As images flash across our screens incessantly, and we search for signals in the blizzard of words about what is happening in Ukraine, we remind ourselves that we are members of the audience in a theater of war (and we hope before not too long, peace). On the battlefield, there can be no question about the fact that real bombs and bullets are destroying buildings and killing human beings. (So, we are sure this is not just a sequel to Wag the Dog.) But as the protagonists fight on the battleground and in economic and financial markets, they are at the same time engaged in an intense information war. Each actor attempts to shape the narratives, find images that reinforce its messages, and craft words that stir emotions to sustain the morale of its warriors and citizens. Each is also working to impact the views and actions of governments and publics in the wider world.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s career as a comedian pretending to be president prepared him brilliantly for his current role as a wartime president whose actions and words have made him a true global statesman. As analysts, we also note that he has taken information warfare to the next level. If, as it is often said, Vietnam was the first war to be fought on television, Russia’s war against Ukraine is the first major war to be fought on social media.

As Winston Churchill did in the darkest days of Britain’s defiance of the Nazi Blitz, Zelenskyy is courageously rallying his citizens and soldiers to fight the invaders. He is also showing the world what leadership looks like—persuading nations around the globe to provide both material and moral support. Taking a page from Churchill’s defiance of Adolf Hitler’s onslaught, Zelenskyy intends to hang on for as long as possible—hoping against hope for a miracle on the battlefield or that somehow the United States will come to save his country.

Our hearts go out to the brave Ukrainian fighters and citizens, and we are praying that Vladimir Putin’s invasion fails. Nonetheless, as professional analysts trying to make sense of what we are seeing, we begin by reciting what we most confidently know: namely, the fundamental truths about war that have been learned over centuries of experience. The “fog of war” is dense and thickened by disinformation and propaganda; “truth is the first casualty of war” (since, as Churchill said, combatants must wrap their campaigns in a bodyguard of lies); a Clausewitzian “friction” frustrates perfect plans when they have to be translated into operations; “first reports are always wrong”; and “wars are much easier to start than to end.” These have become clichés because each captures a basic truth about war.

Since these truths have been reflected in every war that we have observed and studied (and that one of us has fought in), we start our analysis each morning by reciting them to ensure we have our feet on a solid foundation as we try to interpret the latest reports. This leaves us with a degree of skepticism about what we are reading, hearing, and seeing from reporters and commentators talking as if they found a way to pierce the fog, unmask the protagonists, and discover what is actually happening. But then we ask ourselves—and each other—ten key questions—and force ourselves to write down our best guesses about the answers.

1. How is the military war going on the battlefield?

We find it more difficult to make confident judgments than most commentators. In essence, we agree with the “senior [Department of Defense] official” quoted in The New York Times this week, who when pressed to give his assessment of the war would only say: “a very dynamic and active battlefield.” While it is clear that Russian ground and air forces have significantly underperformed, and that the defiance of Ukrainian fighters and the population exceeded all expectations, we do not agree with those who have concluded that Russia has “lost” or even that it is “losing” as claimed by a number of prominent American observers. Ukraine’s military deserves high marks for slowing the Russian advance, destroying hundreds of tanks and dozens of airplanes. Nonetheless, when comparing the map of Ukraine at the start of Russia’s invasion on February 24 with today, it is clear that the line of control and the line of conflict have steadily moved west. One-quarter of the Ukrainian population has fled from their homes. Russia now controls twice as much Ukrainian territory as it did when the war began. In our assessment, Russia is currently regrouping and adjusting its strategy for the next phase of the war in which it will rely on more destructive artillery and rocket bombing of cities as it continues to try to grind down Ukrainian opposition.

Some around Putin appear to have been as delusional about a quick, easy victory as U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld was in 2003 when he imagined that U.S. forces would be greeted as “liberators” in Iraq and American troops would be home for Thanksgiving. In contrast to observers who expected a short war, we did not. The Nazi blitzkrieg did not capture Paris until the thirty-ninth day. In Afghanistan, the timelines of war for Americans in 2001 and Russians in 1979 stretch out to thousands of days.

