Operationally, conditions must be right for strikes to have a greater chance of success. Not only are American and Coalition forces are preoccupied with Syrian conflict, the air bases in the Gulf region hosting U.S. and allied air power are in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). To use aircraft flying out of these bases for an attack on Iran, the U.S. needs permission from the host nations. The Gulf states must share America’s view that military force is a justifiable means of resolving whatever crisis with Iran happens to be emergent, along with a strong diplomatic push to get all these allies on the same page. There is no guarantee of this happening now, especially when Qatar, home to one of the largest air bases in the region and U.S. Central Command’s forward headquarters, is engulfed in a major row with its neighbors.

Otherwise, the United States and its allies would have to rely on carrier-based air power, warplanes flying from air bases outside the region, and cruise missiles fired from ships and submarines. A similar situation occurred during Desert Fox; Saudi Arabia, which at the time hosted much of the aircraft assigned to the no-fly zone task force, denied the Coalition permission to use its bases for the attack, as did Bahrain and the UAE.

It is safe to say it is not 1998 all over again. In fact, there is little comparison to be made between what Clinton confronted in Iraq with what Trump confronts in Iran. The strikes of 1998 were just the latest chapter in a dozen-year-long interlude between two larger wars, while America’s troubles with Iran appear to be just beginning in 2018. Barring an emergency demanding immediate redress, the Trump administration has a long way to go before it is in any position to successfully employ military options against Iran.

Edward Chang is a freelance defense, military, and foreign policy writer. His writing has appeared in The National Interest and War Is Boring.

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