Ousting the Middle Kingdom from Zion: A U.S. Strategy toward Chinese Influence in Israel
The United States has a deep interest in stopping Israel from falling any further into China’s orbit. Doing so requires mobilizing non-military tools of diplomacy, including some coercive ones, to bring Israel around to the U.S. position.
IN MAY 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went to Jerusalem for several hours’ worth of meetings with Israeli national security officials. Ordinarily, a trip to Israel by America’s top diplomat wouldn’t be particularly noteworthy. But this time, the fact that amid the coronavirus pandemic Pompeo flew so far to spend less than one day in Israel showed something was amiss in U.S.-Israel relations. That something was China. During a press conference with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Pompeo all but named Beijing in slamming non-democratic nations that “obfuscate and hide information.” Israel took the hint: tread carefully with the Chinese.
Growing Sino-Israeli ties had troubled American policymakers for some time before Pompeo’s visit. The United States watched as its Asian rival traded more and more with Israel and pumped investments into the country. According to the World Bank, in 2018 China-Israel trade totaled approximately $15 billion, and Israeli exports from China were valued slightly higher than Israeli exports from America. While Jerusalem and Beijing drew closer, Washington worried that its relationship with its Middle Eastern friend could be a casualty. As the U.S. government has reached a consensus that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is America’s top national security challenge, it has concomitantly evaluated its bilateral relationships through a China lens. Chinese investment in Israel has given American officials grievances that the Trump administration voiced with regularity. Behind those grievances was concern about longstanding defense ties between Washington and Jerusalem. Should the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) buy Israeli ports, build Israeli 5G networks, and secure an even larger economic footprint in the country, America might be forced to rethink its entire security relationship with Israel. Although Jerusalem appears to have gotten Washington’s message, the China variable will strain bilateral ties for the foreseeable future.
This predicament calls for a clear statement of American strategy. A few papers aside, there has been little analysis of what the United States should do—and how it should do it—as regards Chinese influence in Israel. Yet the United States has a deep interest in stopping Israel from falling any further into the PRC’s orbit. Doing so requires mobilizing non-military tools of diplomacy, including some coercive ones, to bring Israel around to the U.S. position. China has become the issue in U.S.-Israel relations—and American policymakers should treat it as such.
AMERICAN FOREIGN policymakers have long seen Israel’s security as important to that of their country—and rightly so. During the Cold War, Israel aligned itself with the U.S.-led order while nearby Middle Eastern states joined the Soviet sphere. Having an anti-communist bulwark in that volatile region was a boon to the United States. This was also true throughout the War on Terror, as Israel played a key role in American counterterrorism efforts. Today, it pays to have the region’s most innovative economy, most powerful military, and most vibrant democracy on our team. Though the Middle East has lost the geopolitical importance it once had, an alliance with Israel very much remains in America’s interest. From assisting with security threats to providing information technology that powers firms in Silicon Valley, Israel has helped America stay safe and prosperous. The two countries have grown so close that President Barack Obama and Netanyahu both called the bond between them “unbreakable” in 2016.
Yet for a relationship so strong, the PRC has been an irritant for so long. In particular, Sino-Israeli defense cooperation has not sat well with Washington. In 2005, Jerusalem nixed the sale of Harpy assault drones to Beijing following a ferocious lobbying campaign by the United States, which considered the Harpy a threat to Taiwan’s security. Around the same time, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated in its annual report that Israel ranked “second only to Russia as a weapons system provider to China and as a conduit for sophisticated military technology.” Israel had similarly backed out of an arms deal with China in 2000 after Washington objected to the proposed sale of the advanced Phalcon radar system. U.S. government officials had worried that sophisticated military hardware might end up in CCP hands as early as 1992, when the George H.W. Bush administration probed whether Beijing had acquired Patriot missile technology from the Israelis. What has perturbed Washington in the past are signs that Israel could be enhancing the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). All this was before China turned into the economic and military giant it is today.
Indeed, Beijing’s new geopolitical clout has given it the leverage to get what it wants from Israel. Jerusalem should take heed of what has befallen Australia, now subject to egregious Chinese tariffs for having the temerity to demand the CCP permit an open investigation into the origins of the coronavirus in Wuhan. Beijing has also notably pressured a group of Muslim nations dependent on Chinese trade into lauding its appalling treatment of the Uighur minority. In light of the gargantuan Belt and Road Initiative, it’s clear the PRC sees economic power as a means of realizing geopolitical ends. Israel should not assume that it won’t run afoul of Beijing or that it will be immune to CCP bullying. But what exactly does China want from Israel?
