The altered modus operandi in Syria presents an opportunity for the United States and its allies to rethink their Syria policy. Washington and Ankara shared some overlapping interests. The defeat of Iranian and Iran-aligned militia influence in Syria is a strategic win. Ankara’s influence over the HTS could, in theory, act as a moderating force as the group transitions from an armed jihadi movement to a political one. Ankara regretted seeing its influence wane in post-war Iraq as Iran rose to dominance and did not want to repeat the mistakes of the past. The SDF holds several thousand Islamic State fighters in detention camps. Turkey has long held that as a NATO member, it is a credible counterterrorism ally. Still, if this is to work, Turkey must be prepared to take on an expanded role to fulfill this commitment against the threat of IS activity.

Two main obstacles stand in the way of a territorially coherent Syria and will pose challenges for American and British policy engagement. The first relates to the formal status of the SDF and a YPG-controlled autonomous administration. The enclave will come under pressure under Turkish influence in Damascus and the northern belt controlled by the Turkey-backed SNA. By privileging its relationship with the SDF, the United States and its Western allies may inadvertently constrain their options and limit their strategic flexibility, especially if the HTS is able to consolidate political and military power at the center of the state. 

This will not mean abandoning the Kurds but rather reassessing the military alignment with the YPG militia and promoting a broad-based range of Kurdish opposition parties, most under the Kurdish National Council (Kurdish National Council (ENKS/KNC) umbrella—an admittedly fragmented coalition with ties to the former president of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud Barzani. The KNC recently called for Kurdish unity ahead of future talks with the HTS government and the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2254, laying out a political timetable for elections in Syria.

The second challenge is the expansion of Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights and its occupation of a UN buffer zone. Recently, Israel approved a plan for the expansion of settlements there. This could lead to the eventual “cantonization” of the Syrian state—a scenario that Turkey seeks to avoid and one that the new guardians of Damascus will struggle to contain. Ultimately, the latter can do little about it until it rebuilds a functioning administrative state. Both scenarios, unfolding at different paces, will have far-reaching consequences and constitute a hard-to-reverse territorial re-arrangement that must ultimately be left to the Syrian people to decide through a transparent constitutional process.

Unless Turkey extends credible assurances—and backs it up with action on the ground—that it supports the rights of the Syrian Kurdish population to equal citizenship and political representation in the new Syria, it will struggle to persuade its partners that its fight is with the YPG-PKK and not the Syrian Kurds. This will not be easy, and previous efforts have failed. But this is a new Syria in the making, and there is a strategic window of opportunity to reset Turkey’s terms of engagement while supporting a Syrian-authored process. 

Dr. Burcu Ozcelik is a Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security at the Royal United Services Institute.

Image: Mohammad Bash / Shutterstock.com.