The Path Ahead

To reclaim leadership and protect its interests the United States must conduct a self-interested evaluation and redesign of its regional approach in four ways: clearly define its interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific; use them as the starting point to develop a comprehensive vision of how it wants the region to operate; develop a regional strategy that leverages each component of national power—diplomatic, informational, military and economic; and empower U.S. officials with the policies and tools necessary to achieve that strategy’s ends.

The need for a comprehensive regional strategy is hardly controversial. U.S. regional strategic drift has been widely criticized and was part of the impetus for the “Rebalance to the Pacific.” However, the United States struggled to demonstrate a vision for the region’s future. The economic aspect of the Rebalance was still-born as the Obama administration seemed unwilling to put the necessary self-interested justification or political capital behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Militarily, ongoing challenges in the Middle East and broader reductions in U.S. forces have led the modest military rebalance to be dismissed by many partners.

Without a comprehensive approach to the region, U.S. diplomats and military strategists are left to react to events and developments in isolation. Being proactive and developing the regional environment favorably prior to the next crisis becomes difficult, because there is no clarity regarding objectives in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. In this context, grasping PRC actions as a basis for U.S. policy is, unfortunately, not wholly surprising. Just as an individual who does not take the time to consider their own values ends up absorbing them from the surrounding culture, the frontline diplomat or military planner without comprehensive guidance, ends up looking at the environment and reacting to the dominant themes within it. When decisionmaking lacks an intellectual guidepost and becomes dependent on reacting to the adversary, it necessarily becomes short-range and vulnerable to surprises. To prevent these pitfalls, U.S. Foreign Service and military officers require a common view of the future that will guide them in the execution of policy. The alternative is to passively relinquish control of U.S. decisionmaking to the PRC.

Much uncertainty lays ahead for the Indo-Asia Pacific, including the role of the United States within it. The PRC could continue to strengthen and flex its military muscle, it could suffer an economic-political collapse, or any number of intermediate futures could result. Regardless of the outcome, the United States will not be well served by constructing its strategy and policies on PRC interests, or what its future may be. To avoid being pulled along by the fortunes of the PRC, the United States must shed its second-handed malaise, take self-interested pride in its values, define a positive future for the region that aligns with U.S. interests, and craft strategy and policy to bring that future into being. The United States must stop countering the PRC and start promoting the United States.

Recommended: This Video Shows What Happens if Washington, D.C. Is Attacked with Nuclear Weapons

Recommended: 8 Million People Could Die in a War with North Korea

Recommended: Why North Korea Is Destined to Test More ICBMs and Nuclear Weapons

Lt.Col. Scott McDonald is a tank officer and a China Foreign Area Officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. He is currently a Military Professor at the Daniel K Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI where he teaches on the Asia-Pacific security environment and Chinese strategic culture. He has previously served as an attaché at the U.S. embassy in Canberra and at the American Institute in Taiwan, as well as in operational planning roles in the Asia-Pacific. Most recently he was posted to Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps where he served in the Commandant’s Strategic Initiatives Group and the Office of Marine Corps Communication.

The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its components. He may be contacted at [email protected].