Undoubtedly China sees considerable value in that country. There, Chinese firms have sought contracts to operate ports, in some cases successfully. Washington has been especially concerned by the fact that a Chinese company recently won a bid to run a port in Haifa, where the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet routinely docks. It is within the realm of possibility that China could one day run all Israeli ports, thereby controlling its shipping lanes in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Suffice to say, Washington would not welcome that outcome.
In addition to infrastructure, China covets technology. The entrepreneurial know-how of the “Start-up Nation” is known the world over, and Beijing would love to acquire whatever proprietary information it can harvest from Israeli companies. Seeing as Chinese intellectual property theft costs the United States as much as $600 billion annually, the CCP has few qualms about stealing from other countries. So far, the PRC has been content to pilfer the trade secrets its Communist economy can’t innovate on its own. That would extend to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which are highly dependent on advanced American hardware like the F-35 fighter and also develop military technology and hold joint military exercises with the United States. If Beijing secures more capability to surveil and infiltrate the Israeli military, then it might not even have to steal American military technology from America directly. Israel could be a channel by which the PLA reaches further parity with the U.S. armed forces. Israel could, unknowingly or not, help China get the edge over its American rival. America cannot allow its military technology to fall into the hands of its chief adversary.
THE PROBLEM is Israel and the United States don’t yet see eye to eye on China. In the 1990s and 2000s, Beijing’s center of gravity—as Carl von Clausewitz would say—was weak since it had little economic or political leverage over Jerusalem. Today, its center of gravity lies in the massive economic ties with Israel the CCP has nurtured. They are the Chinese source of strength in the country. Washington must not lose sight of that center of gravity.
Attacking it does not require employing military power. In fact, using armed force against China or Israel should be off the table because the United States only stands to lose in such a military confrontation. Fortunately, the United States derives much of its formidable national power from non-military sources. Diplomacy is one of them, and, as former defense secretary Robert Gates points out in his book Exercise of Power, has been a remarkably effective tool in U.S. statecraft’s “symphony of power.” That this rousing endorsement comes from a seasoned realist who has devoted his life to advancing U.S. security and prosperity is arresting evidence that diplomacy should be taken seriously. He’s right: the arms sales-related protestations raised by the Bush and Clinton administrations show that Washington can diplomatically extract concessions from Israel on PRC matters.
Irrespective of China, the record shows diplomacy with Israel has done much to advance American objectives on sensitive issues. Take the statesmanship shown by Henry Kissinger while he shuttled between Jerusalem and Arab capitals to negotiate a ceasefire after the Yom Kippur War. Yet in the years since, due to underfunding, American diplomatic power has withered, especially compared to the PRC, which now boasts a world-class diplomatic corps. Retaining and reinvigorating diplomatic engagement with allies like Israel will ensure Beijing can’t step in where Washington has stepped back diplomatically.
Good diplomacy depends on good policymaking at home. To the extent that it isn’t already doing so, the U.S. national security apparatus should make sure that those working on Israel policy, whether in the Department of Defense, Department of State, or the National Security Council, make China a top priority—if not the top priority—and coordinate closely with other officials in different agencies as well as their counterparts in Israel. Everyone needs to be on the same page. As Joe Biden takes the reins, Israel hands will have an opportunity to revamp policy in a way a disjointed Trump administration did not.
Going forward, the U.S. government should complement public pronouncements like Pompeo’s with discreet diplomacy. More closed-door talks between government officials should go on so American and Israeli leaders can discuss the China issue frankly. If the White House readout is to be believed, then China was not a topic of discussion between National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his Israeli counterpart, Meir Ben-Shabbat, when they met in Washington this spring. Another venue the United States should use is Track II diplomacy, which would let non-government actors from both countries weigh in on China. Business executives, think tank experts, and civil-society activists should have a forum in which they can talk about how China has harmed bilateral relations. Moreover, Track II diplomacy gives the U.S. government tools to achieve its policy aims surreptitiously: presumably, the American delegation would try to prod the Israeli one into believing that closer ties with Beijing run contrary to their national interests. After all, any honest appraisal of China’s global economic footprint must conclude that many countries are sacrificing their independence for commercial dependence on Beijing. Track II dialogues would underscore this point. It would behoove Washington to find a university, think tank, or other non-governmental organizations (NGO) willing to sponsor them.
