The Chinese authorities are confronting serious problems over Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. On the one hand, the closeness of relations between Beijing and Moscow is at its highest level in years. As far as Beijing is concerned, Russia’s importance stems from its role as a supplier of raw materials and its value as a geopolitical ally in the confrontational relationship with the United States thrust upon China during Donald Trump’s presidency. Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed the situation in the famous formula in January 2021, when he stated that Sino-Russian strategic cooperation had no limit, no forbidden zones, and no ceiling. A year later, China and Russia reinforced this political line in a joint statement adopted during a visit by President Vladimir Putin to China, in which, for the first time, Beijing associated itself clearly with Russia’s demands to halt the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, as well as calling on the organization, jointly with Moscow, “to abandon its ideologized cold war approaches, to respect the sovereignty, security and interests of other countries, the diversity of their civilizational, cultural and historical backgrounds, and to exercise a fair and objective attitude towards the peaceful development of other States.”

On the other hand, the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine has raised a number of new factors that could have negative consequences for Beijing. Firstly, the unique situation calls into question the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) entire ideological line, aimed at providing a rationale for the fundamental difference between the aggressive, hegemonic policies of the United States and its allies, with the disrespect it has for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries and the double standards it demonstrates towards obedient and independent states, and the peace-loving line of China and its friend Russia, directed towards peaceful co-existence and constructive cooperation with everyone, including the West. Secondly, the newly arrived instability in Europe, brought about by armed hostilities, Western sanctions, and retaliatory measures by Russia, creates problems for the Chinese economy: rising energy prices and the possibility of Chinese companies being affected indirectly by sanctions aimed against Russia, etc. Thirdly, with the operation ongoing, doubts have arisen in China about Russia’s ability to fulfill its goals quickly and emerge from the conflict stronger, rather than in a weakened state.

All of this has led to a debate amongst Chinese experts, which can be detected in various publications and through contact with Chinese colleagues, even in the face of the country’s ever-growing ideologically closed nature. Chinese writers continue, on the whole, to argue that the current conflict has been brought about by years of provocative U.S. policy. A prime example of this is a series of articles by military analyst Jun Sheng published at the end of March in several editions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, and then duplicated on numerous websites. Jun, whose name or pseudonym sounds like “voice of the army,” lashed out with scathing criticism of U.S. foreign policy, claiming it was the United States that had laid the fuse which has sparked the current conflagration of war in Ukraine.

Doubts over the ideological justness of Russia’s actions have been expressed strongly by the well-known Chinese Russia expert, Yang Cheng, in an article that appeared on February 28 in the Shanghai newspaper Tangso yu Zhengming (Exploration and Free Views). Outlining Russia’s argument and recognizing the “original sin” committed by NATO, which should have been disbanded following the collapse of the USSR, he notes that Russia, too, should show strict observance of the principle that “the security of one country cannot be ensured at the expense of the security of other countries.” Now the impression is forming that both sides believe in the idea, professed by political realists, of the “law of the jungle,” which speaks of the inequality of large and small states that has been in effect in international politics since the nineteenth century. China is taking the right action in this situation, not taking sides, opposing the zero-sum game, and calling for a peaceful settlement, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, and effective compliance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter.

Expert opinions on how the conflict shall end and the position China should take vary widely. For example, Hu Xijin, a prominent journalist and former editor of the Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times) newspaper, a mouthpiece for supporters of active power politics, unexpectedly came out with some very moderate proposals. In a long message posted on the Weibo social network on March 4, he wished Russia a “soft landing” and the restoration of a secure strategic environment to its west. At the same time, he spoke out against attempts to “Russify” China’s foreign policy, in other words, against calls to do the same as Russia. In his view, China’s strength, in contrast to Russia’s, is not so much about its army but its economy and, thus, China should act more moderately and over a longer period, using diplomacy, tying the United States closer to itself economically and gaining a competitive edge.

In an interview published on the Fenghuang (Phoenix) Television website in late February, Feng Yujun, deputy dean of Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, commented that the key principle determining the trajectory of Russia’s development has, historically, always been the tension between its great-power ambitions and its lack of power. Today, Russia is once again embarking energetically on restoring its empire; however, apart from its strategic nuclear weapons, its overall state power is characterized by many flaws. Consequently, only time will tell whether Russia shall be able to restore its empire or sink to being a “solitary island.” In another interview published on a foreign website on March 12, deputy director-general of the Public Policy Research Center of China’s State Council Advisory Office, Hu Wei, even questioned whether Russia would be able to achieve its aims, which would put it in a difficult situation. That is why China should renounce its neutrality and not provide assistance to Moscow. Hu Wei believes that this would lead to an earlier peace and “help build China’s international image and ease its relations with the U.S. and the West,” earning “widespread international praise for maintaining world peace.”

Of course, all of these views, which differ on many points, can only be labeled private opinions not directly related to the official line, despite the close association of the commentators with China’s official structures. Be that as it may, they are interesting from the point of view of understanding the discussion taking place in the country.

