2) Get more serious about sanctions and protecting civilians. 

Any agreement will need to see both sides reign in proxies and units throughout the country where violence against civilians has been rampant. This may require a tougher sanctions strategy. 

In December 2020, the U.S. State Department removed Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terror, lifted associated sanctions, extended financial aid, and signaled Washington’s commitment to improved relations with the transitional government. In return, Sudan committed to normalizing relations with Israel (this normalization process is now in limbo). 

After the October 2021 coup, Washington froze $700 million in aid, and many other donors acted similarly. Yet, U.S. diplomats favored accommodating Sudan’s generals. In 2007, Omar al-Bashir only agreed to UNAMID after the United States imposed sanctions on three high-level Sudanese leaders and thirty-one Sudanese companies. The United States should also more vigorously enforce the arms embargo that has been nominally imposed in Sudan since 2004 and incentivize partners to do the same.

3) Support a new political order and security-sector reform.

A key long-term goal today should be to avoid Sudan’s slide into military-Islamist authoritarianism of the 1990s or the division of the country like Libya since 2011. Unlike the 2005 CPA and UNAMID precedents, which papered over the lack of democracy, the peace process this time around must ultimately incorporate civilian leadership and political parties, as the systemic problems in Sudan will not be resolved without fulfilling the promise of a transition to democracy dating to August 2019. To break the cycle of violence and instability, Sudan, after the civil war, must prioritize democratic institution building and security sector reform. 

Though daunting, the long-term goal in Sudan must be the same as it has been since Bashir was ousted in April 2019: incentivize the SAF and RSF to return to the barracks, hold new multi-party elections, and respect civilian rule for the first time in nearly four decades. In addition, Sudan needs a functioning police force that it historically has lacked. Building a capable, well-equipped police force that is large enough to bring stability to the country and respect human rights, especially in regions that have been hit hard by violence, is necessary. 

Avoiding the Pitfalls of Unilateralism

The United States can play a constructive role in Sudan, but it needs to engage the right partners holistically. If it takes on too much unilaterally, it is unlikely to succeed, and the risk of fallout is greater. In spite of the challenges, neither the United States nor its potential partners should abandon Sudan. The United States should galvanize partners to harmonize efforts with regard to diplomacy, sanctions, and measures to build up Sudan’s political and security infrastructure. The situation on the ground is incredibly complex, and there are many layers to the conflict, but a resolution is possible if external actors work together carefully, thoughtfully, and diligently. 

Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice at the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. She has fifteen years of experience working to support policy and analyzing national security issues. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at Carnegie Mellon University, including Writing for Political Science and Policy, Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa, and In the News: Analysis of Current National Security Priorities. 

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science at the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état (2022), which was named one of the “Best Historical Materials” published in 2022–23 by the American Library Association.

Image: Abd Almohimen Sayed / Shutterstock.com.