan Strait into a “hellscape” in the event of a Chinese invasion. This aggressive tactic would counter the U.S.’s “tyranny of distance” by buying time to deploy assets and fight off Chinese forces, even potentially involving strikes on the Chinese mainland.

While the “prevail” approach has injected urgency into U.S. military operations, it has also raised concerns among Asian states. Many Southeast Asian countries do not share INDOPACOM’s willingness to confront China and view Beijing as a stabilizing force in the region. States like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore increasingly perceive the United States, not China, as a destabilizing actor. Additionally, non-English language polling in the region suggests a growing disconnect between how the United States and non-allied Asian states view China and security issues. Even in the Philippines, there is concern that U.S. military support could escalate tensions in the South China Sea.

Uncertainty remains regarding whether U.S. allies will continue to back INDOPACOM’s “prevail” strategy. While Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru supports the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, some Cabinet members, like Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and Defense Minister Gen. Nakatani, are more skeptical. In South Korea, opposition leader Lee Jae-myung, a 2027 presidential frontrunner, takes a less hawkish stance on China than President Yoon Suk-yeol. Even within Taiwan’s ruling DPP, concerns have been raised about INDOPACOM’s role in Taiwan under Paparo’s “hellscape” plan.

To address these concerns, INDOPACOM leadership must ensure that the “prevail” directive includes clear crisis avoidance measures and emphasizes negotiation as a primary tool for resolving disputes, even if that benefits China in some cases. Working closely with U.S. embassies on strategic messaging will also be crucial to mitigating apprehensions about American activities in Asia, as will maintaining direction communication channels with the Chinese military. Fortunately, Paparo understands this imperative and has recently held discussions with his counterpart at the People’s Liberation Army’s Southern Theater Command.

Admiral Paparo’s “prevail” concept represents a bold evolution in U.S. military operations in the Indo-Pacific. As China continues to assert its influence, the United States must be prepared not only to deter but to win conflicts decisively if necessary. However, for this model to succeed, it must be paired with diplomatic finesse and careful communication with regional partners to ensure that military readiness does not come at the cost of long-term stability.

Jeffrey Reeves is an associate professor at the Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, and Senior Washington Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy. His views are his own and do not represent official government policy.

Image: FOTOGRIN / Shutterstock.com.