BROSE RIGHTLY observes that “the United States needs capable allies and partners to succeed in the world, especially to balance Chinese power.” He adds that Donald Trump is not wrong to push wealthy allies to contribute more to the common defense. Still, as he also writes, “having higher expectations of our allies … should not be confused with deriding the value of having allies at all.”

Brose also is correct when he asserts that “the United States has intentionally contributed to our allies being militarily less capable.” He notes American reluctance to sell the most capable offensive and defensive weapons to allies for fear that such sales would be “destabilizing and provocative.” He also points out that for too long “we have taken a limited view of the operational utility of those allies” and that “Washington leaders pay lip service to the importance of allies.”

Indeed, one could press his argument even further: Until now, American planners saw allies as nothing more than a “nice to have” rather than as a force multiplier. Their attitude echoed that of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson, who wrote during the war against France, “the allies are a rope of sand.” The Pentagon’s disdain of allied capabilities might have been acceptable during the Cold War, when America’s dominance and force levels were both overwhelming. It is no longer the case today, when military force levels are shrinking even as defense budgets have grown.

One result of this cavalier attitude on the part of American defense planners, that Brose does not sufficiently dwell on, is the unfortunate case that allies not only have spent less on their defense but have done so inefficiently. Instead of combining their resources and research to produce more, and more effective, systems, leading European states have supported their own defense programs by often duplicating those of their putative partners, as well as of the United States. Moreover, as noted above, the American “not invented here” attitude prevents a viable two-way exchange of military hardware and software between the United States and its allies.

Brose correctly sums up the present and long-standing challenge for American defense leaders vis-à-vis their allies and partners: “This must change for America to deny China military dominance … we must require a lot more from both our allies and ourselves.”

Brose acknowledges that many of his recommendations often are not more than visions; indeed, many of the programs he describes are little more than gleams in the developer’s eye. Nevertheless, he is right to conclude on an optimistic note. Washington policymakers do have the power to change the vector of American military capability. As Brose puts it “we have the money, the technological base and the human talent. And … the flexibility and authorities … to carry off the transition from the military we have to the military we need.” One place for them to start would be to read, ponder, and act upon this valuable volume.

Dov S. Zakheim served as the undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the U.S. Department of Defense from 2001–2004 and as the deputy undersecretary of defense (planning and resources) from 1985–1987. He also served as the DoD’s civilian coordinator for Afghan reconstruction from 2002–2004. He is vice chairman of the Center for the National Interest.