Strategic Scarcity: Allocating Arms and Attention in Washington

Strategic Scarcity: Allocating Arms and Attention in Washington

The United States’ manifest and concrete interests of security, prosperity, and liberty are directly at stake, and its citizens deserve a serious strategy to safeguard these interests.

Second, Washington should reverse its nonsensical military expansion in Europe, now exceeding 100,000. Maintenance of a credible deterrent now demands a lower share of U.S. forces. Therefore, military posture should actually be reduced below antebellum levels to free resources for the Indo-Pacific. Especially important to shift would be fifth-generation aircraft, naval forces, and even certain ground combat power.

Specifically, the Pentagon should consider making the 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force (one of only two fully capable critical units of its type) Indo-Pacific-focused or globally responsive rather than permanently stationed in Europe. Additionally, the Army BCT in Romania and the rotational Army presence in Poland (consisting of an armored BCT, an aviation brigade, and logistics and headquarters elements) could be canceled. While Army maneuver BCTs are admittedly of less utility in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe, these cancellations would provide real savings for Army operations and maintenance dollars that could be redirected elsewhere.

In addition to canceling the increase in Spain-based guided missile destroyers, rotational Navy presence in the 6th Fleet area could be further reduced. For example, it appears the Pentagon is currently maintaining at least a 1.0 CSG presence there, with the USS George H. W. Bush CSG operating in the Adriatic Sea (plus the USS Gerald R. Ford CSG operating in the North Atlantic) as of October 24. This could be reduced to at most a 0.5 CSG presence in the greater Euro-Atlantic region without fixing a CSG in the Mediterranean at all times.

For the Air Force’s part, the two additional F-35 squadrons stationed in Britain should be canceled, still leaving the one previously stationed there. Some 4/4.5-generation fighter squadrons such as F-15s could also be considered for redeployment. Especially in light of the recently announced withdrawal of F-15s from Japan without any plan for a permanent replacement, the gap between rhetoric and resourcing is embarrassingly evident.

Third, Washington should move with all haste to enact or expand a number of key Indo-Pacific initiatives. Chief among these is to stockpile munitions, platforms, and parts critical to U.S.-China defense planning scenarios, including Mk 48 torpedoes, SM-6 multi-mission missiles, SM-3 interceptor missiles, the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (including Naval Strike Missiles), Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense, Patriots, Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense, Stingers, Javelins, Maritime Strike Tomahawks, Small Diameter Bomb II’s, HIMARS (including munitions like GMLRS, ATACMS, and accelerating the fielding of PrSM), the Marines’ Long-Range Fires Launcher, and the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon. Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) and others have introduced legislation that may be useful vehicles for such initiatives. Further, the Navy and Air Force should do what they can to accelerate the development of other hypersonic missile variants. The Navy should also not further delay procurement of the Light Amphibious Warship, a critical maneuver enabler for the Marine Corps in any near-future littoral campaign.

Additionally, Congress and the Pentagon should prioritize the Indo-Pacific in other major ways. Perhaps most importantly, the Navy needs to alter its current shipbuilding plan (and Congress should provide the funding) to sustain its aging ship capacity in the near term. Currently, the Navy’s plan involves shedding some aging vessels in order to modernize in the long term. This plan assumes risk precisely during the supposed “decisive decade” of the 2020s in order to prepare for potential conflict in the 2030s and later. The Navy should avoid exacerbating past missteps by divesting proven albeit aging warships like Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Los Angeles-class attack submarines. Programs like the Constellation-class frigates and unmanned vessels are crucial, but the sine qua non of naval planning is now arresting the Fleet’s plummeting capacity vis-à-vis the flourishing People’s Liberation Army Navy in order to mitigate near-term risk in the 2020s.

Other specific ways in which the Defense Department should prioritize the Pacific include infrastructure upgrades like airfield and fuel storage hardening, dedicating a Security Force Assistance Brigade to training Taiwan forces, and coordinating with the State Department to prioritize Taiwan in the byzantine Foreign Military Sales regime.

Other priorities for Congress include passing the Arm Taiwan Act, legislation co-sponsored by Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) and Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI), which would provide $3 billion to Taiwan annually for five years to acquire asymmetric capabilities, but importantly would make such aid conditional on Taiwan’s own future military preparations, countermanding incentives for free-riding. Relatedly, adequately funding the Pacific Deterrence Initiative for non-platform-centric budget items is crucial for the next defense authorization.

These policy recommendations would help Washington economize its scarce resources for its true strategic priority in the Indo-Pacific given the exigency of denying Chinese hegemony, but the Biden administration has thus far affected a false piety in evangelizing the importance of the Indo-Pacific while profligately allocating its arms and attention overwhelmingly in Ukraine.

This is a time for focus and choice. The United States’ manifest and concrete interests of security, prosperity, and liberty are directly at stake, and its citizens deserve a serious strategy to safeguard these interests. Those presently helming American statecraft are unlikely to alter course, however. Britain once faced similar strategic scarcity, a rising land power, and economic turbulence. Adm. Jacky Fisher offered equally applicable counsel to Washington’s strategic situation today: “We’re out of money, so we’ll have to think.”

Austin Dahmer is a principal policy analyst in the defense industry and a consultant on defense strategy, force development, and budget issues. Follow him @austinjdahmer

Image: DVIDS.