A further example stated in the essay as limiting China's global influence is Beijing's reticence to engage in proactive global problem solving, instead preferring “hollow invocations” that disputes should be solved through “peaceful means” and “win-win negotiations.”

Firstly, does China vacillate more than any other historical great power? Secondly, the author would agree that sometimes indecisiveness is symptomatic of weakness; however, it may equally be attributable to antipathy or tactful diplomacy. Some may argue that the confrontational stance adopted by other nations has proved much more inept and refusal to employ “coercive measures” does not necessarily reflect a lack of ability. The Western inability to positively shape international events in the post–Cold War era, as evidenced by recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, bears testament to the often counterproductive nature of confrontational or coercive tactics. Such measures have often proven costly in human, economic and reputational terms. China’s circumspection in furthering its national interest through the threat or application of force, instead preferring “peaceful means” and “win-win situations,” is evidenced by its handling of the Taiwan question. The inexorable progress of Taiwan’s economic dependence on the Mainland and growth in Cross-Straits travel may in time realize Beijing’s objectives without recourse to violent measures. As Sun Tzu state, “Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.” This is the opposite of the policy of brinkmanship adopted by Russia in Crimea.

An additional claim is that China cares more about its international image and considers it a priority over appearing to contradict globally-agreed-upon settlements or courses of action, which is not the behavior of a global leader:

“Beijing usually takes a lowest-common-denominator approach, adopting the safest and least controversial position and waiting to see the positions of other governments before revealing its own.”

On the contrary, this highlights the Machiavellian nature of Chinese diplomacy. Reservation in divulging one's position before others is again not symptomatic of weakness, but rather shrewd negotiation, in which the advantage lies with the party that discloses the least and knows the most about its adversary. In the words of Sun Tzu, “Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.”

The contention that China modifies its position in international debate in order not to be seen as contradicting a consensus on matters of little consequence to its long-term strategy also does not imply impotence. If one country views an issue as being of importance but another does not, it would be illogical to incur the ill-will of the former unless a significant advantage may accrue to the latter. Flexibility in one’s negotiations is generally an asset that not even the most obstinate diplomat would deny. As Sun Tzu states, “According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one’s plans.”

The nature of Chinese diplomacy

Chinese diplomacy is criticized in the article for being “minimalist and tactical, not normative or strategic.” Have all historical premier powers conducted diplomacy in an unchangeable, monolithic fashion? If so, does indisputable evidence exist that Chinese diplomacy is substantively different in manner?

In relation to the semantic arguments, is the divergence between strategy and tactics defined? A common problem in international relations is that the world is a chaotic system obviating a grand strategic approach to deal with spontaneous events.

Is Chinese diplomatic influence hindered because China is not a normative power? No definition of these norms or standards is given, and hence this conjecture remains an unproven matter of opinion. Finally most will agree that the adoption of a “minimalist approach” and careful resource conservation to avoid potential overstretch is a wise course of action. As Sun Tzu posited, “There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.”

Does China's world diplomacy lack substance?

China is charged with excessive stage-management of its diplomatic conventions in order to awe its domestic audience, detracting from its international gravitas. This argument is a non sequitur, that a nation seeks to impress at diplomatic meetings does not imply that the events lack substance. Most nations manage the minutiae of such engagements both for domestic and foreign consumption.

For this accusation to be admissible, it must be proved that Chinese diplomatic visits are quantitatively or qualitatively different from those of the United States or the British Empire in the nineteenth century, both recognized hegemonic powers in their eras. It must also be proven that Chinese showmanship is intended for domestic consumption and not to impress visiting dignitaries, and that theatrics and shrewd negotiation are irreconcilable.

An additional argument is that Chinese lack of power is exemplified by an excessive focus on trade in its diplomatic engagements with retinues of mostly corporate CEOs in search of investment and trade. In this regard, China is no different from any other major power. A primary motivating factor for the expansion of the Second British Empire was to secure trading rights. Similarly, after the Second World War, maintaining free and open markets to U.S. manufactures and trade was one of the key drivers of U.S. foreign policy.

Is China an irresponsible nation?

Shambaugh claims that despite Chinese participation in global governance issues, such as UN peacekeeping, anti-piracy operations, counterterrorism in Central Asia, overseas development assistance, nonproliferation of nuclear materials, public health, disaster relief and combating international crime, “China could and should do much more.” It “punches well below its weight” by not contributing proportionately to its size, wealth or potential influence and that international consternation at China's dereliction of its international duties considerably detracts from its international presence impeding the exercise of Chinese power.

Does a global consensus exist as to the definition of responsible global obligations, or is this a Western-consensus bias? If so, is there corroborating evidence that China eschews these responsibilities and are these issues relevant to China's national interest? Additionally, the statement that China “punches well below its weight” and that “China could and should do much more” abrogates the hypothesis that Chinese power is exaggerated.

There are a couple of cognitive biases evident in the description of China as an irresponsible nation. Firstly, naive realism: the belief that we see reality as it really is, objectively and without bias; that the facts are plain for all to see, that rational people will agree with us, and that those who don't are either uninformed, lazy, irrational or biased. And secondly, the false-consensus effect: the tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them. Because the United States and Europe agree on many issues does not imply that this consensus extends to Asia and the Global South. This is particularly the case in relation to the Iranian nuclear crisis.

It is generally received wisdom in the West that Iran should be prevented from acquiring nuclear-weapons capabilities, that all well-informed nations should support a non-nuclear Iran, and that any opinion to the contrary is irresponsible or a sign of debility. However, the West frequently overstates the extent to which the international community backs this position. India has long argued that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is fundamentally flawed; the club of nations legally permitted to possess nuclear arsenals is based on the acquisition of nuclear weapons before 1967, without a thorough ethical description as to why such international discrimination should exist. Exemplifying Chinese apathy in the Iranian nuclear crisis has elements therefore of all of the aforementioned cognitive biases.

Finally, it is maintained that China has not become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system, as exhorted by Robert Zoellick in 2005. What is a responsible stakeholder and who evaluates whether an individual, organization or nation is behaving responsibly? Who is the ultimate arbiter of the responsible conduct of nations? It is rather ironic that China is held to account by Robert Zoellick: a former managing director at Goldman Sachs, executive Vice President at Fannie Mae between 1993 and 1997, and the eleventh president of the World Bank who lectures China on becoming a responsible stakeholder in 2005 two years before the subprime mortgage and world financial crisis. Could this be considered the height of post–Cold War American hubris?

Constraints on China's global governance capabilities

In detailing the reasons why China will not surpass the United States as the most influential nation in the world, Shambaugh lists three potential “constraints” on China's global-governance capabilities:

1. Chinese skepticism of the premise of global governance and the wish to conserve resources through nonintervention in crises not in its direct national interest. Why would a Confucian, market-socialist nation actively support a system of global government based on the dollar as the world's reserve currency and global-governance bodies, such as the IMF, World Bank and the UN, in which Western nations possess disproportionate power compared with their populations or the sizes of their economies? Regarding nonintervention in crises not in its direct national interest, as Sun Tzu states, “If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.”