Editor’s Note: The Red Cell series is published in collaboration with the Stimson Center. Drawing upon the legacy of the CIA’s Red Cell—established following the September 11 attacks to avoid similar analytic failures in the future—the project works to challenge assumptions, misperceptions, and groupthink with a view to encouraging alternative approaches to America’s foreign and national security policy challenges. For more information about the Stimson Center’s Red Cell Project, see here.

Red Cell

As Israel pounds Lebanon and contemplates retaliating against Iranian aggression, the loss of U.S. influence on Israeli decision-making since the October 7 attack is striking. A militarily dominant Israel may be able to bring a cessation of terrorist attacks temporarily, but any permanent peace will be elusive. U.S. President Joe Biden has been inept in his handling of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and may have inadvertently spiked Kamala Harris’ campaign if gasoline prices keep rising and a regional war ensues. Trump’s prior plan for bringing peace through economic ties between Israel and Arab states and maximum pressure on Iran looks feeble and unpromising, with both Russia and China drawing closer to Tehran. 

Whoever wins the U.S. presidential election will face the unwelcome choice of trying to bring order to the Middle East and risk eclipsing other priorities in Europe and Asia or allowing the region to fester under Israel’s military domination, creating conditions for a larger conflict down the road.

A New Third Israel Front

On October 1, 2024, Iran fired more than 180 missiles at Israel. This represents one of the largest ballistic missile attacks in the history of the conflict against Israel. IDF military spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said Israel’s air defense systems intercepted most of Iran’s missiles, but some landed in central and southern Israel. According to a situation report by The Washington Post, at least two dozen Iranian long-range missiles have breached Israeli and allied air defense systems and hit at least three military and intelligence facilities in Israel.

Iran’s attack came after the Israeli military began carrying out “limited, local, and targeted ground attacks” against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. According to a statement by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the attacks were a reaction to Israel’s killing of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders in recent months. If Israel retaliated to the recent Iranian bombardment, Iran would attack again “harder,” Tehran threatened.

The Israeli military, however, said that the Iranian attack “will have consequences.” “We have plans, and we will act in the time and place we decide,” said military spokesman Hagari. He did not specify when this could happen or what the retaliation might look like. Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu hinted at a tougher response, stressing that Iran had made a serious mistake and would be held accountable for it.

America’s “Ironclad” Support for Israel

The United States takes these threats seriously and has increased its military support for Israel to help repel Iranian attacks. The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would increase the number of fighter jets in the region and instruct the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln to remain in the Middle East. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Israeli Defense Secretary Yoav Gallant “discussed the serious consequences for Iran in the event Iran chooses to launch a direct military attack against Israel,” according to a Pentagon statement. And U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said that “support for Israel’s security is ironclad” and added that Washington will coordinate with Israel on any future response. Although the U.S. government claims to coordinate closely with Israel, it has been outwitted multiple times by Netanyahu’s initiatives.

Israel’s Doubts About U.S. Support

However, after the Biden administration reacted only cautiously to Iranian attacks against Israel last April, Jerusalem no longer feels obliged to follow Washington’s recommendations and exercise restraint in the future. Israel’s confidence in Biden’s determination to take concrete action against Iran and its nuclear facilities is low. Currently, Biden is calling for a proportionate response from Israel and has advised against Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Israel fears that Iran could turn its possession of a nuclear bomb into a deterrent. The weapons would serve as a “nuclear shield,” allowing Iran to become more aggressive and safe in the knowledge that it cannot be attacked in return.

Currently, it is risky for Iran to escalate the confrontation. With Hamas decimated and Hezbollah leaderless and disorganized, Iran’s proxies cannot assist Tehran as they normally would. In addition to the current attack on Hezbollah, Israel’s crushing of Hamas in Gaza has significantly diminished Iran’s ability to stir up trouble in the face of threats. However, these setbacks could prompt Iran to accelerate its nuclear weapons program.

