There is something similarly dubious about the proposition that cheap energy is the basis for industrial prowess. If true, the world’s manufacturing powerhouse would be the Middle East or Russia, not Japan, Korea, and Germany, which rely on imported and often-costly energy. In truth, energy is a marginal cost for most industries—in the United States, United Kingdom and South Korea, for instance, energy was just 2-3 percent of total costs in manufacturing in 2012. Of course, energy is more important for some sectors, but these are a small subset of the economy. The idea that shale gas, in particular, will reshape the world’s manufacturing base is a hyperbole.

Perhaps the most fundamental change will come from a shift in how countries assess “political leverage.” Conventional wisdom often equates having energy with having leverage, and it assumes that dependence means weakness. This is a hypothesis, of course, and we have several counterexamples to disprove it. For instance, the 1973 oil embargo that was meant to weaken American support for Israel and accelerate an Arab victory, or Russia’s repeated failures in using gas as a weapon against Ukraine or the even-more-suspect thesis that Europe’s dependence on Russia weakens Europe. Yet this is so ingrained in our political conscience that a shift in energy power is inevitably perceived to bring about a shift in political power as well.

There is a risk in such a profound psychological change, and American foreign policy, in particular, might feel empowered by its reduced dependence on imported energy. The danger is not a withdrawal from energy-rich regions, such as the Middle East—America has likely too many other interests there to allow for such a dramatic U-turn. Rather, the danger is that the United States will try to leverage energy for political ends and trigger unintended consequences. Of course, the new energy reality makes some policies—such as sanctioning Iran or Russia—more tenable by assuaging fears over a tight oil or gas market. But this is different than leveraging energy by suggesting, for instance, that LNG exports should be preferred for some countries over others.

The commoditization of energy has been one of the greatest geopolitical blessings of the past half-century, as markets have largely replaced militaries as the arbiters of where molecules should flow. Despite occasional political incursions, and much political interference within countries, this is a system dominated by supply and demand, by technology and risk taking, by innovation and competition. The energy rich do not run our world—look at a map of energy resources globally and you see a poor predictor for where political and economic power is distributed. The de-politicization of energy is a major public good, and its persistence will trump any short-term gain that the United States might be able to extract by playing politics. How the “revolution” plays out depends very much on American restraint.

Nikos Tsafos is a founding partner at enalytica and is currently advising the Alaska state legislature on gas commercialization issues. He was previously a director with PFC Energy, with a portfolio that included overseeing research and gas fundamentals and leading the firm’s global gas consulting practice.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Ruhrfisch/CC by-sa 3.0