As regards China’s official position, it is formulated in official statements from China’s foreign ministry, as well as by diplomats and, of course, the country’s leadership. Perhaps, it is expressed most clearly in an article by China’s ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, which was published on March 15 in The Washington Post specifically for a Western audience. The high-ranking Chinese diplomat rejected American media claims that China had allegedly known in advance about Russia’s plans and had even asked Moscow to delay its military action until the Winter Olympic Games had finished in Beijing. In addition, he noted that China was a major trading partner of both Russia and Ukraine, and that over 6,000 Chinese citizens were living in Ukraine, meaning that Russia’s military efforts run counter to Beijing’s interests. He said that China would have done everything possible to prevent an armed conflict if it had known about it in advance. The Chinese ambassador also denied claims that Moscow had allegedly requested help from Beijing and noted that China supported peace talks and “will continue to coordinate real efforts to achieve lasting peace” since its ultimate purpose is “the end of war and support regional and global stability.”

Chinese leader Xi Jinping also confirmed this position during an online meeting with U.S. president Joe Biden on March 18, when he declared: “China does not want to see the situation in Ukraine to come to this. China stands for peace and opposes war. This is embedded in China's history and culture.” Xi rejected U.S. efforts to force China to exert unilateral pressure on Russia and called on all countries to support Russia and Ukraine in conducting fruitful negotiations and dialogue that might lead to peace. He also called on the United States to enter into a dialogue with Russia in order to address the core issues of the Ukraine crisis and alleviate the security concerns of both Russia and Ukraine.

Statements made by Chinese officials beyond the scope of the dialogue with the Americans are far more critical of Washington. For instance, Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said on March 17 that the U.S. Government’s decision to expand NATO to the east is directly related to the current crisis in Ukraine and that the key to resolving the situation lies in the hands of the United States and NATO. Two days earlier, he had called upon the United States to think deeply about its role in the development of the Ukraine crisis and to make a tangible effort to defuse the situation there. In a speech on March 19, Deputy Foreign Minister Le Yucheng made a similar argument, sharply criticizing the bloc mentality and very existence of NATO following the collapse of the USSR, as well as the unilateral sanctions imposed on Russia without any UN Security Council mandate, which he described as an attempt “to use globalisation as a weapon.” Speaking at a meeting of the UN Security Council on March 14, China’s representative, Zhang Jun, actually agreed with Russia’s argument, underlining the importance of the indivisibility of security and calling for the renunciation of Cold War thinking vis-à-vis the Ukraine crisis.

Consequently, China’s position can be formulated as follows: 1) China opposes military action, does not want it, and advocates an early peaceful settlement and the preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity; 2) China believes that Russia’s military action was sparked by provocative U.S. policy, first and foremost by NATO expansion; 3) Moscow’s reaction was excessive, and China should not follow such a path; 4) Russia remains a highly-important partner, and any peaceful settlement should take into consideration its legitimate concerns, as well as the concerns of Ukraine.

The idea that China considers Russia’s reaction to be excessive is indicated in particular by the fact that, in recent statements, Chinese officials have formulated their position in such a way that many can interpret it as a criticism not only of the United States and NATO for their power politics but also of other states, including Russia. China achieves this non-committal middle way by leaving certain subjects of criticism unspecified. For instance, when Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi met General Secretary of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization Zhang Ming, he called for: resolute opposition to the revival of a Cold War mentality and the creation of confrontation between blocs; categorical opposition to unlawful unilateral sanctions; respect for the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; and upholding international justice. However, Wang did not specify who was doing all of the above and not respecting international justice. The Chinese ambassador to Ukraine, Fan Xianrong, has given China’s position regarding Ukraine. According to Ukrainian media, when speaking in Lviv (the city to which China has moved its embassy), Fan stated clearly that China would continue to assist Ukraine in its development and respect the “path chosen by Ukrainians because this is the sovereign right of every nation.”

Overall, it seems that Beijing has not yet formed its final position, which may be subject to change throughout the conflict; however, its principal features are clear. On the one hand, China’s principled approach to protecting the territorial integrity of all states remains unchanged. This is due primarily to China’s own separatist problems and because it positions itself as the leader of the Global South countries, for many of which the issue of maintaining their territorial integrity is also one of their most acute problems. It is no coincidence that Beijing often states that there is no similarity between the situations involving Ukraine and Taiwan since the former is a sovereign state, whilst the latter is an integral part of the People’s Republic of China. On the other hand, Russia is a highly important partner of China in its confrontation with the United States, which has done a great deal in recent years to make Beijing understand that this confrontation is serious and set to last for a long time.

Consequently, current U.S. calls for China to assist in attempts to asphyxiate Moscow cannot have been received positively in Beijing, where they are well aware that, once the United States and NATO have finished with Moscow, they will redouble their efforts to rein in a solitary China. The United States will not be able to intimidate Beijing into changing its stance on Russia through anti-Chinese sanctions, since China would find the adoption of an anti-Russian policy self-defeating. Perhaps, the essence of the current U.S. proposals was summed up best by Liu Xin, the prominent Chinese television presenter for the English-language channel CGTN, when she wrote on her Twitter account: “Can you help me fight your friend so that I can concentrate on fighting you later?”

China does not stand to gain from a weakening of Russia. It is far more likely that Beijing will provide it with all possible assistance whilst trying to avoid the secondary effect of U.S. sanctions, for which it can make certain concessions in more sensitive areas, such as banking, whilst also persuading Russia to resolve the situation as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, close collaboration with Russia in the future will depend more on purely geopolitical interests than on a common vision of world order.

Alexander Lukin is Head of the Department of International Relations at HSE University and Director of the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia.

Image: Reuters.