Editor’s Note: This article is the third installment in a series on the succession of Russian president Vladimir Putin. Read the first and second here and here.

In our first article in this series exploring potential successors to Vladimir Putin, we examined one option: the semi-dynastic succession of Putin’s cousin, Anna Putina Tsivilyova. In our second article, we considered the possibility of a hardline succession featuring Putin’s Chairman of the National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, or his son Dmitri. In this article, we explore a third possibility: a reformer emerges from the ranks of the bureaucracy to become Russia’s next leader. 

As renowned historian Vasily Kliuchevsky demonstrated, rather than hindering, war has necessitated reform multiple times in Russian history. Think of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Alexander II, and even Gorbachev. Their initiatives depended on a unique class, what historian Bruce Lincoln called “enlightened bureaucrats” who play critical roles in running the government but are virtually never tapped as top leaders. These administrators wield their power thanks to their unique, specialized knowledge. Their mandate was to fortify the economy for prolonged conflicts while avoiding any fundamental reform. 

The hereditary monarchy of Tsarist Russia made it impossible for these reformers to “rise from the ranks.” Peter needed military modernization and financing, not Western liberal values. His modernizers were mainly foreigners, especially Germans, and their increased presence in the Russian elite raised tension with conservative nobility whose wealth greatly depended on maintaining and deepening serfdom. This model peaked for the Russian Empire with the defeat of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. As the nineteenth century wore on, it was increasingly clear that Russia’s considerable, illiterate, land-based serf population was a crimp on economic growth and technological development. However, as Tsar Nicholas I told his State Council in 1842, “Serfdom, in its present form, is an evil obvious to all; but to touch it now would of course be an even more ruinous evil.” Russian Tsars, Soviet General Secretaries, and Vladimir Putin have all faced this dilemma in some form or another: the system is inefficient and corrupt, but reforming it risks destroying the foundation of state power. Arguably, the only leader to attempt systemic reform was the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who was—and still is—vilified by modern Russian and Chinese propaganda. 

The best historical analog to Vladimir Putin is Nicholas I, who served as Tsar from 1825 until his death in 1855. He was a conservative who sought to promote a newly branded state identity based on the troika of autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality while defending other conservative European monarchies. He and his fellow monarchs viewed the liberalism that felled the Bourbon dynasty in France as the most dangerous threat to their sacred status quo. Notoriously, Nicholas’s leadership concluded with the failure of the Crimean War. 

However, Russia’s current technocracy takes its cues from Georg Kankrin, one of Nicholas I’s finance ministers. Kankrin, who some historians credit with assisting Russia’s victory over Napoleon, steeled the economy for war by economizing the budget and maintaining a rigid monetary policy. Kankrin, who met the Tsar on a daily basis, had a unique prerogative to speak his mind because of his personal relationship with the monarch. Other famous Tsarist and Soviet mandarins include Pyotr Stolypin, who, under Nicholas II, spearheaded partial privatization of the land; Sergei Witte, who made the ruble convertible and launched the Trans-Siberian Railroad; Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who pushed Brezhnev’s politburo to implement administrative optimization. For nearly a decade, Putin’s friend, the former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, a fan of Kankrin, epitomized this brand of “enlightened” bureaucrat. This article focuses on the inheritor of this Russian tradition, Mikhail Mishustin, Putin’s current prime minister. 

It’s a journalistic stereotype to assume the KGB runs Russia. Indeed, Mishustin, Kudrin (former head of the Accounts Chamber, former Minister of Finance, and current executive at Yandex), and his successor as Finance Minister, Elvira Naibvuilina, along with other Putin technocrats, wield significant personal power. They maintain influential patronage networks. The necessities of crisis management have granted these “enlightened bureaucrats” even more clout. In particular, Covid shutdowns and wartime disruptions have meant that they dole out massive state subsidies. Increasingly, Russian businesses and the military depend on the whims of the Kremlin’s civilian ministries.