Rather than demanding outright that Israel do no business whatsoever with China, a more practical approach is stressing the many risks of engaging China and how that engagement imperils ties with the United States. Then it will be easier to convince Israel that, at a minimum, it should protect critical infrastructure from Chinese investment and have strong oversight in other sectors. In 2019, Jerusalem decided to create a body to screen foreign investment, but little is known about how it works. American officials should put pressure on their Israeli counterparts to be forthright about its activities as soon as possible. Should Israel get serious about reviewing the Chinese money it lets into the country, U.S. officials will breathe easier.
Accordingly, a long-term goal of the United States must be minimizing Sino-Israeli commercial relations. To the greatest extent possible, Washington should help Israel tap other markets. Foggy Bottom’s Middle East hands should build on the success of the Abraham Accords brokered last summer through outreach to other Arab countries that might normalize ties with Israel. An end to Israel’s regional isolation would allow Israel to transfer some of its economic dependency from China to its Middle Eastern neighbors. With China’s neighbors, however, the greatest potential lies. Muslim nations in Asia could follow the lead of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in normalizing relations—Indonesia, with its nearly 300 million people could be an especially lucrative trading partner for Israel. Elsewhere Washington should encourage Jerusalem to conclude ongoing free trade agreement talks with India and Vietnam, whose economies could produce much of what Israel imports from the PRC. Israel would also be well served to expand economic ties with rich Asian countries like Japan and South Korea that might be eager to buy Israeli high-tech exports that currently go to the PRC. The sooner Israel weans itself off Chinese trade, the better.
COAXING ISRAEL into breaking up with China will be markedly easier if Jerusalem sees that it cannot treat trade as separate from national security. The realization that economics cannot be divorced from national security is one of the few salutary strategic insights the Trump administration has left our country, and Israel should conclude the same. As for the PRC, it hid its geopolitical ambitions while it was poor and traded with a world all too keen to exploit its humongous market. Now other countries, Israel included, must come to terms with the fact that a richer China is a more menacing China. It is revealing that Israeli national security bigwigs like Meir Ben-Shabbat have led the charge in favor of a harder line toward Chinese investment. A country whose former prime minister prides himself on the moniker “Mr. Security” should be especially attuned to the China threat.
Beyond commercial relations, U.S. interests will be most at risk if Sino-Israel military ties grow. For that reason, Washington must relay to Jerusalem in no uncertain terms that America sees as unacceptable its cozying up to the PLA. Israel by now knows that any arms sales to China are out of the question. It needs to get the same message about PLA contacts. In 2011, then-IDF chief of the General Staff Benny Gantz received a Chinese commander with an honor guard at military headquarters in Tel Aviv. The following year, Chinese warships landed at Haifa in advance of meetings on defense cooperation, the press release for which the IDF’s website has tellingly since deleted. Those contacts could be breeding grounds for PLA espionage, from harvesting military technology to surveilling IDF installations. The United States should tell Israel they must end for good.
Yet diplomacy can do only so much. The United States must be prepared to use other tools in its arsenal, such as economic sanctions. In this case, the U.S. government could threaten to impose sanctions on Israeli cabinet officials who have a hand in facilitating Chinese investment, including the minister of the economy, the minister of foreign affairs, and even the prime minister. But a decision to sanction should not be made lightly. On one hand, it’s unlikely the U.S. government could ever muster the political capital to punish Israel given widespread American support for the country. And on the other, imposing sanctions would undoubtedly dent—if not destroy—America’s popularity in Israel. The most drastic tactic would be to sanction Israeli companies that do business with any Chinese firms linked to the CCP (effectively all firms in China). Those sanctions would provide the remedy of dramatically reduced Sino-Israeli economic ties, albeit with the side effect of harming America’s image in Israel and elsewhere. Sanctions might have their place, but they should be used against Israel as a last resort if negotiations cannot extract requisite concessions.
