And, as Brands emphasizes throughout the biography, Reagan was a considerably different sort of politician than the unbending ideological purist that most Republicans now choose to remember. His political philosophy may have been steely conservatism, but his political practice was pragmatism. Brands acknowledges that in an individual this counts as hypocrisy, but “in a president it is realism.” And it was this quality, after all, that enabled Reagan to believe that Communism was evil while remaining flexible enough to forge an alliance with the leader of the Soviet Union.

Some of the positions that Reagan took would now disqualify him from good standing in the conservative movement, including his record tax increase and liberalization of abortion laws as California governor, his opposition to the right-to-work laws that are currently in vogue with the GOP, and his support of what have become third-rail issues of immigration reform and gun control. And although Reagan is identified as the politician responsible for ushering the religious Right into the Republican Party, he did not share its hostility toward homosexuality. He and Nancy once left their children in the care of a lesbian couple while they went on vacation, and he strongly opposed a California ballot measure that would have barred gays and lesbians from teaching in public schools.

Nor is any current Republican politician likely to emulate Reagan’s tough-love stance with regard to Israel. When Israeli leaders vehemently protested the United States’ sale of military hardware to Saudi Arabia, Reagan called a press conference at which he emphasized that “while we must always take into account the vital interests of our allies, American security interests must remain our internal responsibility. It is not the business of other nations to make American foreign policy.” Reagan rejected Israel’s permanent retention of Gaza and the West Bank, opposed settlement construction in the occupied territories, and promoted a land-for-peace exchange between Israel and the Palestinians. He clashed repeatedly with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, who accused Reagan of treating his country like a “vassal state” and condoning “an ugly anti-Semitic campaign.” When asked if he was losing patience with Israel, Reagan replied, “I lost patience a long time ago.”

More generally, Reagan was a vastly more governance-oriented politician than the famous quote from his first inaugural address (“Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem”) would suggest. He understood that the purpose of politics is governing, and that governing inevitably requires compromise. As he told aides on many occasions, “I’d rather get 80 percent of what I want than to go over the cliff with my flag flying.” As a governor and as a president, he had to negotiate with legislatures that were partially or wholly controlled by Democrats. He accepted deals that entailed pragmatic trade-offs so long as they moved in what he considered the right direction. As Reagan himself put it, when he agreed to raise taxes as part of the 1982 budget deal, “A compromise is never to anyone’s liking. It’s just the best you can get and contains enough of what you want to justify what you give up.”

In this respect, Brands suggests, Reagan was much like his hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Both men

were at once idealists and pragmatists. Each understood that a successful president provides a compelling vision for the long term while making concrete progress in the short term. Each understood that presidents are not czars; they must deliver what the people want, even as they try to make people want something different and better.

Good luck was long thought to be a necessary trait of a successful ruler, and Reagan was nothing if not lucky. In his concluding evaluation of Reagan and his legacy, Brands points out that Reagan was well matched with his times. He grew up as the United States rose to world leadership and became aware of the Communist threat in Hollywood just as it was becoming a salient political issue for the country at large. As president, Reagan benefited from Paul Volcker administering his harsh anti-inflationary medicine at just the right time—too early and Jimmy Carter might have gotten credit for ending inflation, too late and recession might have swamped Reagan’s 1984 reelection chances. Reagan also benefited from the deaths of a series of geriatric Soviet leaders that cleared the way for Mikhail Gorbachev, who became a serious negotiating partner in bringing the Cold War to an end.

Brands offers a satisfying valediction for his subject as well as a brief and rather sad description of Reagan’s final years. But it’s uncertain what lessons can be drawn from this somewhat banausic biography that might provide guidance to present-day politics. The missing character in Brands’s account is the conservative movement, an unruly beast that Reagan somehow tamed and rode to victory but that subsequently slipped its bonds. Can any Republican politician ever again hope to command a relatively unified and governance-oriented conservative movement? Reagan’s rhetorical skill allowed him to reach out to the persuadable middle of the electorate and convince them that his approach could improve their lives. In this era of extreme partisan animus, when the typical American no longer seems to believe that the other side operates with good intentions, will there ever be another Great Communicator?

 

Geoffrey Kabaservice is the author, most recently, of Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party (Oxford University Press, 2012).