Israel’s Operation Protective Edge: Showcase for the Limits of Precision Strike?

Israel’s Operation Protective Edge: Showcase for the Limits of Precision Strike?

The IDF can see anything that moves in the open, and it can kill anything that it sees—but missiles keep falling from the sky.

Cohen and Scheinmann believe that Operation Protective Edge will contribute to the eventual exhaustion of Hamas. But, as the Israeli defense establishment’s now notorious euphemism of “mowing the grass” acknowledges, the effects of attrition are, in themselves, transient. Unless it is uprooted completely, the grass will always grow back. As long as partial attrition primarily by means of standoff firepower is the method of choice, Hamas and its likes know they stand an excellent chance of surviving to fight another day, as they have in the past. Their methods—be they suicide bombings, rocket fire, infiltration or whatever may come after that—may be reduced in effectiveness, but their overall strategy will only have to be adapted, rather than abandoned. Knowing that the pain will be intense, but that it will pass, they will embark upon another adventure when the time seems right, and the potential benefits seem worth the price.

Hitting the Barrier?

Over the past decades, Western militaries have spent much of their energy and resources “pushing the envelope” of precision strike, and they have enjoyed very considerable success in doing so. But not all of the limitations they face in applying this impressive instrument are amenable to military-technical solutions, and not all indicators of capability prove particularly meaningful when they are put to the test.

As the case of Israel intimates, Western states may be more prepared to adapt their aims to their preferred methods, than to adapt their methods to their aims. But whether it is a fifth campaign against Hamas in its Gaza stronghold, the Third Lebanon War, the bombing of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure or the suppression of Chinese land-based missiles in a future East Asian contingency, Western armed forces will have to work with a set of fundamental constraints that will shape outcomes, whether they like it or not. Internalizing these limitations and shaping our strategic preferences accordingly will save us, and the world around us, tons of grief.

 

Michael Carl Haas is a researcher with the Global Security team at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. His areas of interests include air and missile power, military innovation, and the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons.

Image: Flickr/Israeli Air Force