The stated aim of the Biden administration’s policy on Ukraine has been to achieve the defeat of Russia, and to this end, it provided assistance to Ukraine. It did not undertake any serious diplomatic initiative with Russia and Ukraine on a negotiated settlement. Vice President Harris may, of course, adjust that policy if the Democratic Party nominates her and wins the elections in November. As of now, it appears that she will likely continue Biden’s policy. 

If the Trump-Vance ticket prevails, there is likely to be a push for serious negotiations toward a diplomatic settlement. The time between now and the election, as well as the transition to the new administration, should be utilized to begin discussing potential settlement options and modalities, as well as their prospects and implications for Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the United States.

A Trump administration may become both a catalyst and an opportunity for a Ukraine settlement. Both President Trump and Senator Vance have consistently called for such a settlement and have expressed doubts that U.S. and European assistance to Ukraine and economic pressure on Russia can realistically bring about Ukraine’s victory in the war. Both have been concerned about the level of U.S. assistance and have argued that European powers should carry the predominant burden since the conflict is “in their neighborhood.” 

Senator Vance has made an additional argument. He has argued that given the U.S. military capabilities, including our industrial base, the priority should be to focus on the threat from China and that the effort in Ukraine diverts resources needed to deal with Beijing’s vital challenge.

Nor would it be unreasonable for Trump to conclude that the situation on the ground in both Ukraine and Russia provides an opportunity for a political settlement. Victory is not imminent for either side. Ukraine’s resistance has been heroic but has come at the cost of enormous casualties. War fatigue among the populace, if it has not set in already, is inevitable. President Zelensky faced significant challenges in his mobilization effort. The country has suffered mortal blows to its energy and power grid, and there are electricity and fuel shortages due to Russian attacks on refineries. The coming winter is likely to be particularly harsh.

However, while Ukraine may not have the military capability to evict Russian forces from its territory, it has had some military success in liberating areas once occupied by Russia. It now has more weapons, including weapons capable of striking Russian soil, and it has the green light from its allies to deploy those at least selectively. Ukraine has inflicted damage on the battlefield and inside Russia. Kiev also produces more weapons at home and has economic and security commitments from several countries, including the United States. Ukraine, with support from its partners, can continue the war for the foreseeable future.

Russia has important advantages in the war, but for them, too, the cost of the ongoing conflict has been high. Russia has sustained more casualties than those on the Ukrainian side. Many young, technologically skilled Russians have left the country. Ukrainian drones have attacked Russia’s infrastructure. The war is now within Russia itself, making Russians more alert to the conflict. The war has also damaged Russian relations with much of the international community, and the costs of sanctions imposed on it have been significant, including the loss of a large part of its formerly lucrative energy market.

Internationally, the war has made Russia dependent on China, North Korea, and Iran. There is a long history of Sino-Russian mutual rivalry. While both have resented the U.S. power position after its success in the Cold War, they have different long-term objectives. Putin is an advocate of multipolarity, with Russia as one of the poles. China’s long-term objective is global preeminence, with Russia at best as a junior partner. Moscow believes that better relations with the West, especially the United States, could serve its interests. However, that is highly unlikely to occur without an acceptable ending to the Ukraine war.

The war has also strengthened rather than weakened NATO. The alliance has expanded in the last two years and is spending more on defense. If Trump is elected, allies will come under pressure to spend even more. Prospects for Russian victory against Ukraine in the foreseeable future are uncertain at best.

Russia will face a crucial additional risk if Trump is elected. If Putin does not respond positively to a peace initiative offered by the newly elected American President, he will undermine prospects for any improvement in relations. It may also have other unforeseen consequences, such as removing any limitations on Ukrainian use of American weapons and pushing against Russian interests in other regions, including North Korea and Iran.

The same goes for Ukraine. Since American diplomatic and material support is critical to the ongoing conflict, whatever America advocates will have significant weight. If President Zelensky obstructs a Trump negotiation initiative, the United States might reverse the permission given by the Biden administration for the use of American weapons against certain areas of Russia or make future aid conditional on cooperation.

Will these factors produce an opportunity for a peace settlement? I believe they will, though it will not be easy, and success is not assured. Any peace initiative will have to deal with four critical issues and bridge some very significant differences between the parties and other stakeholders.

1. Territory. Territory is obviously a critical issue, and the two sides are far apart on it. Ukraine wants the return of all territories occupied by Russia since 2014, including Crimea and Donbas. Based on his recent peace proposal, Putin—who alone will decide for Russia what is acceptable or not—is publicly demanding that Ukraine turn over to Russia even more territory than it currently occupies. Based on a recent opinion poll, the vast majority of Ukrainians, some 83 percent, reject the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, as demanded by Putin. During the presidential debate in June, President Trump characterized Putin’s proposal as unacceptable.

One option that some experts believe might work is the following: a) Russian forces pull back to areas Moscow controlled before the start of the 2022 war, i.e., Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. b) Ukraine agrees not to use force to liberate these areas but to seek the resolution of their ultimate future through negotiation and peaceful means only. c.) the remaining areas of Ukraine now occupied by Russia will be administered by a UNSC-mandated administration (a kind of protectorate) for ten years or so. At the end of that period, an internationally administered referendum would determine whether the people of these areas choose to rejoin Ukraine, join Russia, or have another option.

2. A robust security guarantee for Ukraine. A legitimate question of the Ukrainian leadership is that, after an agreement and a ceasefire, what is to deter and prevent Putin sometime later, say two years or more, having regrouped and enhanced his military capabilities, to push into the UN-administered areas and the rest of Ukraine to continue his goal of subjugation? This Ukrainian concern is not without cause, as Moscow has followed this method before.

In the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul in 2022, the option under consideration was Ukraine’s permanent neutrality along with a security guarantee by guarantor states consisting of the United States, Great Britain, China, Russia, France, Belarus, and Turkey. The draft text noted that EU membership was not inconsistent with permanent neutrality (Austria being evidence of that). 

Since then, Ukraine has been seeking NATO membership and NATO guarantees. At the recent NATO summit in Washington, the alliance stated that Ukraine’s path to NATO membership was “irreversible.” However, several NATO members have serious reservations about such an outcome. Russia regards Ukraine’s membership as a threat to its national security. Ukraine and the alliance might be willing to consider some defined buffer zones and distances that NATO and Russian combat forces shall maintain from the Ukraine-Russia border. 

One other option is likely to appeal to a future Trump administration: the EU provides guarantees by signing a security treaty with Ukraine, a future member of the entity. Given the limited security capabilities of the EU, that commitment to Ukraine’s security could be supplemented with a commitment by Europe’s two nuclear powers: France and the United Kingdom. In other words, both nations would commit to regard an attack on Ukraine’s post-settlement territory as an attack on themselves, to which they would respond accordingly. Of course, there could be alternative European permutations. Nonetheless, while these options might be appealing to Washington, Europeans are likely reluctant to accept this responsibility alone.

There is also the option of a U.S.-Ukraine defense treaty of the kind we are considering with Saudi Arabia. This year, the United States signed a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine aimed at enhancing defense cooperation, not a defense treaty. The Biden administration was not prepared to go that far, and given President Trump’s and Senator Vance’s statements, a bilateral defense treaty of that kind would be unlikely on their watch.