On December 8, President Joe Biden tried to take credit for the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. “You know, for years, the main backers of Assad have been Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. But over the last week, their support collapsed—all three of them—because all three of them are far weaker today than they were when I took office,” he said, adding, “Our approach has shifted the balance of power in the Middle East. Through this combination of support for our partners, sanctions, and diplomacy and targeted military force when necessary, we now see new opportunities opening up for the people of Syria and for the entire region.” 

Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu also declared victory, arguing Assad’s defeat was a “direct result of our forceful actions against Hezbollah and Iran, Assad’s main supporters. It set off a chain reaction of all those who want to free themselves from this tyranny.”

The facts better support the Israeli leader whose escalation against Hezbollah in September was the trigger, an escalation that President Biden denounced at the United Nations, claiming it would spark an “all-out war” across the region. The withdrawal of Hezbollah troops back to Lebanon to meet the Israeli offensive opened the door to the rebel advance in Syria. Iran’s inability to protect its proxies in Lebanon and Gaza was even more evident in Syria, where the stakes were higher. In the debate over the use of escalation dominance to impose terms versus de-escalation and self-restraint to ease tensions, results count.

In my previous article here, I expressed the hope that the Biden administration was upping its game in the Middle East with an effort that might carry over to Ukraine. I noted that two aircraft carrier groups had been deployed to the Sea of Oman near Iran, reinforced by additional destroyers and the nuclear missile submarine USS Georgia. They were meant to back President Biden’s repeated message to Tehran of “don’t” in regard to any new attack on Israel. 

At the time, I wrote, “This seems to have worked so far. Tehran has not launched the promised revenge barrage for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.” The situation had stabilized sufficiently for the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier group to return to its normal deployment in the Indo-Pacific in mid-September. Less than a week after my article appeared, Iran launched 180 ballistic missiles at Israel. That Israeli defenses, supported by the United States and other forces, defeated this attack should not lessen our evaluation of the scale of destruction Tehran had hoped to inflict.

It has been argued that Tehran had to react to Israel’s campaign against its proxies in Gaza and Lebanon in order to sustain its leadership of the “axis of resistance.” It has been assumed the hardliners won the internal debate on this issue. Yet, what has not been so widely acknowledged is the hardliners also had to win the debate over whether Washington was serious about the threat posed by its naval deployments off the Iranian coast. The hardliner victory and subsequent missile strike meant that the U.S. deterrent had failed. It had not been deemed credible by those it was meant to impress. The fact that the United States did not retaliate confirmed this.

Furthermore, while President Biden conceded Israel had the right to retaliate, his administration again placed limits on what could be hit. The most important strategic targets, oil and nuclear, were taken off the table. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s pledge of support for the Iranian people included the statement, “When Iran is finally free—and that moment will come a lot sooner than people think–everything will be different,” This message implied that Israel might conduct decapitation strikes on Iran’s leaders like it has been conducting against Iranian proxy leaders across the region (and in Tehran itself). This idea has not found much favor in Washington. So, the hardliner argument that it was safe to call the deterrent bluff in regard to both American and Israeli responses was proven correct. This would have kept the hardliners in control of policy unless the United States and/or Israel acted to prove them wrong.

Israel did act, but the United States did not.

Israel retaliated, hitting targets related to Iran’s missile program, a “specific component” of its nuclear program, and its air defense network. Its fighters took out Iran’s most advanced, Russian-supplied S-300 air defense system, sending a message to Tehran that it was helpless against Israeli airpower. Yet, this was the same message that Israel’s retaliation in April had sent. Tehran knows Israel (and America) can strike Iranian targets at will. There is no question who has escalation dominance in the region based on military capability. What is questioned is the willingness of the Biden administration to use those capabilities to take the war to the heart of the adversary with the aim of ending the conflict. Yet, with Tehran threatening a “crushing response” with more powerful weapons against Israel, the only U.S. carrier group remaining in the region was withdrawn.

The ceasefire in Lebanon confirms this analysis. The retreat of Hezbollah to behind the Litani River, giving up their border network of bunkers, is a victory for Israel after it escalated its attacks in September. Many feared this would spark a regional war, but Israel’s adversaries could not match its strength or resist its onslaught. A demilitarized zone will be re-established in Lebanon. The disengagement process will be monitored by the United States and France, not by any power sympathetic to Hezbollah or Iran. Though the Biden administration deserves some credit for this outcome by maintaining support for Israel against critics within its own Democratic Party, the timing suggests that Tehran fears that incoming President Donald Trump will go further and loosen the restraints on Israel’s power. A ceasefire is preferable to further escalation, a conclusion other aggressors should be made to consider.

In contrast, where the United States has the primary security mission in the region, the war in the Red Sea continues. Though Houthi bases in Yemen continue to be hit, there has not been a sustained campaign against the group like Israel has waged against Hamas and Hezbollah. On October 16, the United States used B-2 strategic stealth bombers to hit underground sites. This impressive show of force was meant to impress Iran and deliver substantial damage to its proxy. 

In his statement about the B-2 operation, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said, “The United States will not hesitate to take action to defend American lives and assets; to deter attacks against civilians and our regional partners; and to protect freedom of navigation.” He was correct only on the first point. American and coalition forces have been surprisingly effective in defending against Houthi drone and missile attacks. They have not, however, deterred continuing attacks or made the area safe enough for commercial shipping, which has nearly ceased to use waters that used to carry twelve percent of global maritime commerce. This is because the United States has not used its known escalation capabilities on a scale that would “make clear to the Houthis that there will be consequences for their illegal and reckless attacks.” Those consequences are beyond what the Houthis can bear.

Central Command has given priority to attacking ISIS bases in Syria over Houthi cases in Yemen, even though ISIS’ focus had been on fighting Iran’s proxy forces supporting Assad. The escalation of these attacks now that Assad has fled makes more sense as it is meant to weaken a rival to the (hopefully) more moderate forces backed by Turkey, which are poised to take control of the country. The active intervention of Turkey, a Sunni country backing the establishment of a Sunni regime in Syria, marks another major shift in the balance of power against Shia Iran in the region. Active U.S. (and Israeli) support for this outcome can provide a basis for settling the other complicating factors hampering Turkish relations. A new Damascus regime will be dependent on Arab and Western capital to rebuild (as will a post-Hamas Gaza). The incoming Trump administration can find common ground among Arab, Israeli, and Turkish interests in a broader renewal of the Abraham Accords if it can regain credibility as a trustworthy and active partner.

The Biden strategy in the Middle East has been restrained, defensive only, a limit also shown in its Ukraine policy. Initially, President Biden did not even want to defend Ukraine, claiming it was not a member of NATO (and ignoring bilateral commitments to its security). Ukrainian valor and European reaction led the United States to provide large-scale material support but not the direct involvement in active defense measures as in the Middle East. Biden was also behind the European curve in providing advanced weapons and lifting restrictions on targets Kyiv can hit in Russia even as Russia devastates all parts of Ukraine. It was only on day 1,000 of the war that Ukraine was allowed to strike an arms depot inside Russia. Imposing rules that provide an asymmetrical advantage to the enemy is not the way to win a war.