The same month, the Biden administration launched an interagency strategy aimed at disrupting, degrading, and dismantling illicit Captagon networks linked to the Assad regime through four primary lines of effort.

This past April, President Biden signed into law the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act, which provides for new sanctions against individuals, entities, and networks affiliated with the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad who produce and traffic the drug. 

In the past year, the European Union (EU) has initiated the beginning of a robust counter-Captagon strategy. On April 24, 2023, the EU imposed sanctions on several prominent Syrian and Lebanese figures involved in the Captagon trade, known to have ties with the Assad regime and Hezbollah. This action followed a joint announcement by the United States and the UK on March 28, signaling a nascent transatlantic commitment to counter Captagon, whether separately or in concert.

The Captagon Conundrum

Syria is now the world’s leading producer of Captagon and the central hub of a growing drug crisis in the Middle East and North Africa. The trade of Captagon shows no signs of abating. 

However, suppressing illicit drug production and trafficking with a narco-state as the central node is a conundrum because the state’s complicity ensures protection and resources for traffickers. 

Imposing sanctions on Syrian officials and entities involved in drug trafficking is a useful tool for assuring state accountability as it sends a strong message of international disapproval, isolates corrupt figures, and intensifies the pressure on the regime to change its behavior. However, sanctions are a blunt and inadequate instrument for suppressing the illicit drug trade because they target only a limited number of individuals without addressing the broader networks and systemic issues. 

Effectively addressing cross-border threats from Syria necessitates regional cooperation. This becomes especially crucial in combating drug trafficking when a neighboring state—here, elements of or associated with the Assad regime—is complicit in criminal activities. 

There are ongoing indications of collaborative enforcement efforts to combat illegal drug smuggling in the region, exemplified by the joint operation between Oman and Saudi Arabia in June 2023. Yet, although carefully targeted raids, whether national or joint operations, may yield short-term gains, sustainable suppression requires broader, coordinated strategies addressing both supply and demand dynamics. 

An overemphasis on supply-side strategies in combating drugs is likely to overlook the underlying factors driving demand, inadvertently relocating drug production to remote and marginalized regions. 

Effective solutions require a balanced approach, integrating evidence-based demand reduction efforts that prioritize proactive health and are embraced by regional governments and communities—a position that Washington has come to embrace, albeit belatedly, in crafting U.S. national anti-narcotics strategy. Addressing the sixty-seventh session of the UN Commission on Narcotics (CND) in March, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken emphasized the importance of implementing risk and harm reduction strategies, noting that “untreated substance use and rising trafficking are two sides of the same coin.”

Yet, even if the Captagon trade was halted and the supply dried up, addressing the source of addiction remains uncharted territory in the countries that are most heavily impacted by it. Medical facilities across the region cannot effectively treat drug addiction, often viewing it as a criminal issue rather than a healthcare challenge. 

The Biden administration’s interagency strategy and U.S. congressional sanctions legislation represent a rare display of bipartisanship, underscoring the urgent need to confront the escalating Captagon threat in the Middle East. The EU and the UK echo this heightened concern and growing commitment. Given that China has resumed cooperation with U.S. authorities to combat the influx of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids into the United States, its potential participation in the Global Coalition could greatly bolster international efforts while protecting its own interests in regional stability. Meanwhile, Washington’s strategy, organized around four key pillars, could serve as a model for Europe, facilitating a coordinated campaign to strengthen regional responses to the illicit drug threat in the Middle East—one that is balanced, comprehensive, and sustainable.

Dr. John Calabrese teaches international relations at American University in Washington, DC. He is the book review editor of The Middle East Journal and previously served as director of MEI’s Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) and as general series editor of MEI Viewpoints. He is the author of China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East and Revolutionary Horizons: Regional Foreign Policy in Post-Khomeini Iran. Follow him on X: @Dr_J_Calabrese.

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