A more immediate instrument within the symphony of power is intelligence. U.S. operatives, especially those stationed in the country, should glean what intelligence they can about not only Chinese machinations in Israel but also the Israeli government’s approach to China. Jerusalem may very well be hiding inconvenient details from Washington about the nature of its dealings with Beijing. Israel hasn’t been wholly honest with us before, most notably in the case of convicted spy Jonathan Pollard, and continues its aggressive intelligence collection on American soil. U.S. operatives in Israel should return the favor. No matter how close two countries are, there are always secrets. Effective intelligence gathering will reduce the likelihood Israel gets away with half-truths, empty promises, and outright lies in diplomatic talks with us.
Independent of hard power, the United States should employ the instrument of ideological persuasion. American principles of freedom, openness, and human rights had a lot to do with our victory in the Cold War and stand in stark contrast to the authoritarian challenge of today. Americans need to let unwitting Israelis know that doing business with Beijing is not the same as doing business with Berlin, Brasilia, or Baku. Whoever trades with China is bankrolling a Communist regime that has no friends and wants none. In 2010, the Chinese foreign minister best articulated Beijing’s worldview in stating, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.” This point must be driven home to the Israelis. The difference between America and a CCP-governed China is an ideological one. One country seeks a world that is open and democratic; the other seeks a world that is closed and un-democratic. America should remind Israel its interests would be far better advanced by the former.
What these material instruments of power don’t necessarily reveal is a less tangible one that the United States should also exploit: its goodwill in Israel. Goodwill is related to the ideological dimension, but not entirely so. Washington should not overlook the fact that 83 percent of Israelis have a favorable image of the United States. Israelis respect and like America. While they’re certainly grateful to have the most powerful country in the world as an ally, they also admire its culture, the warmth of its people, and the American spirit. U.S. officials should remember this when talking to the Israelis. Israel is most grateful for American economic and political support, from the many billions of dollars in military and economic aid Washington has provided over the years to its defense of Israel at the United Nations and other fora, and admires the American way of life. If the United States asks something of the Israelis, they will listen.
However much Israeli affections for America run deep, Washington shouldn’t discount Chinese soft power in the country. A whopping 66 percent of Israelis view China favorably, making Israel one of the most pro-PRC countries in the world. In addition to public opinion, Beijing enjoys growing person-to-person contacts. More and more Chinese tourists come to Israel each year. The same is true of Chinese students enrolling in Israeli universities, many of which have CCP-run Confucius Institutes. China has also been actively courting Israeli civil-society organizations. An Israeli NGO called SIGNAL notably promotes bilateral cooperation and has close ties to the CCP. Chinese officials like the ambassador to Israel have also exploited Israel’s open society to spew propaganda in the press. Though China cannot match U.S. soft power in Israel, we should not deem its influence nil. Israel hands in the U.S. government should monitor the PRC’s growing cultural footprint in the country.
Should all else fail and Israel grow ever more in thrall to China, the United States will have to start making threats. Pompeo’s public warning only scratches the surface. U.S. government officials could tell Israeli counterparts outright that they face a choice between America and China—a choice between a free society that cares about Israeli concerns and a closed one that could not care less about them. As Michael Rubin puts it, Jerusalem can either “support the camp of democracies struggling against an authoritarian resurgence or, through its trade policies, become like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey and seek to profit off autocracies who endanger liberal societies.” Deciding on the latter could incur unpleasant consequences. Washington could threaten to re-negotiate or terminate the U.S.-Israel free trade agreement, stop vetoing anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations, or even put a moratorium on defense cooperation. It would not be in America’s interests to follow through on any of those threats, but making them would give Israel even more of an incentive to ditch China. Despite the hope that things won’t come to this, Washington should be prepared if less coercive tools do not work.
ROBUST DIPLOMATIC engagement of our Israeli friends, coupled with the threat of economic, political, and military repercussions, is the best formula to keep the U.S.-Israel alliance strong and pare back the PRC’s growing influence in Jerusalem. It’s not clear that Jerusalem has let this message sink in. The fact that the Trump administration, probably the most pro-Israel administration ever, voiced its displeasure on multiple occasions with Sino-Israeli ties suggests that the country is dragging its feet when it comes to standing up to China. Washington needs to rally its allies against China. Israel should be among them.
Daniel J. Samet is a Graduate Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, where his research focuses on U.S. policy toward the Middle East.
Image: Reuters.