There is a difference between Isolationism and Realism. When Kant penned his work “Perpetual Peace” he had argued, in lines reminiscent of the philosopher Francis Fukuyama, that the endearing appeal of liberal capitalism would herald an era of peaceful cohabitation between nations. That the eras of ideological divides and big bloc rivalries would unravel as nations sought solace in consumerism.

U.S. foreign policy was, on the whole, largely consistent after World War II. The perceived ideological threat of communism which had occupied both Democrats and Republicans revolved around a common consensus, give or take the details in Vietnam, of interventionism in the national interest. 

However, with the dissolution of Marxism as a plausible ideology, there began the unraveling of the saint of consensus. Rather than an outbreak of love and goodwill, the world of Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, and Ukraine has seen unprecedented levels of power and scarcity conflict. That is, the old dividing lines of Fascism, Marxism, and Liberalism have been all consumed under materialism. They exist along a sliding scale between authoritarianism and democracy.

The world is divided into blocs of strategic interest rather than on ideological lines. The Democrats are the last U.S. gatekeepers of the Liberal International Order (LIO). 

It is no longer feasible to be the guardian of Liberalism and morality vis a vis the Democrat's fixation on moral colonialism, of exporting their concentric views to the world. Hence, the current debate on intervention in Ukraine, for the first time, sees a division in consensus between a new Republican party that favors 'realism' in foreign policy.

The “New Right” in the U.S., however, differs markedly from the previous conservative era of fusionism, that of a free market economy and interventionist foreign policy. The New Right and the Trump Republicans have recalibrated this and moved to a foreign policy of realism. George Lofflman sees the essence of the policy shift as, “away from the bipartisan consensus on liberal hegemony and towards a closer alignment between elite and public opinion.” This populist approach means more realism in foreign policy. 

Hence, the debate about the recent Ukrainian offensive into Kursk is now in center frame. Zelensky must assume that a Trump victory could signal a cooling in U.S. support. The strategy so far is defensive war, to bring Russia to negotiation. This strategy hasn't worked and fails to see the long-term game of Putin.

This is all part of the grand bloc's reality outlined above. Philip Breedlove, NATO’s Chief in Europe from 2013-2016, said this week in Newsweek that, "If we keep doing what we're doing, Ukraine will eventually lose... Right now we are purposely not giving Ukraine what they need to win." The non-escalatory Biden-Harris policy hopes to force the Russians to the negotiating table. Zelensky sees the fallacy in this. The Kursk incursion and the lobbying to get the U.S. blessing to use long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles would reduce damage to Ukrainian infrastructure but risks enraging the Kremlin.

Also, last week, North Korea sent 13,000 container shipments of weapons to Russia. The assumption that Russia will bow out due to economic pressures or lack of weapons is not substantial.

I am far from convinced that even long-range missiles would change this scenario. The mousetrap of Ukrainian foreign policy was laid bare when the allies decided Ukraine's entry into NATO was a good idea. 

The dualism in U.S. foreign policy is therefore, on the one hand, to placate Zelensky and uphold democracy and sovereignty but is facing the arrival of the realist school of thought. Donald Trump’s selection for vice president, J.D. Vance, has already outlined that a ceding of some territory in the Donbas Oblast will need to be considered as also the position of Ukraine's neutrality. This realist position is far nearer to the realpolitik of war than liberal soundbites from the Biden-Harris axis.

The new TurkStream pipeline will allow the Russians to sell its gas to Europe and bypass Ukraine. Sanctions have not worked and there is no let-up in Russian arms manufacturing. The Biden administration failed to get the global south on board, these forlorn and often unseen nations are beginning to align themselves with the growing Chinese hegemon. The soundbites of war have been replaced by Machiavellian realism. Excursions into Russian territory, such as the German Sixth Army in 1942, normally end in tears and entrapment. There may be a propaganda coup for Zelensky to break into Kursk, but what are the military goals?

Russia is playing the long game of attrition. Ukraine is fluttering in Washington due to the winds of change.

About the Author: 

Brian Patrick Bolger studied at the London School of Economics. He has taught political philosophy and applied linguistics at Universities across Europe. His articles have appeared in The Montreal Review, The European Conservative, The Salisbury Review, The Village, New English Review, The Burkean, The Daily Globe, American Thinker, and Philosophy Now. His new book, Coronavirus and the Strange Death of Truth is now available in the United Kingdom and the United States. He can be reached at [email protected].

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