The ultimate goal of Colby’s strategy is for Beijing to “see that attempting to secure regional hegemony [would cost and risk] more than hegemony is worth and that accommodating the anti-hegemonic coalition in a stable balance is less unpalatable than continuing its aggressive pursuit of regional predominance.” Accordingly, China would have to “negotiate the terms of its continued rise on equitable rather than dominant terms.” But a strong case can be made that Beijing is already prepared to “negotiate the terms” of its rise on equitable terms—depending on what is deemed “equitable” by both sides. And is the United States itself prepared to accept a “stable balance” with China in Asia? Colby separately highlights the goal of a “favorable balance of power [in the region] with respect to [U.S.] core interests.” But China would also prefer a balance favorable to its interests. Could a “stable” balance be sufficient or acceptable to either side if it was not judged as “favorable”? It seems more likely that a zero-sum contest for favorable advantage would be inherently unstable.

Colby ends the book by assuring Beijing that “China could proudly live in a world in which this strategy had succeeded; it would be one of the greatest nations of the world, and its preferences would command respect. It would not be able to dominate, but neither would the US or anyone else be able to dominate it.” But China would have been explicitly denied its preferences—especially regarding Taiwan—and essentially subordinated within its own region. It is very difficult to imagine Beijing acquiescing to this, whatever the balance of power. It is equally difficult to imagine Washington acquiescing to anything comparable, in terms of perpetual denial of its strategic objectives on the basis of an exaggerated characterization of its intentions. Colby’s strategy of denial would essentially require China to accept what the United States never would.

In Colby’s vision, “Success for this strategy would be a decent equilibrium for all. For the United States, the result would be an Asia with which it could trade and interact without having to obtain a by your leave from Beijing—and with it, the likelihood of a secure, free, and prosperous future.” But none of those conditions is inherently threatened by Beijing, so this strategy would not be required to secure them. “For China, it would be a world in which it was honored and respected,” Colby says. But it would also be a world in which China was contained and thwarted in its ambitions by the United States. “For the peoples of the region, it would mean the autonomy and independence for which they have striven so mightily since freedom from colonial rule,” according to Colby. But Beijing is not really threatening their autonomy and independence; nor do many of them believe that it is.

Ultimately, the strategy that Colby outlines is unlikely to yield a “decent equilibrium.” Given the problematic assumptions upon which it is based, it probably would instead yield protracted disequilibrium and regional instability.

Paul Heer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia.

Image: Reuters.