Rethinking European Security

December 29, 2014 Topic: Security Region: Europe

Rethinking European Security

Sanctions may push Russia to challenge the current status-quo.

How could the Roosevelt Administration “yank the leash” of economic sanction without realizing that this action might cause Japan to strike back militarily?  It is the coincidence of these actions, the total military unpreparedness for a possible attack at Pearl Harbor together with the systematic and biting constraints on the Japanese economy, which draw our attention.  It is this coincidence of strategic circumstance and of error (reflected in the absence of credible military deterrence) that holds analogy to the policies of the West vis-à-vis Putin’s Russia today.

Of course the details of present policy and historical circumstance are not identical.  No Pearl Harbor-style attack by Russia upon U.S. military installations is likely, despite the dramatic uptick of Russian bombers flying from the Gulf of Mexico to Diego Garcia.  But the catalytic effect of economic sanctions, set against blatant military unpreparedness to meet Russian provocation along the Russian littoral and in Poland and the Baltic Republics, in particular, is what constitutes the fulcrum of this analogy and the focus of our strategic concern.

Sanctions may push Russia not toward accepting the rules of a “globalized 21st century” and becoming a “constructive partner” but toward using its military power to attempt to break the economic constraints imposed upon it. Economic sanctions are not an alternative to old-fashioned deterrence, and in fact require an even more credible and effective deterrent in order to be effective.

No deterrent is perfect.  But the objective is to provide sufficient capability to assure a high probability of deterrent success.  Then economic sanctions will provide a genuine additional degree of leverage that may compel Russia to change its current belligerent behavior.  In the absence of an adequate deterrent, sanctions can backfire.  Economic sanctions without a credible deterrent are an invitation to failure.

Charles Doran is the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations, SAIS-JHU, Washington, DC.

Jakub Grygiel is the George H. W. Bush Associate Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Image: Wikimedia/Mikhail Evstafiev​