One key variable is the number of Russian combat deaths, which appear to be approaching the number of Americans lost in the eight years of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Nonetheless, history suggests that Russia knows how to absorb losses, contain failures, recover, and find a more effective strategy to achieve the goals it sets for itself. So before joining in the celebrations of Russia’s failure, we remind ourselves that on day forty-two of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush stood under a banner declaring “mission accomplished” and announced the end of major combat operations. In fact, combat continued for another 3,153 days during which more than 150,000 people died.

2. Will Russia transition to an aggressive total war?

Putin’s disappointment with his army’s initial performance, which made efforts to avoid killing civilians, has given way to increasingly aggressive and brutal moves against civilian buildings and infrastructure. Russia is targeting the civilian population: Slavic, Christian, and Russian speaking (whom Putin has claimed are actually Russians). Putin has still not moved to the unlimited destruction he ordered against Grozny in Chechnya or Aleppo in Syria. If Russian losses mount and the stalemate continues for weeks, we consider it likely that Russia will inflict Grozny-type destruction on select Ukrainian cities—starting with Mariupol.

3. When will negotiations end the military campaign?

Successful negotiations require that the parties have overlapping “zones of agreement.” At this stage of the fighting, both sides have fortified their positions and think time is on their side. Russia continues to demand a replacement of the Ukrainian government (“de-nazification”), the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, recognition of Crimea as Russian, recognition of the independence of the Donbas “republics,” and significant changes in NATO deployments in former Warsaw Pact countries. We expect that Putin might drop his “de-nazification” rhetoric, knowing that Zelenskyy is the only Ukrainian leader with enough legitimacy to sell a political agreement to the Ukrainian people that prevents a prolonged insurgency. While Zelenskyy has given up on joining NATO in the foreseeable future and signaled a willingness to accept Ukraine’s neutrality, he insists that he will do this only if he is given rock-solid security guarantees. He has also made it plain that he will not endorse the Donbas or Crimea’s autonomy, sovereignty, or annexation. Thus, until the price of war is perceived as heavier than the price of concessions, it does not seem likely that we will see a cease-fire or concrete negotiations.

Currently, there is no plausible mediator or mediating mechanism. In the theater of peace, we expect to see an increasing number of leaders jumping onto the stage seeking their moment in the limelight. As we have seen already, this will include meetings, phone calls, and statements—all quickly leaked to the press. But from Emmanuel Macron to Naftali Bennett to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and a lengthening list of others, none has a serious prospect of making much difference in ending the war yet. What is needed is a serious mediator who would be able to engage both Putin and Zelenskyy on an equal footing, nudge them to adjust their demands, help them to bridge wide gaps, and even propose an initial framework. Among the contenders for this role so far, Bennett has made more progress than any of the others—though he has limited his role to “mailbox,” not mediator. The individual with the greatest opportunity to play this role is Chinese president Xi Jinping, the only world leader who might be persuasive to Putin. But other than a cosmetic bow, Xi has so far chosen not to do so.

Certainly, negotiations will be multilayered. They will have to include not just the protagonists in the military war, but also the United States and European Union who are waging economic war. Since Putin has now become so indelibly a pariah, we assess that it is unlikely that the bulk of sanctions will be removed so long as it remains Putin’s Russia, thus making the obstacles to a successful agreement that much more formidable.

4. What about Zelenskyy and the future of Ukraine?

A comedian who became a leader at a time when many leaders became clowns, Zelenskyy rightly commands admiration around the world. Nevertheless, if Russia conquers Kyiv, or if Zelenskyy is killed or flees into exile, then it is likely that Moscow will appoint a puppet government in Ukraine.

If Kyiv falls to the Russians, one possible future would be the establishment of a pro-Russian government in the eastern part of Ukraine, while the Zelenskyy government withdraws to Lviv and governs the west of the country. We cannot imagine Zelenskyy or any other Ukrainian successor of a rump state formally accepting Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory. Nonetheless, they might agree to an end of active fighting along a line of control across from which a Russian puppet government rules in the East.

