Since pausing its attacks on U.S. forces in January, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has focused exclusively on Israel. In March, Iraqi militia groups aligned with Iran claimed for the first time that they had targeted Israel following a drone attack on Ben Gurion Airport. In May, the group took credit for attacks on Tel Aviv. In early June, the Iraqi Islamic Resistance targeted Eilat and Haifa. The continued attacks highlight the inability of the Baghdad government to control the militias, largely due to the considerable influence of the IRGC.

U.S. retaliatory strikes on Iran-aligned militias have deepened rifts within the Iraqi government and between U.S. and Iraqi officials over security relations. In 2019, protestors denounced foreign interference with slogans like “No to America, no to Iran.” Iran’s influence led to a January 2020 vote by Iraq’s parliament to expel U.S. troops. In 2021, the al-Kadhimi administration agreed to a U.S. military training and advisory role that left 2,500 American troops in Iraq. With Iran-friendly Prime Minister al-Sudani, the SCF and militias may now have the power and legal grounds to revoke consent for any U.S. presence. Furthermore, the Gaza conflict and recent U.S. strikes in Iraq have played into the hands of Iranian-backed groups, helping them craft a narrative that weakens moderate voices. In January, the Iraqi government and the United States formed a commission to draft a timeline for U.S. troops to leave Iraq.

In the United States, the debate about the wisdom of maintaining a military presence in Iraq is ongoing. Proponents argue that the costs of withdrawal outweigh the benefits of staying for training and equipment purposes. They claim that calls for withdrawal come from Iranian-allied militias, whose leaders follow guidance from the IRGC. They also warn that withdrawal could lead to Washington’s political disengagement, undoing the progress made by Iraqi armed forces since 2014 with U.S. support and making it harder to counter Iranian influence.

Others contend that Washington should withdraw troops or move them to Iraqi Kurdistan, where they are more welcome while leveraging economic power instead. They argue that the small U.S. force is ineffective in preventing Iran from establishing hegemony over Iraq and that its presence offers Iran and its militias easy targets, risking further escalation.

Diluting over Dismantling

Iraq’s ethnosectarian power-sharing arrangement (muhasasa)—a quota system that allocates power based on the relative political influence of competing factions—is widely criticized as a symbol of a flawed political structure that led to a sectarian civil war, entrenched widespread corruption, and resulted in dysfunctional governance.

Underappreciated is the extent to which Iran has strategically exploited this system’s sectarian divisions for its own benefit. Following the rise and fall of the Islamic State in Iraq, Iran intensified its efforts, ultimately gaining a dominant position in the country while contending with the United States. The IRGC, particularly its Quds Force branch, has worked diligently to influence Iraqi politics, notably through support for allied Popular Mobilization Forces. In turn, the creation of the Muhandis General Company—an economic conglomerate controlled by Iran-backed paramilitaries and their political factions—virtually guarantees a continuous flow of government funds to the PMF.

To be sure, Iraq and Iran have a complicated relationship. Although Mohammed Shia al-Sudani was selected from the SCF, a political bloc with members close to Iran, this has not insulated him from having to grapple with vexing issues related to Iran. These issues encompass water sharing and territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf, as well as efforts to tighten border control to prevent smuggling and limit the actions of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan. The latter has strained relations between Tehran and Baghdad, as well as between Baghdad and Erbil. 

Meanwhile, amid the conflict in Gaza, Iraq has been thrust into the middle of an incipient proxy war between Iran and the United States. As Iraqi Shia armed groups, with Tehran’s approval, have become involved in the conflict by launching attacks against U.S. military installations from within Iraq and against Israeli targets, the risks and consequences for Iraq have escalated. This situation has brought to the forefront several contentious issues, including the security implications of the U.S. security role in Iraq, particularly regarding whether the benefits of an ongoing presence of American troops outweigh the risks for either party. 

As U.S. policymakers contemplate the direction of Iraq policy, it would be prudent for them to focus not on dismantling Iran’s hold on Iraq but rather on diluting its influence. They should also recognize that the kinetic responses of American intervention against Islamic resistance groups have failed to modify their conduct or reduce their sway in Iraq. Additionally, they would benefit from recognizing Iraq’s distinct challenge in managing its closely intertwined relationship with Iran—its primary trade partner, the predominant external actor in Iraq’s security landscape, and a nation long engaged in “shadow wars” with the United States and its regional partners. 

At the same time, it is essential to note that Iranian-affiliated political factions in Iraq, despite their material resources and resilience, are experiencing a decline in public backing, encountering challenges in rallying new supporters, and falling short in broadening their voter base. There are growing fractures within the Iraqi Shia bloc, which could undercut Iran’s influence. Ultimately, diminishing this influence requires strengthening Iraqi state and civil society institutions. While the United States might be faced with the unpalatable options of either withdrawing its military forces or maintaining them, each with its associated risks, even the departure of American troops should not preclude Washington from continuing—and potentially intensifying—its political and economic engagement in Iraq and encouraging its Western allies and Arab partners to do likewise. 

Dr. John Calabrese teaches international relations at American University in Washington, DC. He is the book review editor of The Middle East Journal and previously served as director of MEI’s Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) and as general series editor of MEI Viewpoints. He is the author of China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East and Revolutionary Horizons: Iran’s Regional Foreign Policy. Follow him on X: @Dr_J_Calabrese.

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