While Russia’s military leaders have clearly underperformed, Russia’s financial wizards can boast of unqualified successes. Despite the West’s harsh sanctions, Russian supermarkets remain full. In the meantime, Russian military production has been significantly ramped up. Western experts are dumbfounded by Russia’s success in mass-producing deadly UAVs such as the Lancet model. Moreover, Putin’s technocrats have been able to replace European trade with alternative partners. The ruble, which was supposed to crush Putin, has remained stable. Despite isolation from international finance, there have been no Russian bank runs. 

Ultimately, Putin (along with the majority of the elite) has realized there are few potential replacements with the necessary managerial competency and discretion available. Without his “enlightened bureaucrats,” Putin’s economy would crash quickly. Understanding their irreplaceability within the system, these bureaucratic managers enjoy significant leeway and wide prerogatives. It’s an open secret that Kudrin, Mishustin, and Nabiullina quietly opposed the war in Ukraine. Unlike other functionaries, they do not feel compelled to trumpet bombastic nationalist slogans. Their disciplined monetary policies, such as double-digit interest rates, have been widely criticized in the press and by heavyweights such as Igor Sechin. Nonetheless, with the full support of Putin, they refuse to back down. Putin knows well that a “patriotic” economist like Sergei Glaziev, who advocates free-wheeling spending on industrialization, would quickly run the economy into the ground.

From Systems Engineer to Tax Man to Prime Minister

Imagining a scenario in which a reformist leader in Russia could emerge under the current conditions of repression and militarization requires considerable imagination. Nonetheless, before his death in 2022, the wily Far-Right politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky named Mishustin as the leading contender to succeed Putin. In addition, the Russian Constitution calls for the prime minister to assume office as acting president if the presidency is vacant until new elections within ninety days. Indeed, this was the path Vladimir Putin followed in 1999. 

Putin has been mindful of limiting the scope and prerogatives of his own prime ministers. Putin’s first Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, was able and charismatic and enjoyed close ties to the Yeltsin family. Leery of a Westernizer, conservative forces mobilized a PR campaign to relegate Kasyanov to the margins. They branded him “Misha two percent” for his alleged standard take on government deals. After Kasyanov, Putin was mindful of selecting humorless men with limited ambitions.

In his first years in power, Putin’s greatest fear was the wealthy oligarchs and their ability to buy political power. Thus, Putin has been careful to prevent his officials from abusing their access to revenue flows. In particular, Prime Ministers Mikhail Fradkov and Viktor Zubkov both worked in the sensitive area of tax collection: both were connected to Russian intelligence. After serving as prime minister, Fradkov even became Director of Foreign Intelligence. But to the public, they were faceless placeholders. 

Dmitri Medvedev, who served as Putin’s premier from 2012–2020, appears to be an exception among Putin’s prime ministers, given his legal training and lack of intelligence service background. His management of Putin’s “national projects” was judged as ineffective, and it is hard to identify a single, distinctive success in his eight years as prime minister. In a rare case of a public split among the Putin elite, Kudrin in 2011 called Medvedev incompetent in financial matters. Indeed, Medvedev’s principal virtue is his loyalty to Vladimir Putin. 

Around this time, Putin sought to cement his legacy as a modern-day “Collector of the Russian lands” to cement his legacy in the pantheon of expansionist Russian rulers. Putin understood this entailed military aggression and possible international isolation. Consequently, he would need a far more competent prime minister than Dmitri Medvedev. Russia’s technological progress was an existential need for both military competition and societal control. While Medvedev cultivated the image of a posh trendsetter showing off his iPad on every imaginable occasion, Mikhail Mishustin presented a more compelling image as a former systems engineer with immense IT sector experience dating back to the 1980s.

Mishustin’s father, Vladimir Moiseyeich Mishustin, was a KGB officer who worked most of his career at Aeroflot, an airline company. Trained as a systems engineer in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mikhail joined the International Computer Club, established in 1988 during Perestroika as a central node for the nascent IT industry. There, he had the opportunity to network with international IT companies and Russian state enterprises. Mishustin rose quickly and eventually became a co-owner of the ICC and chairman of its board. KGB authorities were likely involved in the establishment of this club and certainly monitored it very closely. Selling used and new Western computers just before and after the collapse offered substantial profit opportunities. Notably, future Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky started his entrepreneurial career using siphoned Komsomol funds to buy and sell computers and other IT equipment. 

