Italy Steps Up: Janus in the New World

Italy Steps Up: Janus in the New World

Italy’s profile as a supporter of the EU and NATO has risen since the inauguration of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.

 

More broadly, Rome has taken firm stances against challenges to Western hegemony—whether from Russia or China. In response to the Russian invasion, Italy has been one of the most vigorous supporters of Ukraine, both in rhetoric and material, including anti-tank systems, rockets, and surface-to-air missiles. Rome strongly supports Kyiv’s path to EU membership and its reconstruction. In November 2023, the Meloni government began discussing a long-term defense agreement with Ukraine. The country sharply cut imports from Russia in support of sanctions. Purchases of Russian natural gas fell by two-thirds after the invasion and were replaced with gas from Northern Europe and LNG from Qatar and the United States. To adjust, Italy imposed nationwide gas rationing that cut heating levels to both public and private buildings. 

Relations with China have cooled sharply, a process begun under the previous government. Like Mario Draghi, Prime Minister Meloni invoked Italy’s “golden powers” to block prerogatives by China’s Sinochem in the Pirelli Tire company despite its more than one-third share of ownership. Unlike Germany or France, Italy did not try to parse or water down the EU’s initiative to “de-risk” political and economic ties with China. Europe’s leaders have produced strong criticism of China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, its threats to Taiwan, and its suppression of human rights. Economic measures under consideration involve export controls, strengthening of scrutiny of Chinese investments into the EU, and, for the first time, vetting those of EU firms in China

 

In an unprecedented move in the spring of 2023, Italy confirmed that it plans to send the aircraft carrier Cavour and its accompanying flotilla to the South Pacific, an unmistakable show of closer alignment with the U.S. stance on Chinese claim to hegemony in the region. The carrier will head to Japan to brandish strong ties (including joint production of the F-35 fighter) with an alarmed—and rearming—Japan. In 2023, Italy upgraded its relations with Japan to the “strategic” level during a visit of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Rome. It did the same with India during an exchange of high-level visits. In October, a second representative office of the Taiwan government opened in Milan in a ceremony attended by the Taiwanese Foreign Minister.

After signaling for months that it would not renew its agreement to be part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, Rome officially withdrew in December 2023. Expected gains in trade and investment within this framework had not materialized. As the only G-7 country to have joined, Italy’s position was discordant with both the United States and the EU. Instead, the Meloni government has indicated that it will work to “revitalize” its longstanding strategic partnership with China.

When war broke out in the Middle East, the Meloni government made clear its condemnation of the Hamas terrorist attack and support of Israel. At the end of November, Rome abstained on a UN General Assembly resolution calling for a ceasefire because the declaration did not condemn Hamas or support Israel’s right to defend itself. Its stance has generally hewed closely to that of the United States and its major EU partners—calling for sanctions against Hamas, for example. The Meloni government has engaged in both its own and multilateral diplomacy to end the fighting and support a two-state solution. At the same time, when attacks by Houthi rebels on shipping in the region began, the Defense Ministry sent a second frigate to help boost the ongoing EU anti-piracy operation.

Italy’s dance with the EU itself has been complex, owing to earlier policies imposed on Rome when Italy found its national debt level untenable. But with some €70 billion in Recovery Funds smoothing the way, widespread fears that the Meloni government would derail the EU’s actions were not realized. In any case, budget policies have turned out not to be the most prominent bone of contention in new Italy-EU relations.

Migration and Gay Rights: Janus Faces Inward

No policy area better illustrates the Janus-like nature of Rome’s policies than its attempt to deal with tens of thousands of African, Middle Eastern, and Asian immigrants in a way that satisfies key domestic constituencies while not alienating EU allies.

Both Prime Minister Meloni and Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini have promised to stop the hazardous journeys of overfilled boats across the Mediterranean. A controversial decree was made a law by Parliament in May 2023, authorizing the detention of migrants in so-called Repatriation Detention Centers where conditions resemble prisons. The law was met with an outcry by magistrates, including a judge from Catania who refused to enforce the law and liberated on at least two occasions detained migrants, resulting in a major scandal, accusations, and defamation by members of the governing coalition. Another decree approved at the end of 2022 mandated that rescue ships can only carry out one rescue at a time and must dock and unload migrants before going out again. The decree puts significant limitations on rescue efforts and has been repeatedly violated by Italy’s own Coastal Guard. Most dramatically, the government produced an agreement with Albania that envisioned opening two centers for migrants there with costs to be covered by Italy. In December 2023, the Albanian Constitutional Court blocked the agreement’s ratification, making its future uncertain. 

Despite these and other harsh measures, the number of migrants in 2023 more than doubled compared to 2021, surpassing 150,000. Meanwhile, Meloni has also turned to the EU for help, hoping Brussels will conclude an agreement with Tunisia that mirrors the Libyan “naval blockade” that targets boats with migrants, a practice that has drawn much criticism.

In domestic policy, Meloni has led a vigorous charge aimed at restricting gay rights. In July 2023, Parliament passed a law that criminalizes parents who use surrogates to produce and adopt children, even if the process was legally carried out overseas. The law resulted in outrage among the LGBTQ+ community. All the while, Meloni has insisted that a child needs a father and a mother. However, the prime minister herself recently separated from the father of her child, whom she never married.

 

Tests Ahead

For Giorgia Meloni and her coalition partners, the choices for Italy in the new dangerous world are both civilizational and pragmatic, symbolic and instrumental. The practical consequences of leaving the BRI, for example, are few. High levels of Chinese investment in the UK, France, and Germany demonstrate that a BRI framework is unnecessary. However, reversing this policy has enormous symbolic significance as a demonstration of strong allied ties. Perhaps serendipitously, restricting Chinese investment in Sinochem also paved the way for an increased stake by an Italian company

Globally, closer cooperation with the EU and tighter alliance with the United States—for example, in the Indo-Pacific—not only secure concrete gains, e.g., for the Italian defense industry, but also provide Rome with the structure and platform on which the Meloni government can take its stance as a critical ally.

The challenge for Rome will come as that allied superstructure weakens. The level of new Western material support for Ukraine, for example, has fallen to its lowest level since the start of the war. Europe’s unity in condemning Hamas’ attack on Israel is being tested by the horrific humanitarian crisis the war has produced and by political divisions at home. Most directly—and most emblematic of the pressure on Rome’s contemporary Janus—the Meloni government needs to find a way to effectively respond to people’s desperate search for a better life that lands them on its shores—which are also those of the EU.

Ronald H. Linden is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and former Director of European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. During the spring of 2023, he was a Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science of Sapienza University, Rome. Recent publications include Is the Chinese Dream Turning into a Chinese Nightmare for Beijing?

Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Dean of Temple University Rome. Recent publications include The Impacts of the Russia-Ukraine War on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, with Gilles Ivaldi and A Delicate Balancing Act: Turkish-Bulgarian Relations within the Context of Foreign and Domestic Politics.

Correction: A previous version of this article mistakenly stated that the Italian aircraft carrier Cavour had been sent to the South Pacific in 2023. Although the voyage is still planned, as of February 6, 2024, it has not yet made the journey.

Image: Shutterstock.com.