5. If Russia installs a puppet government or annexes part of Ukraine, will a popular resistance develop?

We think yes. As the United States discovered in Afghanistan and Iraq, occupying the capital city and changing the government is the easy chapter in the campaign. Dealing with a resistance movement is complex, costly, and can take years. It is not clear to what extent Russian cruelty and brutality will be effective in suppressing the resistance, even if it is supported by neighboring NATO members. Given the development of Ukrainian national identity in recent years and its success in rising up to defy Putin’s aggression in the past month of combat, it is unlikely that such a puppet regime could gain enough support of the Ukrainian people to suppress an insurgency. Russian forces would thus likely remain in Ukraine.

6. What are the prospects of the war in Ukraine leading to war between NATO and Russia?

A NATO-Russia war remains unlikely. The actions of both the U.S.-led NATO and Russia in the first month of war show clearly that both sides recognize the risks of direct conflict and are making significant efforts to avoid it. NATO countries are sending Ukraine unprecedented numbers of surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank missiles, drones, and other war materiel. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has warned that “any cargo moving into the Ukrainian territory which we would believe is carrying weapons would be fair game,” and Russia’s attack on the Yavoriv military facility 15 miles from the Polish border, which had been receiving and storing arms from NATO countries, underlined the point. Wary of such warnings, the United States and Poland have not sent Poland’s MiG-29s to Ukraine.

NATO’s escalation ladder of potential actions includes: Arming Ukrainian forces with nonlethal materiel, like armor or strategic intelligence; arming Ukrainian forces with lethal materiel, like missiles or tactical targeting intelligence; a small, random incident—perhaps lethal to some Russian forces—that can be contained and isolated; a NATO-enforced No-Fly Zone for limited humanitarian corridors; a NATO-enforced No-Fly Zone over substantial Ukrainian territory; use of NATO airfields for Ukrainian pilots and aircraft attacking Russian forces.

As Zelenskyy pressures NATO to climb this ladder and provide more support, there remain some uncertainties about where Putin will draw the line. Putin certainly does not want war with NATO or the United States. He has exercised great care not to cross the border of NATO countries for fear of such a war. Still, he has attempted to deter Europeans by threatening that their strangling economic measures could force him to resort to a military response. We judge that Putin will not conduct operations against NATO allies in the Baltics in the short or medium terms. After the slow slog in Ukraine, so many Russian casualties, and such a united Western response, we think that Putin is unlikely to pursue ambitions beyond Ukraine in the near future.

7. How is Russia employing its cyber capabilities?

Like others, we have been surprised by the relative lack of Russian strategic cyber operations and electronic warfare against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and command-and-control systems that would complement kinetic operations. From our seats in the theater of war and peace, we observe that Zelenskyy holds live video sessions with the parliaments of Europe, the Knesset, or the U.S. Congress on a near-daily basis. He holds regular evening television broadcasts. He is constantly making head of state phone calls and posting direct appeals in videos on social media. Reportedly, the United States provided Zelenskyy and Foreign Minister Dymtro Kuleba with secure mobile satellite phones to ensure they can safely reach American officials at any time from any place. The Ukrainian military’s command-and-control communications systems appear to be functioning adequately. Where is the previously feared Russian cyber dominance? Whether Russia is withholding this weapon for use against the United States or Europe at a later stage of the war, or whether this is vivid example should lead us to discount prior claims about what cyber can do remains a puzzle for us.

8. How effective are the economic sanctions imposed on Russia?

Putin thought that he could build a sanctions-proof Fortress Russia by amassing $650 billion in offshore reserves. That theory did not work. The scale of the economic assault that the United States and European Union have mobilized and the extent of the damage to the Russian economy and elite have been the biggest surprises for Putin and his team. The effectiveness of sanctions, embargoes, and other instruments of economic warfare are reflected in the fall of the ruble, the collapse of trade in anything but commodities, and the departure of international companies. There is also the long-term geopolitical effect of sanctions that may lead Europeans to reduce their dependence on Russian energy resources and weaken Russian leverage, though in reality, that transition would take many years.

