In Argentina itself, the issue of its claim still surfaces periodically. During the 1990s, President Carlos Menem tried a “charm offensive,” allowing for direct commercial flights between the islands and the Argentine mainland, offering to remove the landmines which had been sown during the occupation (the Islanders ultimately did their own demining), and somewhat ludicrously sending stuffed animals to island children. Perhaps, if it had been a multi-decade project, this effort might have had some impact, but Menem’s successors reverted to a harder line, pressing Argentina’s case in international fora, and seeking to isolate Britain politically.

But while favorable rhetoric has been expressed by Argentina’s neighbors in the name of regional solidarity and anti-imperialism, little concrete support can be found. Uruguay allows vessels which fish in the islands’ waters to use its ports to refuel and refit (although they cannot come if they fly the Falklands flag). Chile allows air service between the islands and Punta Arenas in its far south. (Argentina insists that these flights should include a stop-over on its territory.) Brazil has allowed an increasing number of British military flights to and from the islands to stop at Its airports.

A particular Argentine grievance has been Britain’s alleged “militarization” of the islands, where it maintains a garrison of 1,200 soldiers and a squadron of Eurofighter Typhoon fighter aircraft, and stations a naval patrol vessel in the nearby waters. Particularly galling is the fact that Britain holds the United States to a commitment not to sell weaponry to Argentina without consulting it, in effect giving Britain a veto. Thus, while Chile’s Air Force has U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets and Brazil is buying the Gripen fighter from Sweden, Argentina is almost bereft of front-line fighters.

Potential sales of Gripens and Israeli Kfirs (both of which have U.S. components) and of used Mirages from the Spanish Air Force (which have British components) have been blocked. There had been some reports that Argentina would purchase the Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder, but this appears to be on the back burner. Whether Argentina, sunk in a deep economic crisis, can afford to buy new advanced fighters, is, of course, another question.

Lessons Learned (or Not)

This half-forgotten war, however, does leave some lessons, not only for Argentina and Britain, but for all countries who want to play the game of power politics. The obvious ones would include:

First, a country needs to see where its national interest really lies. In fact, Argentina had little to gain from taking over the islands. There is no reason to believe that any of the profound problems which it faces forty years on would have been resolved had it won. A mixture of wrongly perceived self-interest on the part of the increasingly unpopular military junta and coarse nationalism ended up in disaster. The generals were forced from power, and ultimately had to answer for the many human rights violations which they committed during their tenure. From their cells, they must have asked themselves: “What were we thinking?”

Of course, this lesson in some ways also applies to Britain. Had it found a way to negotiate sovereignty away before the Argentine invasion made it a different matter altogether, it would have spared itself the loss of life and treasure as well as a continuing military commitment in a part of the world of no strategic interest to it.

Second, the enemy gets a vote. Victory is rarely certain, even if it looks like your opponent’s chances are poor. As the Argentine generals learned about Thatcher and Russia is learning about Volodymyr Zelenskyy, sometimes your opponent is willing to make a fight of it, and, as Clausewitz said, “war is the domain of uncertainty.”

Third, either a state can project power, or it cannot. The Argentines could make an essentially unopposed landing on islands which were 300 miles away from its mainland but lacked the ability to sustain it. Britain could send forces to the South Atlantic, albeit at the limit of its capabilities. One of the two aircraft carriers which it deployed had been due to be sold to Australia, and had this already happened, British capabilities would have been severely compromised. It is worth noting that Britain has recently commissioned two new carriers.

Fourth, sometimes a country just has to move on. The United States, once completely obsessed with its failure in Vietnam, got over it, and for good or bad ceased to see it as a reference point in its decisionmaking on national security issues. Afghanistan is rapidly disappearing in the rear-view window a few months after the final withdrawal. One could argue that some memory might have been useful before some of the more recent American engagements, but overall, it may be best sometimes to let the past go, however painful it may be to do so.

Ten years from now we will see the fiftieth anniversary of the Falklands War. There is little reason to expect any great changes in the status of the islands. Until Argentina resolves its deep-seated internal problems, it is unlikely to be even minimally attractive as an alternative to the British connection, while a military effort by its shrunken, under-resourced military is highly implausible. As to whether the lessons of this small war in an obscure corner of the globe will have been learned by other countries, to judge from more recent military interventions which ended poorly, we should not count on it.

Richard M. Sanders is a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Formerly a member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State. His assignments included service as Argentina desk officer from 1997 to 1999, as Director of the Office of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs from 2010 to 2013, and as Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army from 2016 to 2018.

Image: Wikipedia.