The International Computer Club, where Mishustin worked from 1992–1998, provided Mishustin an ideal platform to connect with Russian and international IT companies as well as Russian state officials and state-controlled CEOs who sought to modernize their IT capabilities rapidly. Reviewing the scant biographical literature on Mishustin, three qualities jump out: 1) he is very sociable, a born networker, and an excellent public speaker; 2) he is exceptionally bright and multitalented; 3) he keeps his own political views to himself.

Mishustin was recruited to the State Tax Service by former Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister Boris Fyodorov in 1998. Fyodorov was one of the top leaders in Yeltin’s first liberal market reform-oriented cabinets. Fyodorov, who penned a glowing biography of Pyotr Stolypin, favored Pinochet-style, top-down market reforms to jumpstart the Russian economy. He encouraged foreign investment and expertise to bring this about. By 1994, Russia’s reformist period had sputtered out, and Fyodorov left the Russian government to co-found the United Financial Group with American banker Charles Ryan. After a financial crisis in August 1998, Fyodorov briefly returned to the Russian government as Deputy Prime Minister and head of the State Tax Service. This move marked a watershed moment in Mishustin’s career, and the role of Fyodorov is significant.

Fyodorov’s intellect, forceful character, and respect in the international financial community, as well as in Russian business and government circles, were crucial to UFG’s success. Deutsche Bank purchased the investment bank UFG in two tranches, concluding the sale in 2007. UFG maintained control of an investment fund, UFG Asset Management (UFGAM), valued at the time at about $2 billion. After Fyodorov’s sudden death from a stroke in 2008, UFG tapped Mishustin to take Fyodorov’s place. Mishustin at this time, of course, had nowhere near the stature of Fyodorov, but that UFG recruited Mishustin at this time is a powerful testament to their confidence in his skills and government ties. He helped manage UFG through the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent period of rapid growth in asset valuation. While Mishustin has been the subject of the Navalny Anti-Corruption Organization investigations into his ownership of valuable property, it is not hard to imagine that in the two years or so at UFGAM, Mishustin legitimately earned tens of millions of dollars. His stint with the International Computer Club had also been lucrative.

As prime minister in 2010, Putin hired Mishustin to return to government as head of the tax services. This shows a great deal of confidence on Putin’s part in Mishustin. While this is only speculation, Putin may have also been impressed with Mishustin’s loyalty to his mentor, Boris Fyodorov. It may also reflect Putin’s heightened valuation of assiduous and confiscatory tax collection to provide revenues for the Russian state as the government was turning away from market and legal reforms. 

Mishustin’s ten-year tenure as head of the Federal Tax Service was a great success. As Alexei Kudrin was widely viewed as the top finance minister in the world, Mishustin acquired a similar reputation as the top tax man. Mishutin introduced a personal online filing system. He thus succeeded in eliminating mounds of useless paperwork, a feat Germany and the United States have yet to achieve. Overseeing 150,000 employees, Mishustin was able to triple tax revenue. In 2019, a Financial Times reporter extolled Mishustin’s achievements: 

This is the future of tax administration—digital, real-time, and with no tax returns. The authorities receive the receipts of every transaction in Russia, from St Petersburg to Vladivostok, within 90 seconds. The information has exposed errors, evasion, and fraud in the collection of its consumption tax, VAT, which has allowed the government to raise revenues more quickly than general Russian economic performance. The new system is directed more at shopkeepers than oligarchs.

