Or is it ultimately just a new bipolarity between autocracies and democracies? In any case, Russia and China are trying to deepen relations with autocratic regimes through an active foreign policy and also to win over or neutralize the countries of the Third World. China, for example, has now decided on a “Global Security Initiative” aimed at this and is trying to strengthen its global influence and provide a kind of counterweight to Western fora and formats by inter alia maintaining and possibly expanding associations of emerging economies such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

However, there is no rigid “bloc” of authoritarian states. This applies even to Russia and China, despite the fact that at their summit on February 4, 2022, they committed to a “no limits” partnership and stated that their relationship was superior to any Cold War alliance. China is clearly pursuing selfish interests, which is also reflected in the Silk Road initiative toward the Central Asian successor states of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine did not come at a convenient time for China, as it could thwart or at least hinder China’s economic rise and efforts to overtake the United States as the strongest economy as quickly as possible. The apparent Chinese reluctance to support the Russian war of aggression—i.e., Beijing’s abstention in the vote in the UN Security Council on Russia’s declared annexations in southern and eastern Ukraine on September 30, 2022—has awakened hopes.

Still, it would be unrealistic to expect China to turn its back on Russia, which it will preserve as a geopolitical partner in the (looming) confrontation with the United States over Taiwan. For its part, Russia remains dependent on China’s goodwill and support in the current situation; however, Putin will have to be content with Russia’s position as a junior partner, which is unlikely to please him. This notwithstanding, China will not be able to stop Putin from further military escalation in the face of a Russian military defeat in Ukraine.

China can be assumed to reject the economic “deglobalization” emerging as a result of the war. However, it remains to be seen whether, in view of the developments that have occurred in the meantime and in particular the high tensions over Taiwan, which is of paramount political importance for President Xi Jinping, a different Chinese calculus has set in.

But there are also forces in the United States that are banking on a division of the world into democracies and autocracies. However, it cannot be assumed that time works for democracy. After a continuous increase in the number of democratic states in recent decades, their number has been declining in the last few years. According to The Economist’s Democracy Index, only twenty-one states were classified as “full democracies” in 2021. And these worrying autocratic and autocratic-populist tendencies are not only found in some EU states. In the United States, the prospect of an “America First” Republican president taking power again in 2024 gives rise to particular concerns regarding the development of international relations.

There are good reasons why the West should not rely on democracies succeeding in a confrontation with autocracies. Autocratically-governed states are not necessarily less successful economically—as the example of China shows. They are integrated into the world economy, which has benefited their economic advancement and success. And they are very important suppliers not only of industrial goods but also of strategically important raw materials. There are also a number of democracies that cannot be won over to a categorical course of demarcation of ostracizing autocratic states. This applies to countries such as India, which hopes to obtain economic benefits from continued cooperation with Russia. In addition, the reserved wait-and-see attitude of important Third World countries (e.g., South Africa) should not be underestimated. These countries (rightly or wrongly) did not see themselves sufficiently recognized and respected by the developed Western world in the past; now they are called upon to take a stand against Russia and China and to sanction these states, which they resent as that would entail considerable economic disadvantages for themselves.

Why the above explanations and the extensive historical discourse? By now we should all be aware that we must adapt to a new world order or disorder, to major new threats to peace, security, and our values. But the Zeitenwende (turning point) proclaimed by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz was not a completely unforeseen turning point. The Russian war against Ukraine marks an unexpected and incisive change. But it is also part of a historical process that is now taking place with increased dynamism.

It is now more important than ever to defend our freedom and values by shaping a well-fortified democracy and pursuing proactive policies in the alliance and the EU. And despite the understandable moral outrage and righteous anger at Putin’s war realities, escalation risks, and existing political constraints must not be ignored.

In relation to Russia, we are in a new, intensified phase of confrontation, on the brink of a Cold War 2.0. In many respects, this Cold War is not comparable to the old Cold War after World War II. Nevertheless, in shaping the now critical transitional phase that should again result in a stable, predictable world order, we should draw and apply lessons from the previous Cold War. Now is not the time of arrogance that in some respects shaped the West for many years after the end of the division of Europe and especially after the turn of the millennium.

The complexity of the current international situation requires multilayered foreign policy responses. The focus must be on safeguarding our freedom and democracy as well as preventing a major war, which could imply existential dangers for all of humanity. Escalation risks must be tackled, not simply dismissed or ignored—as is often unfortunately the case in relation to the war in Ukraine. The following tasks can be identified as priorities:

1. Maintaining adequate defense and political solidarity to deter aggression and to defend the territory of all NATO member states. That is the very basis for the security policy to be pursued. This makes it particularly urgent for Germany—as for all other European NATO partners—to eliminate the significant equipment and capability deficits of the Bundeswehr. The measures taken to date—in particular the special fund of EUR 100 billion recently allocated to the Bundeswehr to close capability gaps and modernize its arms and equipment—are unlikely to be sufficient. Also, questions such as the reinstatement of compulsory national service should not be taboo.

2. Within the framework of NATO, an effective multinational forward defense on the border with Russia (possibly based on the model of the past Cold War) must be organized in order to be able effectively and sustainably deter an attack or a “spillover” onto the alliance’s territory.

3. In view of future uncertainties concerning the political course of the United States and the resulting effects on transatlantic relations, but also in view of the intensification of the multipolar great power rivalry that will characterize the world order, the EU should significantly strengthen its ability to assert itself on the global stage and also achieve strategic militarily autonomy (including through an independent nuclear deterrent).

4. The competition and rivalry among the great powers require skillful management and sound judgment based on realpolitik considerations. A deliberate policy of confrontation between autocracies and democracies would only intensify rivalries. It should therefore be avoided, as should the exclusion or ostracizing of individual states. Common interests and challenges such as dealing with climate change should form a key guiding principle. It will be of key importance to defend and strengthen wherever possible a rules-based international order. This is above all in the interest of smaller states, which otherwise cannot individually assert their interests vis-à-vis the great powers.

5. Despite the less-than-favorable forecasts, everything should be done to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible. To that end, a balance of interests should be sought between Russia and Ukraine. However—and this will prove to be a particularly daunting challenge—the setting of false precedents must be avoided. The latter means that Russia must not be rewarded for the war of aggression it launched in contravention of international law. As it has the necessary political clout, the United States should engage Russia as an equal, and push decisively for a diplomatic solution. For such a solution, both sides will have to abandon their expectation to win the war and will have to accept bitter and sometimes face-saving compromises. The great risk of escalation, the high number of victims to be expected in a long-lasting military conflict, as well as major disruptive consequences, felt in virtually all parts of the world should not simply be accepted.

6. In view of the prospect of a largely unregulated new Cold War (following the dismissal or abandonment of the previous arms control acquis), it is necessary quickly to resume the dialogue between the great powers and to revive arms control. This is necessary not only to stabilize the military confrontation and avoid miscalculations. Arms control policy measures could also prevent a new arms race and excessive defense spending, thus freeing up necessary resources for effectively meeting jointly the challenges facing mankind as a whole (in particular, climate change, global health care, and support for sustainable livelihoods).