The significance of the first claim is unclear: Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan are notoriously porous, so it’s certainly possible that the crackdown after the Riyadh bombing was real, but was not airtight—the movement of Al Qaeda operatives through Iranian territory may have continued without Iran’s consent. (Either way, U.S. allegations suggest that consent was later forthcoming.) The second claim may work against the counternarrative. Why would Al Qaeda try to kidnap Iranian VIPs to win concessions if relations were good? Assuming the plotting was occurring in late 2003—after the Riyadh attacks and the alleged crackdown—it suggests Al Qaeda was responding to Iranian pressure. But we can’t leap to conclusions: we don’t know if the plot was approved! Given Al Qaeda’s overt hatred of Iran, there’d be reason to keep junior members in the dark about any covert relationship.

The little details in the torture report are thus, like the fragments we already had, too small and too incomplete to use with confidence. The portrait of the Al Qaeda–Iranian relationship remains unfinished.

John Allen Gay, an assistant managing editor at The National Interest, is coauthor of War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences (Rowman and Littlefield, 2013). He tweets at @JohnAllenGay.