However, the perception that the tax system is “directed more at shopkeepers than oligarchs” confirms the limited nature of tax reform. For 99 percent of the population, the new tax system is very efficient. Still, Putin’s friends and cronies deal with a very different personal, non-transparent, and arbitrary system with no realistic recourse to legal defense. Large businesses are also taxed in a more non-transparent and selective manner to advance the Kremlin control of critical strategic and lucrative sectors. Then, federal taxation of various regions is also done to advance central control and, in some cases, imperial policies at the Kremlin’s behest. So a restive region, such as Chechnya, receives bountiful subsidies while areas, such as Vologda, with its passive Russian population, languish in squalor. This is the key to the commercial success of Anna Putina Tsivilyova’s coal giant Kolmar, as we pointed out in a previous article. 

The most noteworthy aspect of Mishustin’s tax reforms is their systematic nature and reliance on big data blockchain technology that allows the government to track every commercial transaction, no matter how small. In other words, it is a massive and intrusive surveillance system. According to one rumor, Mishustin, during a meeting with a European official, asked where his counterpart had breakfast. With the answer, Mishustin turned to his computer and quickly informed the official what he had for breakfast. One of his former colleagues at UFG said that his background as a systems engineer is critical. Indeed, Western tax ministers may be envious of what Mishustin has been able to do as an “enlightened bureaucrat,” even if it would violate privacy norms if implemented in their home countries. In a Russian article published just after he was named prime minister, Mishustin was described as a “digital special force,” an allusion to an elite military unit.

Yes, Prime Minister Mishutin 

When Putin 2020 replaced Dmitri Medvedev with Mishustin as Prime Minister in 2020, the public initially saw yet another faceless bureaucrat in the mold of Fradkov or Zubkov. Soon, however, Mishustin established himself as a figure with a formidable media pulpit and a daily presence on Russian state news. Heading cabinet meetings, he cuts a dignified figure. Few broadcasts go by without a clip of Mishustin deliberating on pensions, health care, car insurance, veteran compensations, maternity benefits, minimum wages, and business subsidies. For everyday Russians, these topics are vital. While Mishustin methodically talks, other ministers dutifully listen, taking notes. Mishustin’s public persona is professorial and a tad boring. His style epitomizes the ubiquitous slogan during Putin’s yearly terms, stabil’nost (stability). The Russian media compares Mishustin to the last Tsarist reformer, Pyotr Stolypin, who thundered at the revolutionary democrats, “You are in need of great upheavals; we are in need of Great Russia.” 

Earlier in his career, Mishustin had found powerful protectors: Boris Fyodorov, Alexei Kudrin, German Gref, and Viktor Zubkov. It was Mishutin’s neighbor Konstantin Chuchenko, a KGB man, who introduced him to another patron, Sergei Naryshkin, Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Despite being unathletic, Mishustin even played hockey with Naryshkin, other elites, and even Putin himself.These nocturnal games with key members of the power elite have been compared to an Eyes Wide Shut-like secret society. Like Peter the Great’s “All-Joking, All-Drunken Synod of Jesters” or Brezhnev’s hunting trips, Putin’s hockey club is a key informal governance institution. The diligent Mishustin even developed considerable proficiency in the sport. As the Russians say: “cowards don’t play hockey.” In this manner, Mishustin has gained access to the highest rungs of power, including the intelligence services. Here, Mishustin could strengthen his ties, especially with the more hawkish Siloviki, members of the Russian political elite from the military, security, and intelligence services.

It is worth noting now just how unusual Mishustin’s rise has been. He has had two significant jobs in his career in the private sector that involved a great deal of interaction with foreign elites. He was even a partner with an American during his time with UFG Asset Management. He is certainly the first Russian PM in more than a century with significant private-sector experience. The change in his physical appearance from thirty years ago is also striking. In the 1990s, Mishustin appeared to epitomize a chubby nerd. The forceful personality may have been there, but it is not apparent in recent photos. Today, while hardly a gymnast, he appears as a hefty but toned and powerful man. While perhaps a cliché, he looks like a literal political heavyweight.

Upon his accession to the premiership, Mishustin (who lacked an English-language Wikipedia page as late as 2020) was introduced to the public abruptly in a typical Putin-esque “special operation.” Humiliatingly, Medvedev found out about his demotion only after it was announced on TV. 