On the other hand, Russia’s economy is complex. As the war has created fears of disruption, the price of oil and gas has spiked. Since the war began, Russia has been receiving more than half a billion dollars daily from its sales of oil and gas. On March 3, it received $720 million from gas sales to Europe alone. Thus, it is difficult to judge how economic pain will influence Putin’s choices. The key question is whether Putin will conclude that the costs of continuing the war so far exceed its benefits such that he will turn to a diplomatic path and accept less than he had demanded. At this point, we think that is unlikely to happen soon.

9. What are the implications for China and Taiwan?

China is the only major power supporting Putin’s war. China has set aside its core foreign policy principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and accepted risks to its economy in order to back its closest partner. This reflects the fact that over the past decade, Xi has built one of the most operationally significant alliances in the world. As detailed in “Will China Have Putin’s Back?,” Russia and China share a common adversary (the United States) and a common objective (to weaken America while building a post-American order). The two nations have built a thick web of cooperation in trade, investments, intelligence, weapons development, military exercises, and diplomacy.

Could Xi now be having second thoughts about the “no limits” partnership with Moscow that the 5,000-word communique that capped the Xi-Putin summit at the opening of the Beijing Olympics declared? Certainly, he and his colleagues have to be thinking about: the underperformance of Russian soldiers, weaponry, and logistics; the rapid and massive response of the “Global West,” including Japan and Australia, that is willing to upend decades of economic, financial, and trade relationships to punish aggression; the beginning of the end for Putin, who will become an isolated pariah regardless of the outcome of the war; the growing domestic disturbances across Russia; the promise of prolonged popular resistance or insurgency in Ukraine even if Russia sacks Kyiv and installs a puppet regime.

On the other hand, if the U.S.-led sanctions and other forms of economic warfare were to prove effective in crippling Russia, China has to fear that it could be the next target. If the West were to succeed in “canceling” Putin, his circle of oligarch supporters, and other Putinistas, China would have to be concerned about its own vulnerabilities to something similar. Thus, at this point, we have seen no concrete evidence to suggest that China is seeking to constrain Russia’s war.

If Russia had achieved a quick victory at low costs, and the West’s response essentially mirrored the sanctions imposed after Crimea, the likelihood of a Chinese move against Taiwan would have increased. Watching the performance of what Putin had advertised as a new modern army with the capacity to “fight and win,” the repeated breakdowns and malfunctions of Russia’s most modern military equipment and logistics, and the ferocity of the U.S.-led Western response, we suspect Beijing is pausing to review its plans for military action against Taiwan.

10. Will Putin go nuclear?

As of this writing, since we believe that Putin still thinks he can achieve his goals on the battlefield, we see any use of nuclear weapons as highly unlikely. If, however, Putin’s only alternative was humiliating defeat, we fear that this could become a live option.

As he sent Russian soldiers to invade Ukraine, Putin ordered his nuclear arsenal to “special combat readiness” and threatened “consequences as you have never experienced in your history.” After seven decades in which no nuclear weapon has been used in war, many today assume that a “nuclear taboo” makes any deliberate use of nuclear weapons unthinkable. We suggest they think again.

A person who did not hesitate to bomb one of his nation’s own cities into rubble could certainly contemplate using low-yield nuclear weapons to destroy a Ukrainian city. Exploring that path, he might even take a page from the U.S. playbook in ending World War II. Putin could consider delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon to destroy one of Ukraine’s small cities, call on Zelenskyy to surrender—and threaten that if he did not, invite him to watch what a Ukrainian Nagasaki looks like.

As the United States and its partners contemplate the road ahead, we urge them to remember the lesson that President John F. Kennedy offered successors as the main takeaway from the Cuban Missile Crisis. In his words: “Above all, while defending our vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”

In conclusion, to return to the fundamental truths about war with which we began, our answers to these core questions remind us of two more truths. Once begun, wars take on a life and momentum of their own. And finally: war is hell.

Graham T. Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is the former director of Harvard’s Belfer Center and the author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?

Amos Yadlin is former Chief of Israel’s Defense Intelligence and a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Image: Reuters.