IMEC at One Year: India-Middle East Leads, Europe Needs to Recommit
One year into the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, progress in the India-Middle East segment is strong, while Europe, led by Italy, must ramp up efforts to unlock the initiative’s full potential.
Editor’s Note: An Italian-language version of this article was originally published in Formiche.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), signed on September 10 last year at the G20 Summit in Delhi, stands as one of the most significant geo-economic initiatives aimed at revitalizing trade and commerce across the Indo-Mediterranean region. This corridor connects the economies of the Indo-Pacific with the Mediterranean-Atlantic, forming a crucial economic bridge. As we mark the first anniversary of IMEC, it’s essential to assess the progress made thus far. India, along with Middle Eastern partners like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, has made encouraging strides, while the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza have sidetracked Europe and the United States. Yet despite regional challenges, India and its West Asian allies remain optimistic about the initiative, in contrast to their more distant Transatlantic counterparts. This disparity must be addressed swiftly to ensure the corridor’s full potential is realized.
Why Does IMEC Matter?
At its core, IMEC aims to enhance global trade and connectivity by linking South Asia with the Middle East and Europe. It promotes economic integration among key regions by creating more efficient and expansive transportation routes for goods, energy, and services. Additionally, it fosters stronger political and economic ties between India, the Middle East, and Europe, potentially boosting regional resilience and stability.
Though this may sound like a novel endeavor, IMEC is, in fact, being built upon a reliable foundation—namely, some of the oldest and most significant trade routes between India and Europe, which date back millennia.
The key to understanding this dynamic is India’s historical importance. From ancient times up to the nineteenth century, India accounted for between 20 to 30 percent of the global economy. Much like China’s economic role in recent decades, it was India that drove a great deal of global trade in the ancient world. Such was India’s influence on global trade that it is woven into European history, from Herodotus’s Histories to Alexander the Great’s campaigns. Columbus’s quest for a western sea route to India and the competition among European maritime powers to dominate Indian trade routes changed the world forever.
Now, after recovering from colonialism’s economic drain, India is poised to reclaim its historical importance. The country is now the fastest-growing major economy and is poised to become the world’s third-largest by the end of the decade. This resurgence positions India as a key player in fostering Indo-Mediterranean economic integration, driving interest and investments into relevant projects.
It is with this historical understanding that one approaches IMEC’s present function and future potential. Currently, Indo-Mediterranean trade relies heavily on the Suez Canal, and its primacy will be sustained for decades in the future. Yet, it cannot be a single source of failure. Diversification and redundancy in Indo-Mediterranean commerce will be increasingly sought and valued. Thus, looking ahead, new transport corridors will emerge, connecting the Gulf nations overland through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to the Mediterranean. Turkey and Iraq are also developing plans to establish overland routes from the Persian Gulf through Anatolia to Europe. As the Indo-Mediterranean trade expands in the coming decades, these multiple trade arteries will be essential for handling the increased volume of commerce between the two regions. These routes offer immense potential to drive economic growth and integration, benefiting areas from Central Asia to coastal African nations along the Indian Ocean—just as they did centuries ago.
Given the variety of interests involved, IMEC is a true multilateral initiative, with no single nation dominating the endeavor. Its founding members include eight leading G20 economies—India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Germany, France, the European Union, and the United States—each with a vested interest in funding hard and soft infrastructure facilities within their own borders to support this growing economic partnership. Moreover, strong U.S. diplomatic, economic, and security backing for IMEC serves to strengthen the connections between free and open regions across the Indo-Pacific and Mediterranean-Atlantic, advancing American interests while limiting the strategic flexibility of its adversaries.
Yet the true vanguard of IMEC’s potential are the leading port cities of India, the Middle East, and Europe. Among these are Mumbai in India and Dubai in the UAE, which serve as powerful financial and transportation hubs, acting as force multipliers for economic growth. In Europe, meanwhile, Trieste—the northernmost Mediterranean port and historic marine gateway for Central and Eastern Europe—stands out as a vital entrepot, owing to its strategic position and proximity to the European industrial and financial heartland.
