The Venezuelan Connection

One should not expect an easy negotiation with the ELN, based on the experience of Colombia’s last seven presidents, all of whom entered into conversations with it one time or another. On the positive side, the ELN may feel more comfortable dealing with a leftist government, and to the extent that some of their more political demands overlap with Petro’s campaign platform, they may find common ground. And, indeed, there may be some desire on the part of ELN leadership, as there was in the FARC, to come in from the cold and lead normal lives.

However, it has been argued that the ELN has become transformed in recent years through its association with the Venezuelan governments of Hugo Chavez and his successor Nicolas Maduro. The ELN and the FARC had long used the border region as a refuge and were involved in drug trafficking there, colluding with elements of the Venezuelan military.

But there has been a qualitative change, according to an analysis by “Insight Crime,” an NGO which tracks security developments in the Western Hemisphere. The ELN, it suggests, has spread its presence to large areas of southern and central Venezuela, where it both engages in criminal activity and acts as an additional security force for the regime, and even is viewed as a potential element of resistance in the event of a long-feared (if improbable) U.S. invasion.

Even if this analysis may overstate the ELN’s role in Venezuela, it does raise the question of whether it can truly disarm and reintegrate itself into Colombian political and economic life while remaining intact in Venezuela, especially as Colombia’s narcotics industry serves as the ELN’s principal financial engine, along with extortion and illegal timber cutting and gold mining. And even as Venezuela prepares to host the talks, the Caracas regime can hardly be considered to be a neutral, honest broker.

Also, the ELN is less centralized than the FARC, with the leaders of various regional elements enjoying greater autonomy and acting as local warlords. It is doubtful that all of them will accept a peace deal even if the overall leadership agrees to it.

Petro’s quest for “total peace” also includes seeking a deal with breakaway FARC elements which had rejected the deal reached with the FARC in 2016. At a minimum, it is unclear if they would have any interest in such a negotiation, as they instead may prefer to fill the vacuum which the ELN could leave should it disarm. And it would seem difficult for the government to offer them a better deal than that which the main body of the FARC had previously accepted.

Going it Alone?

What will the role of the United States be, given its long history of support for Colombia in its struggle against drug traffickers and guerrillas? The United States has so far avoided direct confrontation with Petro despite his insistence that previous policies have been failures. While the United States was broadly supportive of the negotiations with the FARC, it has stayed silent regarding the “total peace” initiative. At the recently concluded first round of peace talks, the parties called for the United States to “accompany” the peace process. But the reality is that extensive U.S. assistance both for security and development, which has continued with bipartisan support since 2016, has always been predicated on continued counternarcotics efforts.

But Petro’s Colombia seems determined to walk away from using the security forces against coca cultivation and trafficking and to seek a deal with the ELN, the FARC remnants, and the drug cartels which will likely leave the cocaine industry intact. Thus, instead of providing total peace, his plans may allow large parts of Colombia to once again become lawless, ungoverned spaces. Under those circumstances, U.S. support will inevitably wither away, leaving Petro to try to implement his grand plans on his own.

Richard M. Sanders is a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served at the U.S. Embassy in Colombia in 1985-86 and 1999-2002. Other assignments include service as Director of the Office of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs and as Foreign Policy Adviser to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Image: Reuters.