Second, support for the mainstream opposition would bring the United States into greater alignment with its regional allies. Backing Sunni Arab opposition groups in the battle against ISIS will dilute the influence of the Kurdish YPG. This could reduce tensions between Washington and Ankara, and improve the probability that Turkey might more actively contribute to the effort against ISIS. And given the potential for the liberation of ISIS-controlled territory to be used as a wedge against a Syrian government backed by Iran, Saudi Arabia will be more likely to increase its support. A more united front between the United States and its regional allies in the battle against ISIS would likely translate into greater unity and steadfastness on the diplomatic front in any future negotiations concerning a political transition in Syria.

Third, in the battle against ISIS the United States has a natural competitive advantage over Russia and the Syrian government. The United States has anti-ISIS campaigns underway in both Iraq and Syria and elsewhere in the region, while Russia’s engagement is for now limited to Syria. Given that ISIS is a regional phenomenon, not a Syria-only enterprise, any attempts to weaken or defeat this group require cross-border campaigns, where victories on one side of the border can translate into advantages on the other side. Neither Russia nor the Syrian government has this kind of “whole-of-battlefield” approach to ISIS. This means that unlike the United States and its allies, Moscow and Syria lack the ability to deliver a body blow to ISIS, and therefore are less able to use the war against ISIS to strengthen their relative position in the battle for Syria.

The war in Syria is at an inflection point. Prior to Russia’s involvement there was no real diplomatic process, and no prospects for a cease-fire. While there is plenty to be suspicious of in terms of Putin’s motives, one of which was to make Obama appear feckless, it is incontrovertible that the Russian shake-up opened up a diplomatic track for a conflict that was becoming a deadly war of attrition. While Russia’s fortification of Assad clearly contravened the stated policy of the United States and was a blow to the opposition rebel groups, it created an opportunity for a different strategy. By closing a window of toppling Assad through direct attacks, it opened a window for an indirect strategy whereby the mainstream Syrian opposition, with U.S. support, is able to liberate land from ISIS, build its reputation, and translate that into leverage against the Assad regime. By liberating ISIS-controlled areas with U.S. help, the opposition could create a political horizon for Syrians for the first time in almost five years.

If the United States and the Syrian opposition take advantage of the opportunities provided by the current cease-fire, perhaps then the demonstrations that have taken place around the country recently could be a positive harbinger of things to come.

Ross Harrison is on the faculty of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and is a scholar at The Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. Ross is also on the faculty of the political science department at the University of Pittsburgh, where he teaches courses in Middle Eastern politics. Harrison authored Strategic Thinking in 3D: A Guide for National Security, Foreign Policy and Business Professionals (Potomac Books, 2013).

Image: Wikimedia Commons. Tasnim News Agency/Hosein Zohrevand. CC BY 4.0.