Alongside these ports, businesses from IMEC signatory nations are set to collaborate in ways reminiscent of the historic Hanseatic League, forming a sort of modern “Indo-Abrahamic League.” Leading Indian companies like Tata, Reliance, and Ambani will increasingly partner with Middle Eastern giants like DP World, Etisalat, and major UAE banks. Meanwhile, European companies such as Italy’s Generali, Fincantieri, and key players in banking, finance, telecom, and energy will join forces to facilitate trade along IMEC’s growing commercial corridors. A prime example of such collaboration is the Italy to India Blue Raman submarine fiber-optic communications cable project, involving companies like Reliance Jio, Omantel, Sparkle, and Google. Additionally, Trieste’s harbor has attracted investments from major European logistics companies, including MSC, HHLA, and Adria Ports, further strengthening its role in driving economic activity along the corridor.
An Anniversary Appraisal
One year in, progress on IMEC is mixed.
Starting with the good news: India, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have each made significant strides in strengthening their bilateral economic relations. In 2022, India and the UAE signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, aiming to boost bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2027. Since May 2022, trade between the two countries has grown by 16.4 percent, reaching $83.64 billion in 2024. The UAE is now India’s third-largest trading partner after China and the United States. Both nations are also making steady progress on a bilateral food security and processing corridor, with Indian Tobacco Corporation (ITC) exploring the possibility of extending this corridor across the entire IMEC route.
Similarly, FedEx is involved in planning and preparing for future expansions of IMEC’s transport corridors. India’s trade with Saudi Arabia is also on the rise, passing $50 billion annually, making Saudi Arabia India’s fourth-largest trading partner. Saudi Arabia has committed $20 billion to develop road and rail networks within its borders to support IMEC, reinforcing its critical role in the corridor’s success.
Now, the bad news: the ongoing conflict in Gaza, along with rising tensions between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran, presents significant challenges for IMEC. Likewise, Houthi attacks on Suez Canal traffic add further complications. However, the long-term peace and stability of the region are closely linked to increased economic activity, interdependence, and prosperity along IMEC’s trade routes. Regional actors recognize this reality and are gradually working towards it. Europe and the United States should take note and prioritize IMEC as a key component in any peace negotiations to resolve current conflicts. The U.S.-Saudi Arabia civil nuclear agreement, currently in progress, also holds great potential to strengthen IMEC in a meaningful way.
In addition, the Europe-Middle East and Europe-India segments of IMEC, in general, are lagging behind. Greater effort is needed to match the progress made in the India-Middle East segment.
Italy as the Key IMEC Actor?
Italy, as the most proximate European signatory of IMEC, is uniquely positioned to take a leading role in tackling this challenge. Its strategic interests align perfectly with this responsibility, as Italy seeks to diversify and strengthen its commercial ties with Asia while progressing its Mattei Plan on partnering with Africa. IMEC, with emphasis on infrastructure, innovation, and new markets, is precisely the sort of initiative called for in the Draghi Europe Competitiveness Report. Both India and Italy view African nations along the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean as integral to the future of Indo-Mediterranean trade and commerce. The Italian port of Trieste, located at the head of the Adriatic Sea, has the makings of becoming IMEC’s primary European hub—a sort of Rotterdam of the Mediterranean—offering the most efficient connectivity between the Mediterranean and the heart of Europe.
Beyond its geographical advantage, Italy is also politically well-placed to lead IMEC’s European advancement. With recent parliamentary elections in Europe and France just concluded and the U.S. elections on the horizon with Germany next year, Italy provides much-needed institutional and political continuity within the Transatlantic alliance on IMEC. Italy should proactively engage with the new European and U.S. administrations to ensure that IMEC remains a high priority within their geostrategic agendas. Additionally, Italy should push for IMEC to receive top billing under Europe’s Global Gateway initiative, European Competitiveness agenda, and the G7 Global Partnership for Infrastructure Investment. To further its national interests, Italy must offer visionary leadership and sustained commitment, ensuring the European segment of IMEC matches the energy and enthusiasm demonstrated by India and Middle Eastern nations.
Kaush Arha is President of the Free & Open Indo-Pacific Forum and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue.