North Korea’s offset strategy for besting the superior conventional forces arrayed around it combines classical political strategies with unconventional tools in the form of nuclear weapons, missiles, cyber attack and space-operations forces. North Korea is also deploying advanced long-range, precision conventional forces to hold all of South Korea hostage. While President Park was talking about unification and President Obama was touting a nuclear-free world, North Korea was single-handedly defying the international system and gaining leverage.

Choosing Among Inadequate Policy Options

It is easier and more sensational to be a spoiler in international relations than it is to keep the peace. Accordingly, the economic, diplomatic and military policy options under consideration in Seoul and Washington are inadequate. None of them offer the likelihood of halting North Korea’s nuclear deployments or provocations, and yet the idea that Pyongyang will want to cut a reasonable deal under such circumstances stretches credulity.

Economic carrots and sticks are the tool of first resort within the U.S.-ROK alliance. Although sanctions have always been seen as merely a means to an end, the pursuit of increasingly painful sanctions appears to have become an end in itself of late. In the wake of the January nuclear test, the UN Security Council passed its most restrictive sanctions yet on Pyongyang (UNSCR 2270). South Korea also closed down its major economic bridge with North Korea when it suspended operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The United States then undertook the first human-rights-based sanctions on North Korea and did not shy away from calling out Kim Jong-un himself.

The latest financial pressure cracks down on North Korea’s illicit trading network, in part, by imposing sanctions on those companies and individuals acting as middlemen for North Korea. This process is fueled by an upsurge in big-data analytics and open-source information that can highlight suspicious activity. A landmark report by two nongovernmental organizations, the Asan Institute and C4ADS, has placed a spotlight on suspect Chinese business activities, and the evidence is at least compelling enough for Beijing to take some action. Even the most thoughtful and informed discussion of next-generation sanctions envisions only modest steps for North Korea—especially greater multilateral cooperation to improve the gradual imposition of punitive financial measures on North Korea.

Ultimately, Washington must convert its strength in the form of defense and pressure into political objectives. Unfortunately, the idea that Kim will negotiate even a moratorium on nuclear weapons just when he appears to be gaining greater leverage seems unlikely. At a minimum, the price of a deal with Pyongyang would be very clear: accepting North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state, relaxing sanctions and increasing economic engagement, and scaling back military presence and exercises. This is not a quick recipe for slowing nuclear proliferation or enhancing the credibility of American power and commitment.

But just as we must avoid conflating North Korea’s weapons with war, we should also avoid confusing modest arms control with appeasement. After all, as bad as the diplomatic options look, the military options can be even more frightening. Talk of a preemptive strike to prevent North Korea’s nuclear deployment—or possibly even an ICBM reentry vehicle test—is easier said than done. On previous occasions, when the United States enjoyed far more favorable force advantages, it ultimately decided the risks were too high.

Policymakers are in a difficult position, as available means offer no sure path of achieving desired strategic goals. There is a swelling body of expert consensus in the United States that the next administration needs to move the North Korea problem higher up the policy agenda. But while policy consensus is usually welcome by political leaders, in this case the consensus is also a constraint. While most agree on the need to block North Korean nuclear deployment, few are willing to pay the potential price of doing so.

In short, it is easier to criticize President Obama’s policy of strategic patience than it is to offer a compelling narrative of what might have been done to alter the present course. More draconian sanctions and pressure? More engagement with China to force North Korea into submission? More diplomacy with Kim Jong-un on the theory that he is not wedded to nuclear weapons as a means of regime survival?

Certainly, North Korean nuclear weapons are a regional and global challenge and not simply a problem for the United States. Nuclear weapons are older than North Korea itself. A determined dictatorship fixated on the pursuit of nuclear-tipped missiles can eventually pick apart the seams of our fragmented world. South Korea and the United States have been satisfied with strategies of limited pressure and limited engagement, and China has sought to ensure neither strategy went too far toward destabilizing its neighboring buffer state. Even so, it will take years for North Korea to deploy a proven, tested arsenal of nuclear weapons. At this point, it is merely cashing in on the perception that it will be able to pull off the ultimate act of international defiance: establishing a nuclear-weapon state despite the opposition of major powers.

Kim Jong-un has many goals. Beyond basic survival he would like to exert his authority over the Korean Peninsula. To achieve that, he would like to break the ROK-U.S. alliance, win acceptance as a nuclear-weapon state and then demand more favorable terms. By playing all the outside powers off one another, he could well prevail in keeping the world at bay. Here is the ultimate catch: if North Korea were to "win" greater power and influence, the need to be more open to the flow of information, people, and money—in short, the need to be integrated and interconnected with Northeast Asia—would doom the legitimacy and mystique of the Kim dynasty.

Washington needs a comprehensive, long-term plan for attacking North Korea's strategy. Tenets of this approach are well known and include strengthening both defense and diplomacy, while finding ways to apply pressure on Kim Jong-un. Using big-data analytics to track and then crack down on Kim's illicit global network is one way to obligate China to do more to pressure North Korea. Information operations are another way to create divisions within North Korea. Over time, new military technologies may give defensive weapons the upper hand over offensive weapons.

Meanwhile, the United States and South Korea need to preserve deterrence while remaining open to a possible diplomatic off-ramp, one that could take us out of this vicious cycle on the Korean Peninsula. We must keep open diplomatic channels to determine whether it might be possible down the road to establish a less threatening relationship. North Korea could, in theory, return to the idea of a nuclear and missile moratorium, but it is unlikely to do so over the next couple of years. During that time, Kim will try to fully exploit the democratic transitions in the United States and South Korea, coupled with the perception of being a threshold nuclear-weapons state.

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is senior adviser and senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

Image: Participants in the Arirang Mass Games in Pyongyang, North Korea. Flickr/@fljckr