So what is China to do in the face of an out-of-control buffer state? The five principles of peaceful coexistence put forward by the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai call for “noninterference” in the internal affairs of another state. Beijing put that principle aside and even delved into theological matters, in its interference in the selection of a new Panchen Lama—rather like an Italian government trying to dictate the color of smoke coming out of the Vatican chimney during a Papal election. However, Beijing would argue that Tibet is not considered an independent country, while Korea is—even if in a tributary status, according to the traditional Chinese world view.

Prior to its intervention to save Kim Il Sung’s regime during the Korean War, Beijing had last played in Korean court politics in the late nineteenth century and it did not turn out well. Intervening to block Japanese encroachment at the request of the Korean queen consort in 1882, China was driven out of Korea by military defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and would not return for sixty-five years.

Qing Dynasty China’s erstwhile ally, the Korean queen consort, was brutally assassinated, cut to ribbons by Japanese agents soon after Beijing’s withdrawal. Given the bloody results of both the late-nineteenth-century intervention and the Korean War, Beijing might well hesitate to enter again the quagmire of Korean court politics.

Still, Beijing keeps its ace in the hole in case of a sudden contingency in Pyongyang. His name is Kim Jong Nam, elder half-brother of the Young General. He is remembered for his arrest at Narita Airport in 2001 with a fraudulent passport while attempting to visit Tokyo Disneyland. He was raised primarily by his executed uncle Jang Song-thaek so he presumably shares Jang’s pro-Beijing sympathies. Chinese security is said to guard him around the clock during his exile in Singapore and Macau. Beijing has also reportedly warned Kim Jong Un, after an alleged failed attempt to assassinate his half-brother a few years ago, to steer clear of any further family feud. Whatever happens in Pyongyang, Beijing is certain to keep Kim Jong Nam and his European-educated son Kim Han Sol within earshot in case they have to take, on short notice, that return flight to Pyongyang.

Chinese statecraft is renowned for its long-sightedness and patience. Chairman Mao reportedly once famously remarked to then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that “we can wait 100 years for Taiwan.” The question is: how long can even the usually patient Chinese endure the brinkmanship, recklessness and rudeness of their immature protégé in Pyongyang?

 

Dennis P. Halpin is a former Peace Corps volunteer in South Korea, a former U.S. consul in Pusan, and a former adviser on Asian issues to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He is currently a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS (Johns Hopkins) and a consultant to the Poblete Analysis Group.

Image: Flickr/(stephan)/CC by-sa 2.0