So it is a world order—and I must also say that in some ways the American project has succeeded. As you know, as a dean of a school of public policy, one of the most painful things I had to do in this book was to praise schools. Because I see that the spread of the MBA—the American MBA—around the world has produced a whole new cadre in East Asia of American-trained MBAs who don’t want to make war, but to make deals. And the reason why trade is exploding in East Asia is because all the leaders now are saying, “What is the point of fighting each other? In trade, you win some, I win some, we are all winners. So lets carry on doing it that way.” So in that sense, America has actually civilized the world. And yet, America is not aware that it has civilized the world.

RWM: But you’re expressing with a great deal of confidence that the 88 percent, having adopted and embraced Western values, as you say in the book, will embrace also policies and practices and outlooks that will protect the 12 percent when it no longer can protect itself through power and wealth. And, I found myself wondering whether there maybe isn’t perhaps a little bit of naiveté here. Why would the 88 percent—you’re also quite stark in your presentation of how the 88 percent feels about the abuses, perceived abuses of the West over the course of its three-hundred-year hegemony. So why wouldn’t the 88 percent be more harsh in terms of its dealings with the West in the future?

KM: Uh, I will say that the short answer—and throughout this book, by the way, I don’t appeal to ideals, I don’t appeal to altruism, I appeal to selfish national interests. And so I think it’s in the selfish national interests of the rest of the world to work with the West, because the West has had by far the most successful societies, the best universities in the world are still in America, some of the best research is done here, so why have a fight with the West, why not work with the West? But at the same time, I also appeal to the selfish national interest of the West to say that it is now in your interest to create a new world order that you would like to live in when you are no longer the dominant power.

And you’ll notice in the book that I begin by quoting the speech that Bill Clinton gave in 2003 where he said “If America thinks it will be number one forever, then fine, lets keep on doing what we’re doing and not care what the rest of the world thinks. But if we can conceive that we will no longer be the number one power, then surely it is in America’s national interests to create a multilateral, rules-based order.”

Now, what he didn’t say, but it was obvious that he was leading to, is that we should act to constrain the next number one, China. But clearly the key point that I make to American policymakers is be aware of every loophole that you are creating in international law. Every loophole you’re making is one that China will walk through. So if you don’t want China to walk through those loopholes, close them now.

So it is now in your interests to strengthen international laws, to sign treaties and conventions that are in your interests. Think about this example: You had Secretary Robert Gates going to Singapore to speak at the Shangri-la Dialogue, calling on China to abide by the Law of the Seas convention, which is good. China should abide by the Law of the Seas convention. But a friend of mine stood up at the Shangri-la Dialogue and said, “Mr. Secretary, I’m so glad you asked China to abide by the Law of the Seas convention. When is the Unites States going to ratify it?” And obviously he was embarrassed.

And the worst thing that America can do is to underestimate the intelligence of the rest of the world. The rest of the world, having become very intelligent, can see through double standards clearly and it is not in America’s interests to have double standards, because every double standard you have creates an opening for China.

RWM: You talk a lot in the book about the relationship between the United States and China, and you suggest that history tells us that when a number one power in global or any geopolitical setting is faced with relinquishing its number one status to a rising power, that often that leads to conflict. And yet you are relatively optimistic about the US-China relationship into the future, notwithstanding this historical reality. Can you explain why you are optimistic?

KM: Well, as you know, one of the painful things that I speak about, both in my previous book and in this book, is Chinese geopolitical competence. Because the Chinese have done a great deal of work—they came out of nowhere. One of the examples I gave is that in 1980, the US share of global GDP was 25 percent in PPP terms and Chinese share was 2 percent. Now by 2017, which is only four years from now, the U.S. share is going to go down from 25 percent to 17.6 percent, and China’s share is going from 2.2 percent to 18.2 percent. Now that’s a remarkable rise in history and yet they have been able to do it without shaking up—upsetting the global order and without alarming the United States of America. And this was the result of very wise advice that Deng Xiaoping gave to the Chinese leaders: “Take a low profile. Swallow your humiliation. Accept that you have been insulted from time to time. Wait for your time to come and do not rock the boat.”

RWM: It will come, they are saying.

KM: It will come. It will come. So in a sense they have been rising very quietly, but you can see already in China that nationalism is rising. So it is not in America’s interests, it is not in global interests, to see China emerge as an angry dragon. So if you do not want it to emerge as an angry dragon, create the rules of the road that you want the next big elephant to follow; right now, while you are the number one elephant, create the rules of the road and say this is how the number one elephant behaves. Cause everything you do today—behave, how do you say, do to thy neighbors, as you would want others to do to you, right?

RWM: Yeah.

KM: So similarly, everything you do as number one elephant in the road, say this is what I want China or so to do. And once you adopt that path, it clearly creates an opening for China to follow you. And the Chinese, by the way, have absolutely no desire to run the world or conquer the world at all. Because that country itself has so many problems, they do not want to take on the world at all. In fact, they would be quite happy to see the United States carry on its leadership of global organizations. They are not rushing to say: “hey it is my turn to be number one.”

RWM: Unlike what a lot of people in America are suggesting, including in Presidential campaigns here.

KM: Yeah, yes.

RWM: But let me ask you this: You compare the United States somewhat unfavorably, as you just did to an extent, to China in respect to being players on the international economic scene. And we at The National Interest agree with that to a significant extent. But hasn’t China also acted irresponsibly at times in currency policy and intellectual-property protection, cyber thefts, cyber spying, and shouldn’t that come into play in these discussions?

KM: Well, I actually believe as a realist that in the world of geopolitics, there are no saints; there are only sinners. We are all sinners, and the question is the extent. Certainly one of the points I make in the book, that it is a bit unfortunate that the United States invaded Iraq. Apart from the fact that Kofi Annan said it was an illegal war because it was not authorized by the U.N Security Council nor was it an act of self-defense.

But the stupidest thing about the Iraq War is that it is the biggest geopolitical gift to China. I’m sure the Chinese must have popped the champagne in Beijing and saying, “Good, this gets the United States out of our hair for seven to ten years. We can focus on economic growth, let them get stuck in a quagmire and waste a trillion dollars,” which is what you did. So, that’s an example of geopolitical incompetence.

So, you have been making mistakes, and the Chinese have been making mistakes, too. Certainly, as I have described in the book, they really mishandled the crisis with Japan over the detention of the Chinese fishing boat captain; they mishandled South Korea over the North Korean shelling of the island; and they mishandled the ASEAN states over the South China Sea. So they have been making mistakes recently, and I say, “Guys, what is happening to you?”