China may be a carbonated bottle, and Taiwan may be its cork, but these metaphors are often misconstrued to mean that an autonomous Taiwan is the sole barrier holding back Chinese conquest and world order revision. This misinterpretation, however, has inflated the importance of defending Taiwan. However, carrying the logic of this metaphor through to its natural end will help the United States more clearly assess the geostrategic implications of Taiwan’s possible annexation.

When a cork is popped, how far and long does the champagne actually flow? And to what extent does external pressure affect these measurements? A short burst of champagne is the appropriate measurement for how China would act if it ever regained control of Taiwan. This suggests that the United States need not treat Taiwan as if it were a final line of defense. Any annexation of the island would mean neither the drastic propulsion of Chinese power nor the total breakage of its natural restraints.

To be sure, annexing Taiwan would immediately extend China’s capabilities beyond the first island chain. Yet, the second and third chains could easily be maintained, and perhaps the first chain could even be triaged. Perhaps the establishment of additional chains in the Indian Ocean is called for as well.

Or, perhaps, the island chain strategy has simply diminished in value. A product of the 1950s, it was used to geographically contain communist maritime expansion. This proved to be an effective strategy for two reasons—the communist world was relatively isolated at this time, and communism’s threat was primarily militaristic. Neither of these conditions applies in the case of China, which is deeply embedded in global institutions and is using this position to primarily exert its illiberal influence in the realms of governance and economics.

Instead of relying solely on a regional containment strategy, the United States would be wise to prepare a series of maritime chokepoints in the eastern hemisphere that could be closed off in response to Chinese militarism. The ability to threaten a networked closure of China’s shipping lanes would be a strong deterrent for a country with global economic interests. This incentive structure would serve as a more appropriate strategy for an era in which the balance of power only favors China in its own backyard.

In broader geostrategic terms, annexing Taiwan would only allow the People’s Liberation Army to project power an additional 150 miles. It would also address the legitimacy of some of China’s contested claims in the South China Sea, thereby marginally extending its exclusive economic zone and improving its resource security. After the immediate flurry of activities associated with securing its new territory and resources, China would quickly settle down for four reasons.

First, having the opportunity to project power farther is not the same as having the ability to do so. China’s military investments have so far prioritized capturing Taiwan and delaying or weakening U.S. forces that attempt to intervene in the Taiwan Strait. This has resulted in a large share of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems comprising China’s arsenal, which serve a locally defensive purpose. Moreover, China will not be an attractive ally for as long as it remains authoritarian and powerful. This political unattractiveness limits China’s opportunities for overseas bases from which it could sustain ground and air operations. Ultimately, the more China attempts to push outward offensively, the more its power degrades.

Second, this degradation of China’s offensive ability works in the inverse for the United States. China has the advantage over the United States in the Taiwan Strait but the opposite is the case for the rest of the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, if China takes Taiwan without a U.S. intervention, Beijing would still understand the principle of “differentiated credibility”—there is a meaningful distinction between aggressing Taiwan and formal U.S. allies such as Japan or the Philippines.

Third, the United States is not the only force capable of balancing against China. Beijing has gone to great lengths and has thus far enjoyed a good deal of success in reassuring its neighbors that China will rise peacefully. Taking Taiwan by force would leave kindling at the foundation of these reassurances; any further militarism would engulf China’s regional diplomatic endeavors in flames. From these ashes would rise a large and resolved balancing coalition intent on containing China. This coalition would represent the antithesis of Beijing’s regional ambitions.

Fourth, and most importantly, China’s domestic economic situation precludes it from seeking any war in its own backyard. China is large but is also aging, highly vulnerable to a changing climate, and increasingly invested in hollow infrastructure. Therefore, it needs access to maritime routes and resources in order to manage these structural challenges. Instigating war with other Asia-Pacific states would result in the restricting of maritime navigability. The Malacca Strait and the Sea of Japan are the first maritime chokepoints that would be closed off in response to any coercive leveraging of Taiwan. Breaking free of these maritime restrictions is a large part of why China desires to annex Taiwan in the first place.

As China has been translating its wealth into military power, one might argue that the economic security resulting from the annexation of Taiwan would enable China to continue investing in its military to the point that it becomes an imperial threat. Yet, this argument is based on an unproven and highly questionable premise that China desires an empire in the conventional sense. To the extent that China’s rise disrupts the world order, the nature of Beijing’s conduct is far less belligerent and far more insidious. To counter this type of threat, the United States must focus more on developing its soft power domestically and less on maintaining its relative military power in every arena in the world.

These points support the notion that Taiwan does not hold any vital U.S. interests. To the extent that geography can naturally restrain China, the region is studded with earthen redundancies that perform a similar function as Taiwan. These geographic features provide a strong economic and security incentive for China to rise peacefully. While the seizure of Taiwan would be devastating on humanitarian grounds, it would not cause a regional crisis or whet a Chinese appetite for further conquest. In fact, the only way to assuredly turn a cross-strait crisis into a larger, longer, escalating war is for the United States to intervene.

If the United States is truly concerned for the well-being of the 24 million people living in Taiwan, as it ought to be, shining a new light on the geographic element of this issue illuminates a unique opportunity. China seeks not to reunify with the Taiwanese people so much as it seeks to control the island territory that they live on. Similar to how the Uyghurs of Xinjiang were between Beijing and the development of westward projects for its Belt and Road Initiative, the Taiwanese now stand between Beijing and the development of its maritime initiatives.

Coincidentally, U.S. geography enables an extremely high capacity for immigrants. If the United States is willing to accommodate Taiwan’s population at home and China’s territorial interests on the other side of the world, it could simultaneously avert crisis and tragedy in the Strait, enable Taiwanese culture to live on, and lower the risk of future inter-state war in the Asia-Pacific, all while enhancing its own economy and soft power in the process.

Given the poor choices available, this would hardly be the worst outcome.

Matthew Gallagher is a Marcellus Policy Fellow with the John Quincy Adams Society. He graduated from the University of Florida with a B.Sc. in Sustainability and a minor in Innovation.

Image: Reuters.