How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Is Rebounding in Iran
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not only dominated global headlines, but also triggered a wide-ranging debate in Iran and among Iranians about Tehran’s ties with Moscow.
Third, several Iranian officials’ remarks about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also connected the issue with the ongoing Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations. They suggested that it can embolden Iran’s diplomacy toward taking more robust stances to get greater concessions from Washington. Part of this initially new-found self-esteem was the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s announcement, on the second day of Russia’s invasion, that claimed that “[uranium] enrichment [...] continues with a maximum ceiling of 60%, which led Westerners to rush to negotiations, and it will continue with the lifting of sanctions by both 20% and 5%.” This is not only a reversal from JCPOA provisions and the compromise deal sketched out during the ongoing Vienna talks, but an explicit recognition of the rationale behind Iran’s nuclear escalation strategy aimed at provoking Western alarmism and maximizing Western concessions.
Russia Taking the Vienna Talks Hostage?
However, these hopes were dashed later, when the West decided to impose severe sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Now, Moscow, increasingly troubled by unexpected difficulties in Ukraine and faced with significant economic pressure, chose to play the “Iran card.” Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asked the United States to provide it with a “written guarantee” that all of its economic dealings with Iran won’t be hindered by U.S. sanctions now slapped upon it. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken rejected this out of hand, saying that the Iran nuclear issue was in no way tied to the new sanctions on Russia. Indeed, Moscow’s last-minute request raises questions about its intentions, given the fact that Russia’s role in the JCPOA’s revival and implementation is already cleared by U.S. sanctions waivers.
Therefore, speculations about this Russian behavior ranged from Moscow frustrating the final phase of the talks and delaying its conclusion up to wholly torpedoing them. Such Russian obstructionism is based upon several Russian contemplations at a time of unprecedented tension with the West: Creating complications in the Vienna talks could be traded with Western concessions on the Russia/Ukraine front, could continue to distract Western politico-diplomatic capital from clearly focusing on confronting the Russian challenge, and could delay the weakening of Russia’s energy position by preventing Iranian oil from reaching the global market.
Meanwhile, Russia’s last-minute request has created strong irritations within the same official Iranian circles who had initially lent support to the Kremlin’s war, including from the SNSC secretary and the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson. Against this backdrop, there are even calls in Iran for direct talks between Tehran and Washington—something that the Islamic Republic has routinely rejected to do—as a way to bring the Vienna talks to their conclusion and thereby avert Russian spoiling.
However, it seems Moscow has finally abandoned its attempts to hijack the Vienna talks. On March 15, Lavrov claimed Russia had written guarantees from the United States—reportedly assuring full Russian cooperation with Iran under the JCPOA but not necessarily beyond that in case this would clash with sanctions that have been imposed against Russia over its war on Ukraine. Russia may have decided against derailing the nuclear talks because the JCPOA remains in its interest. For example, an Iran freed from many sanctions could help Russia circumvent the onerous sanctions regime it now faces. Indeed, this is quite a reversal from the past, when an Iran under crippling sanctions looked to Russia for support. In sum, a sanctioned Russia and an Iran largely freed from sanctions is opening a new chapter in the tormented history of Iranian–Russian relations.
Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad is Associate Fellow at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, where he also publishes the Iran in Focus brief. He is also the author of the much-acclaimed book Iran in an Emerging New World Order (2021). Follow him on Twitter: @AFathollahNejad.
Image: Reuters.