Within a year, it was clear Mishutin was no placeholder. Mishutin’s Coordination Center, managed by Dmitry Chernyshenko, methodically implemented some of the most significant administrative reforms of the Putin era. As one scholar predicted:

First, the federal executive will be shrunk by about 32,000 staff units, with cuts at the center of up to 5 percent and in the regions of up to 10 percent of staff (mostly by cutting currently vacant positions). By contrast, the PM’s office is being expanded to 1.792 staff. More importantly, the PM’s office should move away from merely servicing 61 government commissions and focus on policy work instead: the PM’s office now mirrors the Cabinet of Ministers, which should bolster its capability to coordinate policy and solve impasses.

In contrast to Medvedev’s posturing as a liberal reformer, Mishustin’s reforming is not claptrap. The main goal was to unify production standards and end “digital feudalism” by creating compatibility among Russia’s 800 information systems. The new mantra was “one portal” for all issues (this managerial unification drive has also been promoted by Anna Putina). Another key reform moved away from Kudrin’s flat tax. Mishustin, in 2021, imposed progressive taxes on the “rich,” those earning more than 5 million rubles a year (at the time, about $800,000). At the time, these reforms received little notice other than from specialized journals. In retrospect, it is clear that Mishustin created the administrative prerequisites for an isolated wartime economy. As opposed to the West, Russia would be ready for the long game. 

Mishustin gained new powerful patrons at the top levels. Mishustin’s Jewish ancestry, sure enough, has been commented on in the outskirts of the “patriotic” anti-semitic press.Nonetheless, Mishustin receives glowing praise from right-wing outlets, even from Alexander Prokhanov’s anti-semitic Zavtra. One article compared Mishutin’s approach to Stalin, an ultimate tribute for Russian “patriots.” On the liberal side, Mishustin has faced relatively minor criticisms. For over a decade, undercurrent rumors have circulated that Mishutin was involved in corrupt deals. However, none of this has dented Mishustin’s rise, and in the Russian context, it may even embellish his Godfather-like protected status.

Starting in 2020, Russian national TV news has regularly featured Mishustin meeting cabinet ministers and other functionaries one-on-one. He is comfortable wielding technical terms and power. For example, in his meeting with Sergei Chemizov, a man fifteen years Mishustin’s senior and a longtime powerful KGB crony of Putin, we see a confident Mishustin in command of the situation. When Mishustin demands a performance report concerning the lagging defense production, Chemizov seems diffident and nervous.

During his frequent one-on-one meetings with Putin, who often enjoys watching underlings squirm, Mishustin exudes authority and competence, delving into technical issues. From body language, it’s clear their relationship is strictly professional: there is no sign of personal warmth. By contrast, during his first term, Putin preferred to work with people he knew intimately. The needs of the war have somewhat diminished cronyism. 

The only time we see the nerdy Mishustin cut loose in public is in contexts such as meeting with university students to pose Sheldon Cooper-like math puzzles. It’s clear he has a genuine love of science, math, and technology. Behind the scenes, he can cut loose in other ways: in 2011, Mishustin co-authored a tango, “A True Woman,” for the Russian pop star Grigory Leps.

A Technocrat at War 

Mishustin was kept in the dark about the plan for a full invasion of Ukraine, or at least, this was what he let on. During Putin’s surreal cabinet discussion on the eve of the invasion on February 21, 2022, Mishustin called for “bringing our position to the West, if you will, catalyzing it.” Only when diplomacy had been exhausted, according to Mishustin, should Russia recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk Republic. [When his patron, Sergei Naryshkin, expressed similar sentiments at this meeting, he was ferociously lampooned by Putin.] For months after the invasion, Mishustin refused to mention the “special operation” at all, only hinting at some vague “external challenges” or the “current political situation.” Some have called him the informal leader of the moderate peacenik faction. Since the war, Mishustin and Nabiullina have worn funeral-like dark suits. Several times, the news camera has caught Mishustin rolling his eyes during Putin’s anti-Western tirades. In 2022, Mishustin rarely found himself caught up in the web of Kremlin propaganda. 

