The extreme options thus seem to hold the greatest dangers for Ali Khamenei. He’s more likely to take a blended path—and that’ll probably be a nuclear deal without a grand domestic opening. But our assumptions in this exercise may be unsound—and there’s one path that the supreme leader may find most attractive of all. Sanctions relief after a deal is likely to take time, and growth may take even longer—Iran’s oil industry, for example, will need tens of billions of investment to recover from its current state. A deal will spark tremendous optimism, but you can’t feed your family with optimism. Your landlord won’t accept optimism in lieu of rent. Pocketbook issues matter, and here the Rouhani government has trouble. As Arthur MacMillan notes for AFP, Rouhani’s efforts to save Iran’s economy have required austerity measures. The prices of fuel and bread have gone up significantly; inflation is better than it was but still severe, even by Iranian standards. Stabilizing the economy is often a thankless task, and it would be hard to blame the poorest for voting against the man who cut the subsidies. Rouhani might get his nuclear deal, but he might not get his Majles even if the 2016 elections are (relatively) open. This could be Khamenei’s best-case scenario: economic revitalization and the mobilization of parts of society sympathetic to him. Rouhani, in this case, would be harried but not defeated. The regime would be more stable—and Ali Khamenei would sit comfortably at the top.

John Allen Gay, an associate managing editor at The National Interest, is coauthor of War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences (Rowman and Littlefield, 2013). He tweets at @JohnAllenGay.

Image: khamenei.ir.