Policymakers know, if occasionally ignore, that American power is limited. Policymakers in Washington will learn that they can accomplish vastly more once they enshrine American grand strategy with the value of collaborating with states and institutions who share a commitment to building a peaceful, stable, and secure world. Whether diminishing nuclear proliferation, preventing genocide, providing humanitarian assistance, restraining extremism, or confronting economic policies that threaten the global economy, the United States and its allies will be better able to build a more secure and prosperous world when they work together. Policymakers and the public should not forget the eminently practical and straightforward reason for building stronger alliances and partnerships. In practice, it is no longer necessary or appropriate for Washington’s grand strategy to rely on diplomatic domination or play the role of referee of last resort.

In reality, the United States cannot afford to exempt itself from global leadership. The time has come, despite being mired in an anemic and slow recovery from the "Great Recession," for the United States to exercise greater world leadership. This is crucial when one looks at the challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela—and increasingly Egypt and Syria in the highly unstable Middle East. However, the counterpoint to this principle of leadership is eminently practical: the United States does not have unlimited power everywhere, all of the time, for the rest of the world. Attempts to “do everything” only further erode the American public’s support, as the public asks why the nation is carrying the burden while other states apparently get a “free ride.”

The two extremes—one where America engages less and retrenches, or one where America takes the lead on all issues—are equally unacceptable and impractical. This is the right time, after nearly seven decades, for America to reinforce its alliances and partnerships—new and old—so that other states and institutions can rise to the occasion to share the responsibility and burden of leadership. While the United States rebuilt states and regions after World War II and protected them for fifty years, now is the time for those states to join in efforts to resolve global problems. The practical challenge for U.S. grand strategy is how to balance working in concert with others in the international community, while keeping one’s options open in those crucial moments when the United States might decide that it is necessary to act alone. Grand strategy, if it is to be effective, must use principles such as these to help build a world in which states are permitted and encouraged to pursue peace and prosperity.

Balancing Among Principles

To be successful, American grand strategy must embody positive principles that match the circumstances of the moment, build a world based on peace and security, and be guided broadly by the consent of the people. But simply having the right principles is only part of the equation. As most observers would expect, society and its policymakers must carefully balance how they put those principles into practice.

This balance applies with equal force to the principle of reinforcing the leadership role of the United States abroad. To build a secure and peaceful world, it is essential for the United States to play a leadership role. No other state can fill this role, while a world without American leadership is fraught with perils. Getting this principle right requires a particularly delicate balancing act. If the United States pursues a leadership role based on too much involvement, it will antagonize other states, which rightly would believe that America does not have the right or authority to dominate the globe. If it recedes into a foreign policy of minimalism, the sources of disorder will metastasize and grow—and create an unending series of foreign policy difficulties and challenges.

The principle of American grand strategy that calls for working more cooperatively and collaboratively with other states and institutions raises similar challenges. To ignore or merely pay lip service to this principle will suggest that the United States wants to “go it alone.” States will respond by isolating the United States or limiting their support for solving problems that require coordinated action among several nations.

What emerges is a cautionary note about American grand strategy. The unbalanced application of any one of these principles alone will inflict significant harm on U.S. priorities and those of its friends and allies. Worse, to put too much emphasis on any two principles also will undermine America’s grand strategy. For example, policies that emphasize rebuilding the domestic foundations of power and relying heavily on the role of cooperation will reinforce the impression that the United States is unwilling to lead in the current and future international system. States will see this as a strategy for gradually disengaging from the world—until the next crisis occurs.

A strategy that deemphasizes American global leadership and promotes cooperation will weaken the nation’s ability to promote global stability. Strictly speaking, this describes the state of American policy today. The inherent trap with grand strategy lies in how effectively it is implemented. Policymakers simply cannot pursue any or several principles to the exclusion of the others. To do so will be completely self-defeating. The only path to success is to implement these principles of grand strategy in a balanced and purposeful fashion. Any other approach will weaken the United States, embolden its adversaries, demoralize friends and allies, and eviscerate the world order that America seeks to build.

This survey of the areas of consensus and disagreement among these valuable contributions to the study of grand strategy returns us to the question of how, then does America articulate and implement a grand strategy for this post-Cold War era. One question is how can we think more systematically and rigorously about American grand strategy so we can evaluate these arguments and use them to improve American foreign policy over the long-term.

Ultimately, the central question is toward what ends should the United States rebuild the domestic foundations of its power, exercise stronger leadership, and collaborate with alliances and partnerships. Put another way, what is the fundamental goal for American grand strategy? When reflecting on American history, my strongest inclination is that the primary goals of American foreign policy are and always have been to build the foundations of peace and security. Such a world is the greatest legacy that the United States can aspire to achieve. This logic holds today more than ever. For now, however, the nation does not have the economic resources or domestic support to build democracy and freedom in other nations. This is especially true as America pivots away from the entangling nation-building episodes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since World War II, America has taken the lead in creating a more peaceful world order. One reason is selfish: a peaceful international system, which keeps threats and sources of disorder to a minimum, permits the United States to pursue its vital national interest in seeing democracies grow, prosper, and building a vibrant global order. Let us remember the world that FDR envisioned when he outlined his iconic four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. In declaring freedom from fear to be a human right, FDR positioned the United States to lead in efforts to reduce armaments and dissuade aggressive nations from threatening and bringing harm to peaceful states. American political and economic power and diplomatic and military might are essential instruments in building the peace and security that must prevail if Americans and all states strive to live in a world, as FDR envisioned, free from fear.

For America, an Optimistic Grand Strategy

First, American policymakers must express, in words and actions, that it is and truly should be, supremely confident in its abilities and policies—largely because the force of history is on its side. Is anyone willing to argue that the repression of freedom, civil rights and expression—all values that the United States has resisted with rhetoric, policies, and force of arms—represent anything other than a failed past? America’s grand strategy should build from an inner sense of confidence, sadly somewhat lacking at the moment, that free societies and free markets are the wave of the future. While the West faces a stalled and anemic economic recovery with most of the European Union in recession, the cyclical nature of economics suggests that the West and its confidence will rebound. Eventually, the West will organize itself to exercise effective leadership in direct opposition to states that promote authoritarian values and predatory policies.

Second, America is the symbol in foreign policy of three powerful concepts, which historically have dominated its grand strategy. One is the role of freedom as a central organizing principle in the formation and conduct of civil society. Another is the role of free markets that embrace the importance of the private sector in the development of market-based societies, while the last is to promote the value of peace in the actions of the public sector. The confluence of these principles helps to endow the United States with a sense of confidence. The contrast with the authoritarian states could not be starker, as these states are unlikely to marshal the political and economic values that provide the wherewithal to be proponents of a peaceful, prosperous, and free international order.