Israel and Ukraine Are on the Same Side

Israel and Ukraine Are on the Same Side

Jerusalem has limited options for aiding Kyiv. Tehran has no problem supporting Moscow’s invasion. 

While the world’s attention focuses on the U.S. presidential election and the conflict in the Middle East continues to escalate, the Russo-Ukrainian War grinds on. The war represents not only a bloody and cataclysmic clash between Russia and Ukraine but also a proxy war within the larger cold war between a Western bloc led by the United States and a Eurasian bloc consisting of China, Russia, Iran, and their partners. That cold war is also playing out in the hot wars roiling the Middle East and the potential showdown between the United States and China over Taiwan in East Asia. The theaters of the new cold war have grown increasingly interconnected, resulting in a unified geopolitical system characterized by competition and conflict.

Crucially, the principal antagonists of the Middle East conflict—Israel and Iran—are themselves deeply involved in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Israel has provided Ukraine with diplomatic, humanitarian, and intelligence support as Kyiv struggles to resist the Russian onslaught. Nonetheless, Israeli-Ukrainian ties do not fully reflect their fundamental geopolitical alignment in the new cold war, as Israeli support for Ukraine is curtailed by Russia’s presence in Israel’s Syrian neighbor and the precarious position of Jews in Russia. In contrast, Iran has staunchly backed Russia’s war, cementing the Russo-Iranian strategic alliance.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Israel has provided Ukraine with rhetorical and moral support. Former Israeli foreign minister Yair Lapid immediately condemned Russia’s invasion, labeling it a threat to international order. Former prime minister Naftali Bennett even offered to mediate the conflict during its opening months. On March 2, 2022, Israel was one of 141 countries that condemned Russia’s invasion in a vote in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Lapid and Bennett expressed horror at the March 2022 Bucha massacre, which the former suggested amounted to “war crimes.” After assuming the premiership in late 2022, Lapid again lambasted Russia for the invasion.

Israel has also provided Ukraine with significant humanitarian aid. Major measures include setting up a field hospital, supplying humanitarian workers in Ukraine with helmets and protective vests, and sending water purification systems, medical equipment, blankets, and sleeping bags. Jerusalem has also provided Kyiv with intelligence on Iranian drones after Russia began deploying them against Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Israel has refrained from supplying Ukraine with significant amounts of lethal aid despite repeated Ukrainian entreaties. Ukraine has been particularly interested in acquiring Israel’s advanced Iron Dome technology to shoot down Russian projectiles. Although Jerusalem declined that request, Israel reportedly quietly approved the sale of defensive electronic warfare systems to Kyiv.

Concern for how weapons sales would affect the Russo-Israeli relationship in Syria has been central to Israel’s refusal to supply Ukraine with lethal aid. With Russia maintaining a significant presence on the ground and in the skies over Syria, Israel depends on Russian goodwill to allow it to strike Iranian targets throughout the country. Though Jerusalem no longer always notifies Moscow of its strikes as it had been doing before the terrorist attacks of October 7, Israel still depends on Russia turning a blind eye to its activities over Syrian territory. Robust Israeli support for Kyiv could jeopardize Russia’s generally permissive attitude toward Israel’s campaign of degrading Iran’s infrastructure in Syria. Jerusalem’s dependence on tacit Russian permission to strike Tehran’s and its proxies’ positions in Syria thus represents a serious impediment to full Israeli support for the Ukrainian military effort.

Israeli policymakers have also had to weigh how pro-Ukrainian policies might affect Jewish communities in Russia and Ukraine. Prior to the war, approximately 155,000 Jews lived in Russia, while 43,000 lived in Ukraine. After Russia’s invasion, Israeli and Jewish organizations sprang into action, evacuating over 13,000 Ukrainian Jews to neighboring countries. By August 2022, 12,633 Ukrainian Jews and 21,722 Russian and Belarussian Jews had immigrated to Israel.

