Beijing’s last attempt to resort to military force in its relations with Taipei—the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96—was met by a stern response from Washington, which dispatched two carrier battle groups to the region and warned Beijing that any further military aggression against Taiwan would bring “grave consequences” for China. Since then, however, U.S. military preponderance over China has dwindled. A 2015 assessment by the RAND Corporation projects that the U.S. military would now be facing major operational problems in prevailing in any conflict with Chinese forces over Taiwan. In view of the Trump administration’s determination to drive a harder bargain with China, Taipei might nonetheless receive further American assurances in the future. In December, the U.S. Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act, which provides for official reciprocal exchanges between U.S. and Taiwanese senior military officials for the first time since the 1970s. For Washington, a lack of support for Taiwan during a potential confrontation with Beijing could entail a serious loss of credibility with many of its key partners and allies in East and Southeast Asia, raising doubts about its wider defense commitments in this vitally important region.

AFTER A prolonged period of tranquility and rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei, cross-Strait relations are once again headed for troubled times. The apparent realignment of Washington’s Taiwan policy is occurring at a time when Beijing, dissatisfied with the new leadership in Taipei and increasingly assertive towards the United States, has already enacted punitive measures against Taiwan, both diplomatic and economic. Beijing is beginning to feel that it has exhausted all peaceful options of bringing Taiwan back into the fold, and Xi Jinping does not seem entirely averse to the prospect of using some form of military pressure to prevent Taipei from drifting further away from the mainland. Ahead of a key leadership transition in China’s Communist Party in late 2017, and with nationalist sentiment rising in the mainland, Xi does not want to appear weak on matters considered nonnegotiable core interests for the party—particularly Taiwan.

President Tsai Ing-wen, meanwhile, is keen to preserve the status quo of cross-Strait relations and has adopted a conciliatory tone towards Beijing, but she has been equally adamant in her affirmation of Taiwanese autonomy and her refusal to render explicit homage to the one-China principle. Tsai is under pressure domestically, as the same social activists and independence-minded “dark-Green” factions in her own party that helped propel her to power are now demanding that she take an uncompromising stance vis-à-vis Beijing. Tsai’s domestic approval ratings have been sliding precipitously since she assumed office, but her defiant stance on cross-Strait relations and the 1992 Consensus is supported by a large majority of the population. Many in Taiwan have been hopeful that Donald Trump’s statements on the one-China principle may signal positive change for the island’s status, but they remain wary of becoming a mere bargaining chip in a great-power game. Also, while the Trump administration has raised hopes in Taipei that U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations might be upgraded, Donald Trump’s economic isolationism and his decision to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement are bad news for export-reliant Taiwan. The United States is Taiwan’s second-largest trading partner (following China) and Taiwanese companies serve as major suppliers of U.S. tech giants like Apple, which have been pressured by Trump to relocate production to America, raising the prospect of trade disputes between Washington and Taipei.

Considering the interconnectedness of problems in the East Asian region, and the fact that any worsening of tensions in the Taiwan Strait could easily spill over into the South China Sea and beyond, the Trump administration should avoid trying to use the complex and volatile issue of Taiwan as leverage to extract economic and political concessions from Beijing. Instead, it should formulate a consistent strategy on cross-Strait relations that is closely coordinated with its allies in the region. Concrete measures that Washington could take include using its diplomatic clout to oppose any further moves by Beijing to undermine Taiwan’s diplomatic status in international forums and providing Taipei with greater access to military technology, thus ensuring that it can develop a more credible military deterrent. With this in mind, Washington should also impress upon Taipei the need for higher defense spending, even in economically trying times. Beyond that, it would be wise for the Trump administration to defer any substantial policy moves regarding Taiwan until after the conclusion of the nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in late 2017, which will oversee the reshuffling of membership in China’s top leadership bodies, putting particular pressure on the current Chinese government to appear steadfast on issues like Taiwan. The overall priority for Washington should be to preserve the cross-Strait status quo and to avoid making formal commitments to Taipei that would galvanize nationalist hard-liners in mainland China and could raise false hopes among pro-independence forces in Taiwan, which are already exerting substantial pressure on the Taiwanese government.

Amid an overall aggravation of great-power rivalries in East Asia, Taiwan’s president and the new U.S. administration will have to tread carefully and steer a cautious course between the ambitions of the Taiwanese people, whose attachment to China is rapidly dwindling, and an increasingly assertive Beijing that is tightening the screws of authoritarianism at home and shows a growing willingness to throw its weight around in the region. Alongside the various existing geopolitical hot spots in East Asia, the Taiwan Strait may soon reemerge as another openly contested territory.

Björn Alexander Düben is an assistant professor at the School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University, and an associate of LSE ideas at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Image: ROC military honor guards. Wikimedia Commons/Taiwan Presidential Office