However, as Russia’s military position improved in mid-2023, Mishustin assumed a more ‘patriotic’ stance. In fact, Mishustin, along with much of the Russian elite, seems genuinely disillusioned with the West. The technocratic-minded Mishustin is upset that the West is violating its own principles on property rights, free trade, and sound monetary policy. Importantly, Mishustin heads the Coordination Council for the needs of the Military Forces. Launched on October 24, 2022, this organ “deals with the entire range of issues related to meeting the needs of the Armed Forces during the special military operation. Among these are: setting standards for the supply of weapons and equipment, budget financing, pricing, selection of suppliers and contractors, and creation of specialized infrastructure.” 

Given Russia’s massive losses, Mishustin’s council has faced daunting issues. Publicly, this council, which includes all the major siloviki, has met sixteen times. In a meeting on February 19, 2024, we see Mishustin exuding confidence. He calls for producing better weapons and establishing a “peaceful life in the new territories [of Ukraine].” Mishustin stresses the critical role of Anna Putina Tsivilyova’s organization, the Defenders of the Fatherland, and promises lavish funding. 

In public appearances, Mishustin exudes patriotic confidence. For example, at youth conferences in December 2023, an upbeat Mishustin argued that Russia should focus on AI and the digital economy, claiming, “Even our opponents recognize our economic success.” Mishutin has argued that Russia does not need great geniuses as before in its history, but rather good scientific teams. Likewise, at the All-Russian National Exhibition (VDNKHA) in January, Mishustin lectured uniformed students and elaborated on his outlook. He again boasted of his administration’s adoption of virtual reality and AI and urged students to raise their knowledge of finance. As a sign of his growing importance, Mishustin led the official Russian delegation to China twice in 2023. Both times, Chinese leader Xi Jinping granted him a warm reception. Notably, Putin has not met with Xi personally since their early February 2022 infamous “no limits” summit.

A Man to Watch

Is there a chance for a relatively liberal figure to become the next Russian president? While we would like to conclude “never say never,” the practical chance is dim. After Putin’s persecution, is there even a liberal constituency left in Russia? 

What are the chances of a modernizing reformer becoming the next leader of Russia? At least here, we have three examples of Russian leaders who fit this mold: Peter the Great, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin. Putin started in 2000 viewing himself as a modernizing reformer, but for a variety of reasons, he evolved into a reactionary autocrat.

After surveying the field, the only viable candidate we can identify is the current Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin. Ultimately, it’s not clear Mishustin would even be a moderating force. We know as much today about what Mishustin really thinks as we did about Vladimir Putin in 1999. They each keep their cards close to their chest, which is usually wise in a political snakepit. Those who know, or claim to know, Mishustin often remark that he is not politically ambitious. But frankly, it is difficult to believe anybody in any system who reaches the position of prime minister does not have a deep wellspring of ambition within them. In fact, this seems more the case for Mishustin than Putin, as there is a fairly clear history of networking and schmoozing mentors that have helped his rise. Perhaps when Putin was in the KGB and Mishustin at the International Computer Club before they became state officials, they were not politically ambitious, but not after. 

It’s doubtful that it’s Mishustin’s time “to make a move.” He has served Putin effectively and loyally as Prime Minister for four years. Putin has shown that he values Mishustin’s work, as he has already strongly hinted that Mishustin will stay on as Prime Minister. What happens to the rest of the government as Putin enters his fifth term remains to be seen. What is clear is that no longer can anyone diminish Mishustin by describing him as merely a transitional figure.

Probably the most powerful Russian prime minister since Victor Chernomyrdin under Yeltsin in the 1990s, Mishustin is clearly a man to watch, and Western governments and analysts should invest more resources in getting to know him better. However, it is critical to understand that the West cannot help him politically, even if it wants to. By this time, we should know that even the perception of such support is the kiss of death for any Russian politician, reformist or otherwise.

Chris Monday is an Associate Professor of Economics at Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea.

Andy Kuchins is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and Adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

Image: Shutterstock.com.