Since April 2023, Sudan has descended into a catastrophic civil war, with the globe’s largest internally displaced population facing the world’s worst famine in four decades and genocide in Darfur on a scale not seen since the early 2000s. Ethnic cleansing and worsening starvation have led Sudan’s cemeteries to expand as innocent civilians and children are executed, raped, tortured, and maimed. No one knows exactly how many people have died. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello testified in May that the official death toll of 15,000 could be an undercount “by a factor of 10 to 15.” Over 2 million Sudanese have crossed the border, with Egypt and Chad struggling to host refugees. U.S. intelligence warns that Sudan could again become a haven for terrorists. After fifteen months of civil war, Sudan is spiraling toward state failure.

While Washington can be indispensable for advancing the peace process, its approach must be tempered by two realities: (1) the limits of American influence given Sudan’s history and current geopolitical realities, and (2) the possibility for blowback should any Western intervention fail. Washington must avoid a scenario where it finds itself in exile like it has in the Sahel.

Although a multilateral stabilization mission could curb militia attacks on civilians in Darfur, the biggest challenge to previous peacekeeping missions stemmed from the lack of host government cooperation. A new mission would face similar challenges, and currently, there is no political will to undertake one. Ultimately, there are other efforts the United States can take to build the long-term infrastructure needed to move Sudan toward a path of peace.

A ceasefire remains elusive. Last month, the United States held new peace talks in Switzerland. Though Sudan’s military, one of the war’s belligerents, didn’t show up, the military has stated it will attend future discussions in Egypt, brokered by Washington and Cairo. With mediation efforts faltering, the United States must do more in Sudan while limiting geopolitical risk. Washington can do more to coordinate peace diplomacy, garner more serious support for sanctions, and promote a new political order and security-sector reform with backing from regional bodies and allies. 

Sudan’s Long History of Coups 

Prior interventions have had only halting, limited success and never led to durable democracy. Sudan has never had a spell as a democracy that lasted more than three or four years, as coups brought an end to democracy in 1958, 1969, and 1989 and torpedoed a democratic transition in 2021. The Arab Northern elite in Khartoum has long dominated Sudan’s politics and sought to control ethnic minorities and marginalized peripheries. This has led to constant violence, two ethno-religious civil wars (from 1963 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005), and a genocide in Darfur in the early 2000s. The non-Arab Sudanese ethnic groups in Darfur now under threat—the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa peoples—are the same groups that the Janjaweed paramilitaries terrorized twenty years ago.

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the decades-old conflict with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and subsequent peacekeeping missions—including the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from 2005 to 2011 and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) from 2007 to 2020—had limited success. The former facilitated South Sudan’s independence in 2011, and the latter tamed the violence in Darfur. But without Khartoum’s full cooperation, neither supported lasting peace or democracy. 

Democratic openings have appeared twice in Sudan’s modern history, after popular uprisings ousting military dictators Jafaar Nimeiri in 1985 and Omar al-Bashir in 2019. In August 2020, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a group that had been warring with Khartoum for decades, signed a peace agreement. But coups by Omar al-Bashir in 1989 and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in October 2021 killed democracy. The only difference after 2021 compared to 1989 is that Sudan has seen the emergence of rival warlords rather than a single strongman.

There are no “Good Guys” 

Two generals, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”)—the commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—joined forces to oust longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir in a coup in April 2019. Following months of pro-democracy protests by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), the military agreed to a transitional government chaired by Burhan with Hemedti as his deputy. But in October 2021, Burhan (with Hemedti’s support) launched a veto coup ousting civilians from the Sovereignty Council and frustrating hopes for Sudan’s “pacted transition” to democracy.  

Neither Burhan nor Hemedti are “good guys” or leaders of democratic forces in any meaningful sense. Gen. Burhan is a longtime Bashir loyalist turned dictator. Hemedti rose to prominence as the leader of a pro-government militia, the Janjaweed (forerunner to the RSF), which terrorized non-Arab communities in Darfur in the 2000s. In 2022 and 2023, the two coupmakers quietly jockeyed for power and squabbled over the terms of a deal for incorporating the RSF into the SAF and a new political transition that threatened to sideline Hemedti. Tensions came to a boiling point in April 2023 in a failed coup bid by the RSF that led to Hemedti’s dismissal. Ever since, eight rebel groups in Darfur, including JEM, have aligned with SAF to fight the RSF. Any intervention must seek to empower genuine democratic forces rather than Burhan or Hemedti.

A Proxy Conflict

Each side has secured external patrons, with Saudi Arabia backing Burhan and the United Arab Emirates backing Hemedti (the latter forged a relationship with Abu Dhabi in 2015 to supply RSF fighters to combat the Houthis in Yemen). Russia’s Wagner Group, which had trained and supported both SAF and RSF troops since 2018, backed the RSF (which had facilitated profitable access to gold mines for the Russian mercenaries), while Ukrainian special forces deployed to Sudan to support the SAF and fight the Wagner Group. Since the death of Wagner commander Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, Russia has reconsidered its support to the RSF. Moscow struck a deal with the SAF in exchange for weapons and ammunition that would grant access to a military base on the Red Sea coast. Tehran is drawn to the SAF’s Islamist credentials and dreams of the naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, though this prospect alarms Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 

Meanwhile, the rest of the international community has been distracted by less deadly conflicts elsewhere. Last December, the UN Security Council agreed to Burhan’s request to terminate the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). In late May, the SAF rejected calls to return to peace talks sponsored by the United States and Saudi Arabia in Jeddah. Russia and Iran’s increased support evidently strengthened the SAF’s resolve to keep fighting.

What comes next? How to proceed with caution

Total military victory appears unlikely for either SAF or RSF forces in the foreseeable future, even though it is unclear as yet how soon both warring sides will recognize a “mutually hurting stalemate” that will make them willing to return to peace talks and commit to a peace process. How, then, can the United States help facilitate a ceasefire, negotiated settlement, and political transition? 

Here are three steps the United States can take to promote peace and democracy in Sudan.

1) Coordinate international diplomacy and promote “buy-in” from incentivized peacemakers.

The West, by itself, lacks the leverage to make the parties come to the table. However, there are outside actors and several regional organizations that could also play a constructive role in promoting talks. According to the Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index, which aggregates bilateral trade, aid, arms transfers, and military alliances, China holds much more leverage than the United States, its allies, and even Russia. China and Russia are the major players in Sudan, with the former Sudan’s leading outside investor and the latter Sudan’s largest arms provider. Gulf rivals the UAE and Saudi Arabia are bolstering their influence. Iran has provided more modern and proficient drones to the SAF. Peace diplomacy will have to navigate these realities and manage outside influences carefully.  

A coordinated international effort that includes or is led by a regional body (e.g., the African Union or East African Community) with the support of regional and non-traditional partners with backing from the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE could better incentivize the warring parties to join serious peace talks. For example, in March, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) signed an agreement with Tokyo to support peacebuilding efforts and conflict resolution in Sudan. This kind of agreement could be a starting place for renewed peace discussions and non-traditional partner engagement.

Any U.S. leadership should proceed multilaterally to avoid the kind of fallout that has occurred in the Sahel. Gaining consensus where possible will still face complications due to each outside actor’s motivations, which range from resource acquisition to access to Port Sudan to countering political foes through proxies. Regional institutions and bordering states are motivated by regional stability and could serve as valuable interlocutors in pushing toward an end to the fighting.