Senator Sodiq Safoev, Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Relations of the Senate of the Oliy Majlis [Parliament] of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently visited Washington D.C. and spoke on the government’s policies. He said there was no need for fundamental change in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy; the country would continue to avoid military alliances or economic blocs led by “the superpowers.” The 2002 strategic partnership agreement should be the framework for relations with the United States, which he urged to not again neglect the region, lest “serious consequences” ensue. He advocated intensified dialogue with neighboring countries, including Afghanistan, on borders, water, and regional projects like pipelines. Domestically, the Senator said, the country should reduce the authority of bureaucrats and the government’s role in the economy, while the parliament is increasing its oversight of the public prosecutor.

The issues that most vex the United States are Uzbekistan’s lack of religious freedom and its widespread corruption. In Uzbekistan, religious freedom is limited as religious groups must register with the government, proselytizing is prohibited, as is involving minors in religious activities without the permission of their parents. The teaching of religious subjects in public and private schools is banned. In the United States, the assumption is that the practice of any religion is a net good, and America has been aggressive in ensuring this freedom, as when it championed the emigration of Russian Jews to Israel from the Soviet Union. It is an issue that American politicians will automatically support and back up with threats of sanctions.

The Uzbek government, however, is concerned by regional militancy fueled by religion, such as attacks by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, the 1999 Tashkent bombings which some ascribe to the IMU, and indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Afghanistan. (In fact, it was the anticipation of militant attacks that colored the Uzbek government’s approach to the Islamist attack in Andijan.) The United States must address its concerns with Uzbekistan so Uzbek leaders, who still carry the Soviet Union’s skepticism of religion, feel they can solve the problem without fear of American retaliation, though the Uzbeks must marvel at Saudi Arabia’s ability to avoid a similar accounting. If the United States and Uzbekistan cannot reach an accommodation, Uzbekistan may tilt more to Russia and China which will take a hands-off attitude to what they consider a matter of state sovereignty. This is an issue the Americans cannot afford to get wrong.

Corruption in Uzbekistan is a problem and it usually ranks poorly in recognized league tables, such as Transparency International. Prime Minister Mirziyoyev has submitted an anti-corruption law to the Parliament, but just to be sure the United States is insisting on control of the destination of $600 million of returned funds linked to corruption, likely using U.S.-based contractors working for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to disburse the funds in Uzbekistan. This will cause tension with the Uzbeks and will complicate internal stability as Mirziyoyev may have to share power with Rustam Inoyatov, the long-serving head of the secret police, the National Security Service, and Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Rustam Azimov. The United States may attempt to use control of seized funds to favor the English-speaking Azimov, who is well-regarded by multilateral financial institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund, unlike the low-profile Mirziyoyev or the out-of-bounds Inoyatov.

Uzbekistan has a way to retain control of the funds, though with some loss of flexibility. It should deposit the money in an interest-bearing account in the United States and use it to fund a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) “case”, which is an agreement between the United States and a foreign customer to purchase “defense goods and services.” That will limit the use of the funds, but Uzbekistan will pay a low administrative fee of currently 1.2 percent, get the benefit of the U.S. government’s price negotiators, receive detailed financial reports, and attend contract negotiations. This will yield definite savings as the overhead and management fees paid to the USAID contractors may consume up to 30 percent of the total, as opposed to 1.5 percent to the United States. And it will spike any accusations of corruption and lack of transparency.

Uzbekistan’s view of the United States is skeptical but not antagonistic. When it played by the rules by helping in the fight against terror (2001) or opening the prison system to international review (2004, 2005) it feels it got burned. The United States does not understand that Uzbekistan, like many countries, prizes “stability” as a virtue, one that may be endangered by “democracy.” The Russians will exploit this by pointing to the trauma caused by their uncritical acceptance of democracy and capitalism in the aftermath of the Cold War. Given Russia’s warning, and China’s success with managed (“state”) capitalism, Uzbekistan will probably balance elite interests and popular demands for improved living standards with a system similar to China’s, which may also facilitate increased Chinese inward investment and so counterbalance Russia.

In Central Asia, Communism has been supplanted by a new totalitarian ideology, Islamism. Actions by the Uzbek government have contributed to the problem, but leaders have to solve today’s problems today and getting bogged down in “told you so” with the United States will generate heat but no light. Indeed, continuing to support the Uzbek government will not be a departure from the traditions of American foreign policy. In the 1980s, under the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, the United States backed authoritarian regimes that were anti-communist and supported American goals. Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s words, “The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World.” and “…no idea holds greater sway in the mind of educated Americans than the belief that it is possible to democratize governments, anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances,” aptly describe recent American efforts at regime change and nation building. The United States has it in its hands to ensure history does not to repeat itself in Central Asia.

Previous American attempts to remove secular authoritarian regimes in Iraq, Libya, and Egypt failed, though in Egypt the military saved the day by staging a coup d'état. If it wants to constructively engage Uzbekistan, the U.S. should shelve its penchant for social engineering and stick to the basics: coordinated action against Islamists, and improving the economy and business transparency. The former will address long-standing Uzbek concerns with regional militancy, and the latter achieve will many U.S. goals, such as transparent financial accounting, respect for contracts, and honest courts. There won’t be any “Mission Accomplished” moments, but Uzbekistan and the United States can go from quiet success to quiet success and build a businesslike and respectful relationship.

James D. Durso is the Managing Director of Corsair LLC, a consultancy. He was a professional staff member at the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mr. Durso was a U.S. Navy officer for 20 years. His overseas military postings were in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and he served in Iraq as a civilian transport advisor with the Coalition Provisional Authority. He served afloat as Supply Officer of the submarines USS SKATE (SSN 578) and USS GURNARD (SSN 662).

Image: Mosaic dome in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Pixabay/Public domain