The stunning collapse of the Baathist Assad regime in Syria has everyone opining on winners and losers and repercussions in the region and beyond. Accordingly, the winners’ list starts with Turkey and includes Lebanon, Israel, and possibly the Arab Gulf States, not to mention the United States and European countries. However, it is far too early to predict future developments.

Recent events in the Middle East and elsewhere have demonstrated that intense conflicts often unleash a startling series of unintended outcomes. These outcomes are almost always attributable to either or both societal configurations and ill-considered decisions taken by leaders. Current Syrian developments can, in part, be attributed to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel that engulfed the region. Iran and its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, almost immediately decided to support Hamas by shelling northern Israel and forcing the displacements of tens of thousands of Israelis. The year-long shelling eventually triggered a devastating Israeli counter-response that severely weakened both Iran and Hezbollah, rendering them incapable of supporting Bashar al-Assad as they had in the past. In retrospect, Iranian and Hezbollah leaders were imprudent.

The lack of outside support—to which we can add Russia’s absence due to the war in Ukraine—is an insufficient explanation for the regime’s collapse. Reporting from Syria suggests that the rebels led by the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were surprised by the rapidity with which the regime and its military melted away. No one, including Assad’s allies or foes, had foreseen the degree to which Syria’s state institutions and army had frayed due to wanton corruption, repression, and mismanagement.

This suggests that the international community and Syria’s neighbors need to exercise a great deal of caution as they respond to the regime’s overthrow and offer to support the Syrian people. First, little is known about the composition and nature of HTS. It is a rebel organization with roots in al-Qaeda and al-Nusra. These two hardcore jihadist movements wreaked much chaos, violence, and misery. HTS is not the only armed group in Syria, as dire economic conditions can easily occasion violence. Its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, may have hit all the right keys immediately after Assad’s fall. Still, the external and internal challenges awaiting him and his organization may be too intractable.

Externally, two domineering leaders of neighboring countries have already engaged in behavior that will undermine the new Syrian government. Benjamin Netanyahu directed the Israeli army to cross the border with Syria into the demilitarized zone separating the two countries. He has also ordered the destruction of chemical weapon depots and production facilities to prevent them from falling into the hands of armed groups. Traumatized by the October 7 events, these Israeli actions, provided they are temporary, are understandable. However, he also had the Syrian navy and much of its air force demolished. These strikes were followed by a cabinet decision to double the settler population in the Golan Heights. A boastful Netanyahu, instead of offering a hand to the Syrian people who had accomplished an extraordinary feat, complemented these actions with an uncompromising and antagonistic language bound to infuriate the incoming Syrian leaders but also deepen suspicions and the ill will for Israel in the region. The Israeli leader, however, is far more interested in using Syria to boost his own precarious position at home, damaged by his conduct of the war in Gaza, approach to the hostage issue, and the corruption trial.

Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, too, is pursuing his own objectives in Syria as he directs the Syrian National Army (SNA), a military group he controls, to attack the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) composed of Syrian Kurds in the north of the country. The new authorities in Damascus have stated that they will not tolerate armed groups independent of the central government. Turkey claims that the SDF is a terrorist organization, but it is the lynchpin of the United States’ ten-year effort to defeat and contain the Islamic State (ISIS). Washington has deployed 900 troops to collaborate with the Syrian Kurds.  For Turkey, the SDF represents a conceptual, strategic threat because Ankara fears the demonstration effect on its Kurdish minority if the SDF parlays its position in post-Assad Syria into some form of autonomy akin to the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. Washington has reportedly negotiated a ceasefire between the SDF and the Turks.

Erdogan is likely to continue pursuing his goals. He will maintain the SNA and Turkish forces based in the northwest to persist in his anti-SDF strategy, complicating negotiations between Damascus and the SDF. At this juncture, the new Syrian government is incapable of opposing either Israel or Turkey. In their haste to act, however, Israelis and Turks risk overplaying their respective hands and repeating the same post-October 7 mistakes Hezbollah and Iran committed. Poor leadership on their part may engender unforeseen outcomes.

All this suggests Washington will remain the only power center capable of reining in centrifugal forces and ISIS terrorists. These are among the external reasons why the United States, contrary to incoming President Donald Trump’s wishes, will remain engaged in Syria and the broader Middle East. The new Syrian government has a monumental task ahead as it seeks to revive its hollowed state and economy. The United States, paradoxically, stands in its way. The United States, as well as other countries, had HTS designated as a terrorist entity. This designation, along with existing sanctions on Syria, makes it very hard for international companies and other countries to do business with the new rulers of Damascus. Syria has for decades functioned as a kleptocracy and a significant exporter of illicit drugs; rebuilding it will require a great deal of international collaboration. Whether returning willingly or because they are being forced out, refugees will further strain finances and governance. Syria will need quick access to financial and expert assistance. Institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will look at Washington for engagement guidance.

Assad’s overthrow, accompanied by Iran and Hezbollah’s defeat and Russia’s loss of influence, represents a once-in-a-generation-type opportunity. The Iranian regime constructed a formidable alliance that allowed it to defend its revolutionary character at home by pursuing aggressive regional policies. Only Iraqi Shia militias and the Houthis remain of this alliance; anti-Iranian rumblings can already be heard in Iraq. It would be a pity if Iran were permitted to reconstitute its spoiler role or for the Russians to return. U.S. leadership is the only force in a chaotic and disorganized Middle East that can stand in its way.

Washington has no reason to turn its back on such propitious circumstances, especially when the regional balance of power has been so radically reconfigured. Almost everyone in the region, from minorities in Syria like the Kurds, Alawites, and Christians to all the states, from foe to ally, expects America to remain engaged. The region may be ready for a real push for a comprehensive peace. Paradoxically, perhaps, Turkey and Netanyahu (as opposed to Israel) are the only ones who would not want to see Washington assume such a role.

Henri J. Barkey is the Cohen professor of international relations at Lehigh University (emeritus) and an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council of Foreign Relations.

Image: Mohammad Bash / Shutterstock.com