Will the Syrian Civil War be America's Next Foreign Policy Failure

June 24, 2018 Topic: Security Region: Middle East Tags: Syriawarforeign policyTerrorismAl Qaeda

Will the Syrian Civil War be America's Next Foreign Policy Failure

Washington should drop its foolhardy attempt to reengineer the Middle East and allow countries there to sort out their own problems.

President Donald Trump is taking the United States into the ethnic-cleansing business. Admittedly, the operation is supposed to be voluntary, or at least non-violent. Washington and Ankara agreed that Kurdish forces in northern Syria should abandon their positions and move out of the city of Manbij. Not because they don’t belong there, but because Turkey doesn’t want them there. And the Erdogan government convinced Washington to act as enforcer.

Such is the result of the U.S. illegally occupying more than a quarter of Syria and threatening forces allied with the legal government in Damascus. Washington has no constitutional warrant to engage in flagrant aggression, especially when it serves no important let alone vital American interests. If Iran or Russia did the same—both are in Syria at the request of the legitimate authorities—Washington would vilify the offender before the United Nations Security Council and threaten military retaliation. But when the U.S. lawlessly intervenes for no good reason, American officials simply ignore international law.

Most shocking may be Washington’s flagrant mistreatment of Syrian Kurds, who were America’s strongest allies against the Islamic State. Only last fall the United States stood by as Iraq, Iran, and Turkey punished Kurdistan, an autonomous region of Iraq, after its people voted for independence. Many Kurds were shocked, but for Washington the issue always is what have you done for us lately? American officials were never willing to confront the Baghdad government, just rescued from the Islamic State’s depredations, NATO ally Turkey, or even hated adversary Iran.

Now the Trump administration has staged a repeat in Syria. Washington’s anti-Assad, anti-ISIS policy long lacked effective local partners. So-called moderate insurgents never amounted to much and often surrendered personnel and weapons to more radical forces. Backing jihadists who would happily kill Americans if given the opportunity proved to be an even worse option for Washington. So in 2015 the United States enlisted the Syrian Democratic Forces, dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), to battle the Islamic State. Now the “caliphate” is gone, leaving minimal pockets of Islamic State control that some combination of Syrians, Kurds, Turks, Russians, Iranians, Jordanians, Saudis and others could eliminate.

Nevertheless, Washington announced that it hoped to use its Kurdish allies to detach territory and especially oil resources from Syria in an attempt to oust President Bashar al-Assad and remake his country. Congress never authorized such a Quixotic venture, but President Trump, like his predecessors, claims virtually unlimited war powers, including bombing, invading, and occupying the country of Syria.

However, the president evidently remains casualty-averse. If a war is to be fought to push Assad from office, then deny Iran transit routes to Damascus and limit Russian influence in an ally which Moscow began subsidizing sixty-three years ago—all stated administration objectives—but he wants someone else to do it. Hence Washington’s continuing support for the Kurds in Syria’s northeast.

Alas, Turkey always feared the Kurds far more than the Islamic State, which Ankara initially tolerated, as part of its campaign against the Assad government. Indeed, Turkish officials allowed the transit of men and materiel into ISIS territory and were even believed to have enriched themselves facilitating illicit Islamic State oil sales. Turkey never seriously deployed its large and well-equipped military against the Islamic State.

In January, after warning Washington against its close relationship with Syrian Kurds—with some cause seen by Ankara as little different from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, in Turkey—the Erdogan government launched its second and largest offensive into Syria. The objective was to prevent creation of a sizable, contiguous Kurdish territory, called Rojava, on the border. Ankara’s forces, bolstered by local insurgents, many once armed and trained by Washington, drove the Kurds out of border territory around Afrin. The Erdogan government next threatened to march east on Manbij, where American forces were stationed along side YPG units.

The U.S. reaction began with shocked complaints that Turkey’s actions weren’t helpful to America, as if Ankara cared about the Washington’s objectives. Then U.S. diplomats begged the Erdogan government to halt while military officers threatened to resist any attack. Lastly were negotiations to avoid a military confrontation that neither side could afford. The Kurds are supposed to move east of the Euphrates, nevermind where their homes and communities lie and what best serves the interests of their people. Apparently the United States is supposed to take over garrison duty in Manbij as part of joint patrols with Turkish units.

In fact, no one other than a few naïve Kurds ever believed Washington would go to war against Turkey. Not only is the latter a NATO member, though in practice the Erdogan government has become more adversary than ally, but it possesses a significant military equipped by America. As in Iraq, the Kurds were disposable friends, to be used when convenient but abandoned when necessary. That’s geopolitics at its most brutal as played by the world’s increasingly haggard superpower.