Iranian officials have already indicated that Israel’s aggressive stance could possibly prompt Iran to complete nuclear weapons development. Some suggested that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, could revoke his previous fatwa prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The regime has increased both the number and expansion of centrifuges for uranium enrichment and now has a significant amount of near-weapons-grade material. 

Earlier this Spring, the IAEA head Rafael Grossi stated that Iran was enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, much higher than the typical two to four percent of other nuclear powers, nearing weapons-grade capability. “They do have enough nuclear material for several nuclear warheads—does that mean they have a nuclear weapon? No,” Grossi said. “It requires many other things. But the situation is a serious one.” He also complained that the IAEA’s “level of inspection is not at the level we should have.”

America and Israel have always stressed that they will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear bomb. Israel apparently has precise intelligence data on Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran crosses a critical line, Israel could attack Iranian nuclear facilities, which it almost did in 2011. Yet, it is unclear if Jerusalem would be completely successful in taking out the numerous nuclear sites, and the risk is that such an attack would trigger a sprint by Iran to build a nuclear weapon.

In opposing Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, Biden hinted that the United States could support an Israeli attack on Iranian oil facilities but more recently has said he opposes such attacks, no doubt in part because, after his earlier remark, U.S. crude prices started to rise by more than five percent to $77 a barrel. Analysts warn that a blow to Iranian oil facilities could increase oil prices by more than $12, and a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran could send prices up to $28. A major conflict in the Middle East would raise energy prices significantly and potentially throw the current dead heat presidential election in Trump’s favor.

Iran’s Dilemma

Tehran does not want to promote Trump’s possible election victory by escalating the conflict. Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA deal, which former President Obama struck in 2015. On May 8, 2018, Trump kept his election promise and unilaterally terminated the agreement, even though Iran had fulfilled its obligations. At the same time, Trump increased its economic pressure against Iran, warning European companies against trading with Iran if they wanted to avoid secondary sanctions.

The main beneficiaries of the sanctions are Russia and China. Moscow and Tehran have intensified their military cooperation, and China benefits from cheap Iranian oil that Europe and America’s Asian allies are no longer allowed to buy. However, the Iranian leadership cannot be sure that Russia or China would protect the regime if a second Trump administration again considers regime change in Tehran.

Russia’s Interests

Iran and Russia are both facing severe Western sanctions and, therefore, maintain strong economic ties. President Vladimir Putin has also strengthened Russia’s military cooperation with Iran and supported the Assad regime in Syria alongside Iran. While Iran uses domestically made weapons, it still buys some from Russia and has supported Russia with drone technology during its invasion of Ukraine.

According to a recent report by the U.S. Department of Defense, Iran has also supplied Russia with Fath 360 short-range missiles. In addition, Iranian instructors have trained Russian military personnel in the use of those missiles. The short-range missiles allow Russia to reserve its more advanced long-range missiles for other purposes in the Ukraine war.

The Pentagon has indicated that intelligence may have been exchanged between Iran and Russia in communications relating to missile deliveries. U.S. security agencies expect further arms deliveries and closer military cooperation between Russia and Iran in the future.

However, if he returns to the White House as a “dealmaker,” Trump may demand concessions from Russia regarding Iran while giving in to Russian territorial demands in Ukraine, which he has already signaled.

China’s Opportunity

Amid escalating tensions with Israel, Beijing pledged its support to Tehran, but that means little in practice, given that Iran has little chance of engaging China in a far-off conflict. Iran’s dependence on Chinese energy imports is enormous; over 90 percent of its crude oil exports go to China via the black market. In 2021, the two countries concluded a twenty-five-year agreement in which China promised significant investments to secure oil supplies. Should Israel hit and destroy Iran’s oil infrastructure, Beijing would probably promise to rebuild. Although arms trade relations are faltering, there is cooperation in drone development. China, however, will only support Iran diplomatically and oppose U.S. policies but shows little interest in a security role in the Middle East. Although U.S. security agencies find an alleged “axis of anger” troubling, China’s support for Iran—much like its de facto support for Russia in Ukraine—is pragmatic and limited.