Meanwhile, the situation for Jews in Russia has deteriorated. Russian officials have exploited anti-Semitism for political leverage, accusing the Ukrainian government of being anti-Semitic and Nazi-led. This rhetoric is aimed at justifying Russia’s actions by linking the invasion to its historic role in defeating Nazi Germany during World War II. This narrative is complicated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s Jewish heritage, which contradicts Russian claims. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin has cynically remarked, however, that Ukraine put an “ethnic Jew” in charge of the country as a means of “covering up the glorification of Nazism.” Other senior Russian officials, including former President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, have also made searing anti-Semitic remarks. Putin has threatened to shut down the offices of the Jewish Agency in Russia, echoing Soviet-era restrictions on Jewish emigration to Israel. The Chief Rabbi of Moscow, Pinchas Goldschmidt, fled the country after resisting pressure to support the Ukrainian war.

While both the vulnerability of Russian Jews and Russia’s role in Syria have complicated Israel’s policy toward the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Israel’s Iranian nemesis has steadfastly supported Putin’s war.

During the first year of the war, Iran emerged as one of Russia’s chief weapons suppliers. In August 2022, the first Iranian drones arrived in Russia, including both the Shahed-131/136 Kamikaze drones” and the more advanced Mohajer-6 drones, used for reconnaissance and precision fire. During 2022 and 2023, Russia launched at least 3,700 Iranian-made Shahed drones at Ukrainian targets. Russia also established a factory in Tatarstan to manufacture Iranian-style drones.

Iran has also provided other types of military aid for Putin’s war. By early 2024, Iran had given Russia approximately 400 surface-to-surface missiles, including the long-range Fateh-110. Additionally, Iran has compensated for Russia’s deficiencies in ammunition by delivering at least 100 million bullets and 300,000 shells.

In addition to weapons, Iran also dispatched military advisors to Russian-occupied Crimea. According to the White House, the advisors have been “directly engaged on the ground” in assisting the launch of drones against Ukrainian targets. Ukraine has reportedly even killed a number of these Iranian advisors.

There is a yawning gap between the level of Iranian and Israeli support for the respective belligerents in the Russo-Ukrainian struggle. Israel, its options constrained by Russia’s posture in Syria and the fate of Russian Jews, has largely limited its aid to Ukraine to rhetorical, humanitarian, and intelligence measures. Iran, meanwhile, has resolutely backed its Russian partner with massive weapons transfers and military advisors. 

The gap between Israeli and Iranian involvement in the Ukrainian conflict may narrow. As Moscow and Tehran intensify their relationship, Israeli policymakers may conclude that weakening its Iranian rival’s close Russian ally by militarily supporting Ukraine is of paramount interest for the Jewish state. Overall, the Russo-Ukrainian and Iranian-Israeli conflicts represent two sides of the same competition between a Western bloc seeking to maintain the current international order and a Eurasian bloc vying to overturn it. It may not be long before Israeli policy begins to better reflect that fundamental geopolitical reality.

Anthony De Luca-Baratta is an intern at the Center for the National Interest, where his research centers on technology and defense policy. He is a Public Service Fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). When he is back home in Montreal, he is a proud member of JC’s morning hockey league.

William Erich Ellison is a rising second-year PhD student at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His research interests include the U.S.-Israel relationship, the transatlantic relationship, and Israel’s relationships with major powers in a multipolar world. You can follow him on X at @Will51796.

Joseph Schneider Malamud is a rising second-year MAIR student at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Research Intern at the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET). His research interests include European and Israeli domestic politics and their interaction with their geopolitics and national security concerns. Follow him on LinkedIn.

Mollie Sharfman is a recent graduate and recipient of the Public Service Award from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. She also serves as a Chaplain-in-Residence at Georgetown University’s main campus. Mollie’s research focuses on Europe and Eurasia, Israeli domestic policy, and Women, Peace, and Security. Follow her on LinkedIn.

Image: Israfoto / Shutterstock.com.