After swearing in as India’s Prime Minister for a third term, Modi’s first foreign visit was to Russia. This was not quite unexpected to seasoned observers. However, the visit was viewed with serious concern, curiosity, and optimism in geopolitical quarters across the world. Aside from the routine bilateral issues of energy, connectivity, trade payments system, health, and defense cooperation, this time, Modi’s visit is likely to focus on a highly critical and sensitive factor in discussions, i.e., China. Beijing’s strengthening ties with Moscow, its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, and its expanding influence and clout in both the SCO and BRICS are indeed matters of concern for India due to its friction with China.

After the 2020 border clash, relations between Delhi and Beijing deteriorated, and the current phase continues to be strenuous. However, India, at this stage, prefers to resolve the border issues through negotiations and diplomacy. In my previous articles for The National Interest, I discussed the merits and demerits of aligning with the West to address its China challenge. Another window that India can explore is opening a backchannel dialogue route to Beijing through Moscow.

At a cursory glance, this option looks, at best, uncertain, given the emergence of Russia and China as strategic partners, particularly during the Ukraine War. With the Russian invasion, divisions in the world order are clear. Russia has little choice but to enter into the Chinese fold. Due to sanctions from the West, they depend on China for energy revenues. Furthermore, China is also its key ally against the West and an important pillar in their vision of a multipolar world order, which is a challenge to the U.S.-led Western world order. Hence, it is unlikely that they would be able to support India against China in the event of a war between the two. If this is viewed against the backdrop of the enhancement of India’s relationship with the Western World, particularly after 2014, it becomes even more difficult for Russia to stand with India despite the historic, special, and privileged partnership between Delhi and Moscow.

However, closer analysis shows that the Moscow channel is worth exploring, even in the context of a potential Sino-Indian conflict. Today’s India is not the India of 1962. Its situation is not so weak that China can unilaterally dictate its terms. New Delhi’s strategic autonomy, geographical location, technological prowess, robust military, and rapidly growing economy make it a stronger and more credible actor than in the past. The opposing powers constantly woo it, be they Russia and the West, Iran and Israel, or the countries of the “Global South.” India has a unique position in world politics, enabling it to engage China in tough negotiations from the position of strength. It is in this context that Moscow can play an important role.

Before exploring the Moscow channel, it must be understood that Moscow has major stakes in avoiding a Sino-Indian conflict. First, the India-Russia friendship is historical and civilizational. It is based on trust and has weathered the last seventy-five years of turmoil. Russia is a trusted partner in the public perception and among national security and diplomatic circles. 

In 2019, after the abrogation of Article 370, when Russia supported India’s decision, Modi said that both countries do not believe in interfering in each other’s internal matters. More recently, amid India-U.S. tensions over India’s purchase of Russian oil, Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar defended India’s decision, stating that “Russia has never hurt Indian interests…The relations of powers like Europe, the United States, China, or Japan with Russia, they have all seen ups and downs. We have had a stable and always very friendly relationship with Russia. And our relationship with Russia today is based on this experience.” Furthermore, in the wake of the recent ISIS-K attacks in Russia, Russia-India ties have space to grow on the counter-terrorism front. Undoubtedly, Moscow values this friendship. However, if China invades India and a mid-size war ensues, Putin will not be able to support India against China.

For some time, it may remain neutral, but given Russia’s dependence on Beijing, it will not be able to sustain its neutrality indefinitely. In that case, it may stop selling oil and defense equipment to India, which will be a big setback to its economy already under duress from Western sanctions. India will be left with no option except to bolster its ties with the West, and India’s complete shift to the U.S. camp will be detrimental to Russia.

Also, in Russia’s vision of the multipolar world order, India constitutes an independent pole as a civilizational state. India’s clear shift to the Western camp will jolt Russia’s vision of a multipolar world. Besides, Russia has a history of boundary disputes and war with China. In Central Asia and Eurasia, China is agreeably Russia’s geopolitical rival. China’s expansion in these areas, which are traditionally Russia’s political and cultural space, is a matter of concern for Moscow. For Russia, India could be a counterweight to China. Losing India to the West will shatter those prospects, making Russia even more vulnerable and dependent on China.

Lastly, Russia, being a “civilisational state,” as Alexander Dugin describes it, is in a much better position to understand and reach out to Beijing, another civilizational state. Many Indian diplomats told me that routing diplomacy through Washington may provoke China and add to its insecurities. However, suppose Russia takes the lead in the backchannel. In that case, it will be a more credible effort without raising undue insecurities and suspicions, as China understands the historic friendship between Russia and India well. India’s old Russian hands can play a critical role in this initiative. Besides, the current Russian Putin-centric system guided by the ideas of tradition, opposition to Western universalism and value-hegemony, civilizational states, and multipolar world order aligns well with the current RSS-BJP-led Indian political system, which also places a high premium on Sanatan civilizational identity, religious and cultural wisdom, and multipolar world order.

Hence, ample scope exists for synergizing the efforts, but the Indian security and foreign policy establishment remains highly skeptical and despondent about such out-of-the-box ideas. The policy masterminds have strong apprehensions that Russia’s shift towards China is complete and final, and secondly, that Russia is too occupied with the Ukraine effort to either take the India-China border issue seriously or make efforts to achieve any breakthrough at the cost of Chinese support in its Ukraine effort. There is also a sense of suspicion that Beijing could use Russia for its anti-India influence operations executed through backchannel dialogues due to Moscow’s dependence on Beijing.

Such influence operations could be used to mislead India, keep it complacent with the progress of negotiations, and, in the meantime, buy more time to prepare for the war so that when the real invasion happens, India is caught off guard and the Chinese get all the advantages of the element of surprise. Besides, there are internal ruptures in the Indian establishment. Think tanks and experts are divided. Some of them, with robust penetration in the Ministry of External Affairs, are staunchly against Russia and openly advocate alignment with the U.S. as the only way to counter China. Even within the government, allegedly, the diplomatic side is skeptical of engagement with Russia and toe a pro-U.S. line; however, the security-intelligence side is realistic and slightly more positive about engaging China through the Moscow channel.

All said and done, it is reasonable to conclude that currently, there is a complete ambivalence, lack of direction, and vision in India’s understanding of China and its policy to address the China challenge in the Himalayan borders. Alarming predictions of the India-China war made by astrologers and strategic analysts alike worsen India’s fears. Hence, the question remains: what should India do? However, instead of focusing on what should be done, the focus must shift to what can be done.

There are no lasting solutions in geopolitics; problems can only be managed until the circumstances change. Hence, in the short run, managing this conflict with the fundamental premises of conflict avoidance and escalation containment is the best strategy. This can be achieved through nuanced external balancing to prevent any hegemon from dominating the region. While pursuing it, New Delhi’s strategy can be a good mix of soft and coercive diplomacy. Instead of completely aligning with one block, India must pursue multi-alignment and enhance its weight in global politics. New Delhi must engage with Western powers on technological development, climate change, economic growth, and defense on equal terms through multilateral forums without getting bracketed within them. 

No doubt, China brings huge investment opportunities to Europe. However, there are fundamental fault lines and ruptures over the issue of Ukraine, the dumping of Chinese goods, China’s intelligence operations, etc., which India must leverage to its strategic advantage. In South Asia and East Asia, Japan can be the most crucial link to counter China. At the same time, India should maintain a vital presence in the affairs of the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South and continue strengthening its civilizational and geostrategic engagement with Moscow. China’s debt traps and BRI projects are viewed with skepticism and alarm in several developing countries of the Global South, which in turn widens the strategic space for India, provided New Delhi can capitalize on that.