Finally, there is the nub of the real problem with War from the Ground Up. Not all of the wars of the twenty-first century will be as much about politics as they are about combat. Some could well be wars where the armed forces need to fight for real, tangible military objectives.  A complicated military planning process that accommodates military deployments as political signals risks deconstructing the military's capacity to fight and win battles, campaigns and wars. It is folly to sub-optimize the primary purpose of the armed forces just to make them a more amenable political instrument.

Clarity Over Complicated

Simpson's frustrations with outcomes of ISAF operations in Afghanistan are more than justified. Fair enough to argue that using the military as a non-military instrument was, on many occasions, an act of folly. Arguably, we need to be better at planning, organizing and undertaking these kinds of missions. Perhaps, we need a better, more effective doctrine and planning process for those activities.

Arguably, however, the poor results in Iraq and Afghanistan may be just as easily attributed to poor traditional military planning. In Afghanistan, for example, Obama allowed the military half the time and half the forces that would reasonably be required to buy the Afghans sufficient time and space to hold off a Taliban resurgence. On top of that, the politicians (not the military) failed at dealing with the fractious politics in Kabul.

The problem with brand new ideas like the strategic narrative is that they may have no virtue other than being something new.  Sometimes, argues Antulio Echevarria, the former director of research at the U.S. Army War College, these new concepts

"make contemporary wars seem too complex and too fraught with friction to engage in, especially with ground forces. Complexity and friction are part and parcel of everyday life. Treating them as something exceptional makes them larger than life, and calls into question our professional ability to get the job done, despite their presence."

Perhaps the problem is not that war is too complex to master without new thinking. Perhaps, Clausewitz had a better answer. "War is simple," he said, but in war, "the simple is difficult." Simpson fixates on the many little non-combat tasks the military may get wrong.  Arguably, the problem has been getting the big, simple things wrong: for example, not using the military for appropriate task and purpose.

While Americans expect their next president to make them safer, they also will demand the next administration act with prudence and judgment. They have seen what reckless wishful thinking leads to. They'll demand something better.

A vice president of The Heritage Foundation, James Jay Carafano directs the think tank’s research in foreign relations and defense policy.

Image: Flickr/U.S. Marine Corps.